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Abstract 
Exhaustible resource rents are an important taxable base in many countries, with revenue sharing 
often part of the scheme. In some cases large shares are retained for the central government. 
Generally, the discussions of exhaustible resource taxation consider assignment of resource rent 
tax base and revenue sharing from the limited perspectives of efficiency and stability. Tax 
assignment and sharing arrangements are assumed to have a neutral effect on investment of 
resource rents in long-lived public goods. We attempt to demonstrate that this may not be the 
case, specifically looking at the question of whether rent assignment is neutral to effects on 
investment of rents in long-lived public goods, a normative policy objective, and under what 
conditions it occurs. We test the theoretical propositions with data from the Russian Federation 
to derive empirical results. The results from the Russian Federation point toward an important 
dimension of rent tax assignment in a federation. They results show that ceteris paribus, higher 
share of rent for the federation may lead to lower investment in long-lived public goods and may 
be constrained by stability. Another argument has been made for reconsidering rent tax 
assignment using assertive ethnic identity as a manifestation strong ownership claims. 
Communities with strongly valued identities value ownership over land and exhaustible resource 
endowments in their areas. This may be the case especially if ethnic identity is important to the 
resource owning community. The empirical results show that a decrease in the regional share of 
rent resulted in a fall in investments in the republics and regions with strong ethnic identity. 
Republics among the producing regions have historical claims to a distinct identity and may have 
a preference for preserving their identity. This preference is manifested as higher levels of rent 
investment. Following this line of argument, it can be concluded that rent assignment, through 
rent tax or revenue assignment, should favor producing regions within the range of stability in a 
federation, if the objective is achieving higher investment in long-lived public goods.  
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Chapter 1   Introduction 
 
 Research question and contribution to the literature  
Exhaustible resource rents are an important taxable base in many countries, with revenue 
sharing often part of the scheme. In some cases large shares are retained for the central 
government. Generally, the discussions of exhaustible resource taxation consider assignment of 
resource rent tax base and revenue sharing from the limited perspectives of efficiency and 
stability. Tax assignment and sharing arrangements are assumed to have a neutral effect on 
investment of resource rents in long-lived public goods.
1
 In the discussion we are presenting in 
the following chapters, we attempt to demonstrate that this may not be the case. This research 
specifically looks at the question of whether rent assignment is neutral to effects on investment 
of rents in long-lived public goods, a normative policy objective, and under what conditions it 
occurs. We test the theoretical propositions with data from the Russian Federation to derive 
empirical results.   
This research adds to the literature of exhaustible resource rent assignment by 
demonstrating that assignment and revenue sharing arrangements may not be neutral with respect 
to investment of exhaustible resource rent in long-lived public goods.  It presents a case for 
                                                          
1
 Most discussions do not mention if there would be any effects of assignment of rent taxation on investment choices 
of exhaustible resource rents. For example some of the important discussions of rent taxation make this common 
omission: Dasgupta, Heal and Stiglitz (1981) show taxation affects inter-temporal allocation of exhaustible resource 
through effects on the pace of extraction; McLure and Mieszkowski (1983), present different issues concerning 
efficiency, equity and allocation of rents, treating them only as revenues in the general pool without connecting them 
with assignment of rent taxation; this particular treatment is the main discussion in Boadway and Flatters (1983) in 
the same volume and remains the standard approach; McKenzie (2006) is a discussion of arguments for 
centralization due to efficiency effects of rent revenues; Daubanes (2009) traces the effects of exhaustible resource 
extraction and import on gross domestic product and Boadway and Keen (2010) focus on tax policy, design and 
discussion of tax instruments.   
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enhancing the scope of rent assignment discussions and bringing in rent investment 
considerations into revenue sharing decisions. In this sense, it adds the allocation dimension to 
the earlier assignment question that generally concerns itself with distribution and stability 
concerns. A theoretical model developed in Chapter 2 shows that under commonly faced policy 
choices, rent assignment (and revenue sharing) affect(s) investment of exhaustible resource rent 
in long-lived public goods. The following two chapters, using data on the Regions of Russia 
provide some validation to the theoretical propositions. We show that assignment of rent taxes or 
changes in rent shares may have effects on investment in long-lived public goods—a finding that 
has importance for development policy.  
For good economic reasons, exhaustible resource rents serve as a tax base for efficient 
taxation.
2
 Resource rent revenues lead to different expenditure choices regarding current and 
capital spending. For both tax and expenditure efficiency, a framework will be required that links 
both the revenue and expenditure sides of policy choices. Within this framework, rent tax 
assignment and revenue sharing will be considered and different options may be linked to certain 
expenditure choices.  In the following chapters, a case is laid out in a federal setting where 
assignment of tax on exhaustible resource rents and revenue sharing are made in such a 
framework, and under certain circumstances, have effects on investment choices. A majority of 
discussions about resource rent taxation have concerned themselves with macroeconomic 
stabilization and redistribution objectives.
3
 This discussion attempts to add to the literature on the 
subject by focusing on the allocation effects of rent taxation as it distills the effects of assignment 
and sharing arrangements on public investment. In this sense, the discussion builds a case for the 
                                                          
2
 These reasons, for example, are laid out in McKenzie (2006).  
3
 Musgrave‘s trilogy of government functions is a used as a baseline consideration for tax assignment also. See for 
instance McLure and Martinez-Vazquez (2001). The discussion presented in the following chapters mostly takes up 
the resource allocation arguments.  
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pursuit of development policy
4
 through an analysis of assignment of exhaustible resource rent 
tax and revenue sharing.  
In this introductory chapter, we have dealt with a description of key basic assumptions 
and concepts that are used later on. At the same time we have attempted to provide definitional 
clarity for some terms. More specifically, the concept of rent is recounted along with various 
types of resource rent taxes. The assignment question and its various arguments are briefly 
discussed. Then the importance of investment of exhaustible resource rents is highlighted before 
priming the discussion for the theoretical and empirical considerations.  
 
 Resource rent and resource rent taxes 
Exhaustible resource rent is an important fiscal item in many federations. Rent collection 
and sharing therefore commonly crop up as important issues in intergovernmental relations. 
Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, India, Iraq, Mexico, Nigeria, Pakistan, Russia, United Arab 
Emirates, United States and Venezuela are among the major federations of the world. All of 
them produce oil, gas and other minerals in quantities that are significant quantities. For 
example, oil extraction is an important sector in the gross domestic product in a number of 
federations.
5
 Reserves are endowed in some regions only. As a result, rent tax collection and 
revenue sharing are important considerations for the national or subnational fiscal policy.  
Among the federations, Iraq has a major dependence on oil production as it contributes 
54 percent of GDP. Nigeria, another major federation, gets nearly 40 percent of GDP from oil. In 
the United Arab Emirates, the contribution of oil to GDP is greater than 20 percent of GDP. In 
                                                          
4
 For a detailed discussion of this concept, see Bahl (1999).  
5
 The percentages listed here were calculated by first computing the value of oil and gas produced by multiplying 
production with average weighted world price of crude oil and gas; the monthly production of oil and gas and 
monthly world weighted prices from Oil and Gas Journal database were used. GDP at current US$ from WDI 2008 
as reported for each country were used for the calculations. 
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case of Venezuela, oil accounts for 20 percent of GDP closely followed by the Russian 
Federation with around 17 percent of contribution to GDP coming from the oil sector. For 
Mexico, another important federation, the contribution to GDP from oil and gas is around 5 
percent.
6
 A more precise measure of the significance of the petroleum sector to government is 
the share of rent tax revenue as a percentage of total revenue. Again, in a number of federal 
countries
7
 oil and gas rent tax revenues appear as important items in the tally for total revenue. In 
Australia, at 2.9 percent of total government revenue, it is noticeable. In Pakistan, at 8.4 percent 
of total tax revenue, it is significant enough to create long drawn out political conflict between 
producing provinces and federal government. In the United Arab Emirates, with nearly 75 
percent of total revenue, petroleum becomes the mainstay of the fiscal regime. To a lesser 
degree, in Venezuela with half of government revenue coming from this sector, it again becomes 
the main source of revenue. In the largest federation, Russia, it accounts for 36.7 percent of total 
revenue signifying that rent taxes make a major contribution to government operations.  
Before entering upon the discussion of neutrality or otherwise of assignment of rent tax 
and revenue sharing arrangements, it is important to clarify a few connected concepts. The two 
foremost issues are what a resource rent is and what taxes could be classified as resource rent 
taxes. Exhaustible resource rent is defined as the sum of sales revenue and extraction costs, 
computed over a unit of the extracted resource (Dasgupta & Heal, 1979). It can be understood as 
partly a Ricardian rent and partly a Hotelling rent.
8
 Whereas the first component of this rent is a 
                                                          
6
 Calculated from Government of Mexico‘s Sistema de Cuentas Nacionales de México. Cuentas de bienes y 
servicios 2005-2009. Año base 2003. Primera version, Table 51,page 117. 
7
 The percentages are based on the sources listed under Table 4.3 in Chapter 4. 
8
 The term is due to the seminal work on exhaustible resources by Hotelling (1931). The efficient extraction path is 
delineated according to Hotelling‘s rule where the price of the extracted resource grows at a rate equal to that of rate 
of interest (Devarajan & Fischer, 1981).   
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fairly well established concept,
9
 Hotelling rent is a term used to refer to the fact that extraction of 
a finite stock is only rational if the value of extracted amount is higher than the net present value 
of the same amount if left unextracted.
10
 Resource rents taxes attempt to reach this base and 
siphon it away for the general use of the society.  
If economic rent can be computed for a unit of extracted resource, for the purposes of 
taxation this represents a base upon which an efficient tax could be levied. Since the rent is an 
economic profit, it accrues due to scarcity of the resource. Rent signifies the willingness of the 
production process to pay for the use of the extracted resource. The resource is used up in the 
process and is lost forever. Rent is the one-time value paid for this single use to the owner. A tax 
rate that equals the amount of rent remains efficient.
11
 A resource rent tax levied at an efficient 
level will have no influence on investment, types of investment, labor-capital ratio, choice of 
technology, pace of extraction, mine closure and final disposition of extracted stocks.
12
 In 
practice, neither the price of extracted resource nor the costs remain stable over time. When 
combined with the complexity of mining operations spread over several mines, each with 
differential costs, it means that rents may vary between mines and over time. The conceptual 
clarity of rents is not equally replicable in its practical calculations.  
Although not central to the analysis presented in the following chapters, reiteration of the 
tax efficiency and whether it would be affected by the assignment decision is important as a 
benchmark of reference. Assuming that there is no information asymmetry, government can 
design and collect an efficient resource rent tax. It is not necessary that a single instrument 
                                                          
9
 Economic rent is typically defined as the excess proceeds in a production process given to a factor, above the 
amount required to draw the factor into the process or to sustain the use of the factor (Shepherd, 1970).  
10
 Otto et al. (2006) present a discussion of economic rent accruing to mineral extraction.  
11
 Theoretical discussions of neutrality and some design issues of resource rent tax are represented in Garnaut and 
Ross (1979) and Fraser (1993).  
12
 Gamponia and Mendelsohn (1985) show the incidence of different taxes on the owners.  
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should be employed to siphon away rents. Different levels of government can share the base. As 
long as the multiple instruments collect all the economic rent that is there and there are no 
administrative costs associated with multiplicity of instruments, taxation will remain efficient. 
For the most part in my discussion, we maintain these assumptions that resource rent taxes being 
modeled in the analytical framework are efficient.
13
 The same assumption extends to the case of 
multiple tax instruments, all delving into the same base. Later in the analysis, for the sake of 
expositional simplicity a single tax is employed in the model.  
In practice, a number of taxes are used to tax exhaustible resource rents. A World Bank 
study enumerates these taxes under two categories (Otto et al., 2006). The first category 
comprises the in rem taxes and includes unit based royalty, ad valorem royalty, sales and excise 
tax, property tax, export duty, withholding on remitted loan interest, withholding on imported 
services, value added tax, registration fee, rent or usage fee and stamp duty.
14
 The second 
category is made up by in personam taxes. Corporate income tax, capital gains tax (levied only 
in developing countries), additional profits tax (rarely used), net profits royalty or net value 
royalty and withholding on remitted profits or dividends. The in rem taxes do not clearly aim for 
the economic rents accruing to extracted resources. Only where tax systems lack adequate 
capacity, unit based or ad valorem royalty could be arguably a crude means of siphoning parts of 
rent to the government.
15
 On the other hand, in personam taxes are levied on profits and they are 
adequate to siphon away economic rents. Corporate income tax, levied at a higher than normal 
rate, siphons away economic profits from mining operations to the government. In general 
royalty is paid regardless of the profits of the operation. In some cases, a mineral tax may be 
                                                          
13
 In practice, if an operational measure cannot be found, the tax may not be efficient. 
14
 The lists of the two categories of taxes are derived from Otto et al. (2006), Table 2.2, p.32.  
15
 For a description of this case see Hogan and Goldsworthy (2010), p.140.  
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named differently but in essence it is a net profits royalty.
16
 These are two examples of pure rent 
taxes. Disregarding the complexity of computing rent or pure economic profits for mining 
operations that may be spread over several jurisdictions or countries, corporate income tax is 
used to tax rents. If the rate is the same across all sectors, then it does not become a rent tax. But 
in countries where the tax code legislates special (often higher) tax rates for the mineral sector, it 
becomes partly a rent tax. For example, in Malaysia and Venezuela the corporate income tax for 
the oil sector is higher than other sectors. Other commonly used instruments are license fees 
(Brazil), bonus bids (Canada) and export levies (Argentina, the Russian Federation). Local 
governments may levy a special rate property tax. The special component of the rate allows them 
to retrieve some of the rent whereas the general component of the rate is designed as the normal 
property tax payment for use of local services, following the benefits principle.  
Without going into further details of tax instruments and their relative merits, we want to 
focus on the effects of base assignment and revenue sharing arrangements on investment in long-
lived public goods—the topic of my analytic endeavor. Therefore, for the remaining discussion, 
we abstract from reference to individual tax instruments unless specifically required. Instead we 
use the term resource rent tax which embodies the taxes levied to siphon away economic rents 
accruing to extraction of exhaustible resources. This term is also useful as it captures an essential 
feature of exhaustible resources namely, the finite stocks and one time rents that can accrue to 
producing jurisdictions. Before leaving the discussion of individual tax instruments, we present a 
short aside on royalties to clarify the extent to which they could be counted under a resource rent 
tax.  
Royalties are a common tax instrument levied in most countries with significant mining 
operations. It is a tax specific to natural resources. Two aspects of natural resource royalty can be 
                                                          
16
 The Mineral Extraction Tax in the Russian Federation is a royalty which is levied on a notional net value.  
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brought up to clarify the nature of this levy. The first one relates to the nature of the levy. It is 
defined as a payment for resource ownership. In this sense royalty has a legal status not 
necessarily very significant for fiscal policy.
17
 It can be charged only by the owners and payment 
recognizes resource ownership. Royalty is paid in lieu of transfer of property rights of the 
mineral from the endowment owner to the firm carrying out the mining operation. The second 
aspect of royalty is not equally clear. It is levied on the base, the resource rent, but in some cases 
without specifically claiming the levy to be a resource rent tax.
18
 The general practice of setting 
royalty rates is also a manifestation of this approach. In many cases, an arbitrary rate is set which 
remains fixed over long periods of time.
19
 The rate is sufficiently low to keep it below the upper 
bound of rent assessment. Resource rents vary with production methods, commodity prices and 
cost of mining. Royalty collects a known fraction of the value of production without the 
necessity of calculating resource rents for individual mining operations.
20
 Beyond this feature of 
royalty it is but another instrument for collection of part of the resource rents.
21
 In some cases, no 
explicit royalty is collected but another tax assumes the same role. A good example of this kind 
of tax is the Mineral Extraction Tax in the Russian Federation. It is levied at a uniform rate 
across all mines with varying exemptions and depreciation allowances.  
 
                                                          
17
 Sometimes a distinction for royalty has been made as an interest free of production expense; see for example 
Maxwell (1954, 1995) with reference to the United States. A recent account of mineral royalties with international 
cases has been provided in Otto et al. (2006).  
18
 Otto et al. (2006), p.50,  provide a detailed definition of royalty as ‗[a] royalty is any tax that exhibits one or more 
of the following attributes: the law creating the tax calls that tax a royalty; the intent of the tax is to make a payment 
to the owner of the mineral as compensation for transferring to the taxpayer the ownership of the mineral or the right 
to sell that mineral; the intent of the tax is to charge the producer of the mineral for the right to mine the mineral 
produced; the tax is special to mines and is not imposed on other industries.‘  
19
 South Africa has recently introduced a variable royalty regime, changeable with commodity prices that will be 
levied on the base of sales revenue (Cawood, 2010).  
20
 This would be true for unit based and ad valorem type royalties only if they are the only instruments collecting a 
notional value of rent which is not clearly defined.  
21
 Where a royalty is a gross receipt tax, it resembles a general sales tax and appears to be royalty in name only.  
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 Assignment of resource rent tax and revenue sharing 
The general question of assignment of rent tax base and revenue sharing is relevant under 
any tax assignment scheme.
22
 The clearest case of assignment of resource rents would be through 
assignment of resource rent as a tax base to a certain level of government. In other cases, it could 
take place through a sharing of the tax base, where different levels of government levy their own 
taxes. Revenue sharing on derivation basis may also be part of the assignment scheme. Assuming 
that resource rent taxes are levied at an efficient level and the same shares apply, base and 
revenue sharing may achieve the same outcomes for the producing regions because both schemes 
will result in the same amount of revenue with the producing regions. In practice, the shares of 
exhaustible resource rent provided under revenue sharing, belonging to producing regions and 
the rest of the country, may or may not be the same as base sharing. Tax assignment may give a 
higher share to the centre but impose a derivation based high share in revenues for the producing 
regions. On the other hand, if the country has not legislated revenue sharing arrangements, shares 
in the base will determine the revenue shares of different levels of government. In this case, the 
rent assignment will take place through base sharing. If there is efficient central taxation, the 
only efficiency important at the subnational level is on the expenditure side. Therefore, the 
discussion in the following chapters posits the rent tax assignment question allowing for different 
types of tax and revenue sharing arrangements to operate under it. For the purposes of the 
following chapters, ‗rent assignment‘ means the final shares of producing regions against the rest 
of the country, derived from base sharing and/or revenue sharing arrangements.  
 
                                                          
22
 McLure (2003), p.205, provides five alternatives as ‗forms of revenue assignment‘ for oil tax revenues.    
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 Main arguments in favor of central assignment of rent taxes  
and revenue shares 
 
The non-neutrality of rent assignment, if authenticated, implicitly raises a question about 
the balance of arguments in favor of centralization. Therefore, it will be useful to briefly recount 
these arguments here. Efficiency of rent collection arrangements is an important consideration in 
tax policy. It allows governments to avoid creating deleterious effects of taxation on investment 
decisions, pace of extraction, type of methods used to extract resources, processing choices and 
final usage. Rent tax assignment choices are considered under the efficiency framework. A 
considerable quantum of research has been devoted to elaborating conditions under which tax 
efficiency operates.
23
 This literature deals with the difficulties of computing rent and variations 
in rent amounts over time.
24
 International commodity prices are known to fluctuate. At the same 
time, production processes undergo technological changes, in turn affecting production costs. All 
this makes computing rents complex requiring high levels of capacity at various levels of 
government. Generally, it is assumed, sometimes with weak justifications, that central levels of 
government have higher capacity. This argument alone sways the assignment question, when it 
comes to exhaustible resource rents, in favor of centralization although even here we may get 
inefficient taxes. The need to employ efficient taxation in this way leads to arguments for 
centralization of rent taxes.  
                                                          
23
 For example, see Boadway and Flatters (1993), Daniel, Keen and McPherson (2010). 
24
 Most countries use various methods to arrive at a plausible and agreed amount of rent that is to be siphoned away 
for the common good of the society. Recent dispute over mineral rent tax rate in Australia is a manifestation of the 
difficulty of setting the exact size of the base even in developed economies (Novak, 2010). In developing nations, 
the size of the rent in mining operations is often difficult to work out due to specific conditions of the mining 
operations (Hossain, 2003). Concessions may be offered to attract investment (Otto, 2000). Generally, once the base 
is known there is little argument for setting a rate that is less than hundred percent
24
.  
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Without necessarily deprecating the merits of these arguments, it is easy to say that such 
argumentation could only justify administrative centralization, without overshadowing the 
domain of revenue sharing. The producing regions could still receive derivation based shares 
from centrally administered resource rent taxes. Even if there are incontrovertible arguments in 
favor of centrally administered resource rent taxes, they by no means can preclude subnational 
sharing of revenues. The discussion in the following chapters therefore eschews these arguments 
entirely and focuses on the effects of rent assignment on a less studied area, namely public 
investment of resource rents.  
Another set of three issues commonly raised in connection with rent taxation pertains to 
the potential effects of rent revenue on the economy. First issue is the injection of revenues 
derived from resource rents gathered in the producing regions that lower the tax price of public 
services provided in their jurisdictions. The tax price change induces labor migration due to 
differences in net fiscal benefits between producing and non-producing regions. It is argued that 
this is an inefficient outcome. To prevent such labor migration, exhaustible resource rents should 
be spread over a country as much as possible, it is argued. This argument seemingly combines 
allocation and distribution choices. Another related issue works at all levels of government. 
Resource rents may cause exchange rate effects and crowding out of other sectors in the 
economy. Macroeconomic effects may require stabilization, which lies in the functional purview 
of the central government. Thirdly, fluctuations in commodity prices create unpredictability in 
rent revenues.
25
 Rent based revenues are pro-cyclical exposing subnational governments to fiscal 
pressures during economic downturns. Subnational governments, when they have a legally 
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 Boadway and Keen (2010), Figure 2.1, have documented fluctuations in real prices of crude oil, copper and 
uranium between 1966 and 2007, showing large swings without any pattern.  
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constrained access to credit markets, have a lower capacity than central governments to absorb 
the effects of revenue fluctuations (Norregaard, 1997).  
All three issues, it is argued, point toward centralization of rent. These arguments are 
stronger than the efficiency considerations because their effects go beyond tax administration. In 
addition to assignment of rent taxes to the center, on the basis of these arguments, producing 
regions can be deprived of high shares in revenue also. While recognizing these arguments, it 
suffices to say here that none of them makes a water tight case for complete centralization of 
exhaustible resource rents. Arrangements at subnational levels, such as savings funds, 
endowment facilities or fiscal rules, may provide answers that are possible at the central level.
26
 
The following chapters do not attempt to address these options in order to focus on a relatively 
less studied issue in rent assignment, namely the effects of rent assignment on public investment.  
 
 Resource rent and concern for long run productivity 
Exhaustible natural resources present some unique issues for policy formulation. They 
are further rendered interesting when viewed in a federal context. Theory argues for a wider 
sharing of rents in a society (Dasgupta & Heal, 1979; McKenzie, 2006), but it does not clearly 
spell out whether this sharing should be at the regional level or at the national level. The 
ownership question assumes significance when it comes to sharing of resource rents. This is 
partly due to the nature of the resource rents. Exhaustible resources are irreplaceable engendering 
strong ownership claims. They cannot be regenerated in timescales relevant to human planning 
cycles. With an exhaustible resource, ‗the intertemporal sum of the services provided by a given 
stock of the resource is finite‘ (Dasgupta, 1984, p. 153). Exhaustible natural resources are 
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 In the United States for example, five states have large savings funds (Richardson, 1999).  
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generally endowed unequally to certain regions.
27
 Many times their ownership is claimed by the 
society as a whole. Economic theory presents arguments in favor of this treatment arguing that 
since exhaustible resources generate rents and the tax cannot be shifted,
28
 their community 
ownership is more efficient over individual ownership. The efficiency argument is based on the 
distortionary effects of rent on economic agents. It will be inefficient to leave these rents to be 
exploited by private individuals. Taxation of rents to the point of their exhaustion and then 
utilization of revenue for the general community weal is a practical mechanism for community 
ownership.  
This provides a measure of equity within society, at the same time ensuring that 
economic distortion is minimized. However, what is not clear is what constitutes a community 
for the purposes of sharing of resources. In practice this question is not clearly answered. 
Community could arbitrarily comprise individuals living within the geographic confines of 
country or a subnational region. It could be all individuals of such a set currently alive or also 
include any number of future generations. A cursory observation of the way nations are carved 
up shows that communities for the purpose of sharing of exhaustible resource rents varies very 
much in size, nature, constitution and timeliness. Economic theory for the purposes of rent 
assignment does not attempt to create another definition but takes politically constituted 
communities as given.  
Rent assignment discussions therefore do not address community ownership of rents and 
its effects on expenditure choices. Even if efficient taxation is employed and macroeconomic 
instability is addressed through fiscal rules, expenditure choices for accumulating resource rents 
are important to development and growth in the economy. As discussed below, unlike other 
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 The same may hold for renewable natural resources.  
28
 For a classical account of the arguments, see Kitrell (1957). For a recent discussion see Rothman (2000).  
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forms of taxation, rent tax combined with appropriate expenditure choices, can be an instrument 
for development and long term sustainability of productivity. Implicitly, rent assignment based 
on the arguments recounted above, assumes that expenditure preferences are the same across 
jurisdictions in a country. More specifically, it assumes that producing regions and communities 
asserting ownership to exhaustible resource endowments have the same rent investment 
preferences as other communities in a nation. These assumptions are not plausible. The 
discussion in the following chapters addresses this discrepancy in the rent assignment question. It 
connects rent assignment with expenditure choices, employing a policy framework, and allows 
for differences in preferences for rent investment among regions.  
An argument for linking rent assignment to expenditure choices is made from the 
perspective of development and growth. Finite resources extracted from endowments are used as 
inputs in the current production processes. They sustain current levels of consumption. Resource 
rent is collected by government and can be invested or consumed. Once the stocks decline or are 
exhausted, the productivity of the economy will be adversely affected. Decline of stocks can 
mean declining levels of consumption and welfare in this situation. If rent is consumed, the 
productivity and consumption level become low as stocks approach zero. However, if rent is 
invested in producible capital, it will sustain current levels of production.
29
 This policy choice is 
referred to as the Hartwick Rule (Hartwick, 1977). More specifically, all the rent from 
exhaustible resource should be invested in producible capital to preserve current levels of 
productivity and consumption. This principle is the normative outcome for policy choices in 
most of the following discussion.  
                                                          
29
 This is different from other taxes as the base for such taxes is not exhaustible. Taxes may distort economic 
behavior but they can be harvested in perpetuity as long as the transactions or incomes are there.  
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A related concept, genuine savings or genuine growth, attempts to take exhaustible 
resource decline and environmental damages into consideration. In this discussion, the issue of 
rent assignment is being analyzed assuming that the notions of the Hartwick Rule and genuine 
national savings indicate an interest in seeking optimal rent investment namely a level of 
investment that sustains productivity of the economy.  Exhaustible natural resources are an 
endowment but by their nature the stocks deplete regularly with extraction. This means that their 
extraction is carried on over a finite period of time. Extraction does two things: it makes an input 
available to the production of goods and services within the economy and it also deprives future 
generations of an input in the production process. It also reduces the opportunity to collect rents 
in the future. If the rent is consumed by the current generation, it enhances their welfare 
measured in consumption terms, but it potentially reduces the welfare of the future generations. 
The Hartwick Rule is a theoretical concept which describes that under certain conditions 
intergenerational equity can be guaranteed even when exhaustible natural resources are 
extracted. These conditions include constant returns to scale production, stable population and no 
technological progress. It states that if rents from exhaustible natural resources are invested in 
long term replaceable capital, then there is no change in the intergenerational welfare (Hartwick 
1977). According to the Hartwick Rule 
∆ k = - y(t) 
Where ∆ k is the change in capital in time t and y(t) is the amount of resource extracted in 
the same time period. The rule means that the all the resource rent should be invested in 
producing new physical capital. If this condition is met then consumption remains unchanged 
over all time periods.  
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The intergenerational distribution of benefits within the federal arrangement of 
government is complex. Relying on the Hartwick Rule, we would argue that the 
intergenerational assignment of benefits is a function of extraction rate, distribution of ownership 
and the type of investments or consumption generated by the rental income. Exhaustible natural 
resource is available, by definition, in some time periods only. Its availability to production 
immediately creates an intergenerational equity question. If it is available to individuals living in 
the prior time period only, then it is their endowment and has a wealth and income effect during 
it. The consumption level of the individuals in the prior time period will be significantly 
improved, depending upon the size of the endowment and cost of extraction. Going by a 
utilitarian perspective, the intergenerational equity question is not significant. In the later time 
period, when the resource has been exhausted, individuals will not have any endowment to rely 
on. There should be a negative of the income and wealth effects in operation, reducing their 
consumption levels. As long the sum of generational welfare has increased, which generation 
benefited the most is unimportant. But applying Rawls principle, if we assume that no individual 
before the start of time knows if he will belong to the prior generation or the later one, then he 
will only choose an intertemporal distribution of the endowment such that his consumption stays 
the same in either time period. To achieve a no envy result, some distribution principle is 
required.  
Hartwick (1977) suggests that this can be achieved if the royalty from the exhaustible 
natural resource is invested in reproducible capital. In the first time period when the resource is 
extracted all the rents should be invested in production of reproducible capital which leads to a 
higher level of consumption for the individuals in that time period. In the second time period, 
only a higher stock of reproducible capital is available. This becomes an endowment for the 
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second generation and ensures that their consumption level, measured in present value terms, 
does not change below that of individuals in the preceding time period. The same principle has 
been endorsed by Solow (1986) when he suggests that as a rule, efficiency and equity both can 
be achieved if the rents from exhaustible natural resources are invested in capital formation. A 
nice implication of the Hartwick Rule and Solow‘s discussion is that equity does not need to be 
considered separately. As long as efficiency is achieved and the Hartwick Rules is followed, 
equity follows. In other words, an exhaustible resource is also part of the capital available for 
production. As long the capital available for all time periods is the same, given no increase in 
population or change in technology, it does not matter whether a natural resource or reproducible 
capital forms the stock of capital in a certain time period.  
Intergenerational equity is a one way concept, where the earlier generation can take 
actions to improve the later generation‘s welfare. But the other way round is not possible due to 
one way flow of actions (Rawls, 1971). There are various views of maximizing intergenerational 
equity, ranging from the utilitarian to the Rawlsian. The Rawlsian max-min social welfare 
function would ensure that the welfare of the poorest generation is maximized (Solow, 1974). 
There are apparent problems with both the views. But Hartwick Rule by comparison offers a 
simpler criterion. An simple analysis of rent sharing and welfare consequences is presented in 
Appendix A.1.  
 
 The following chapters 
In the following three chapters, this simple framework is expanded to take into account 
differences in preferences, tax base endowments and sharing of exhaustible resource tax base. 
Chapter 2 begins with a discussion of the value of long-lived public goods to economic 
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development and growth. This is later used as a policy device to set up the theoretical model for 
rent tax assignment in a federal country. The theoretical model presents a general case in a two-
region federation where regions vary in tax base endowments and preferences for long-lived 
public goods. After the discussion of the general case, additional cases are presented to discuss 
intergovernmental grants, differences in tax base endowments (general measures of regional 
wealth) and other subnational taxes. The results yield hypotheses that can be empirically tested. 
The government while allocating fiscal resources makes a fundamental choice, how much to 
allocate to investment in public capital out of the total expenditure. The ratio between investment 
and total expenditure is kept a certain level as governments seek to provide higher current 
expenditures to their populations. The increase in long-lived public goods is another objective 
that the governments pursue while attempting to keep current expenditures at a certain desirable 
level. The theoretical model attempts to explain the effect of reduction in subnational share of 
resource rents in this context. After presenting the model we then use six cases to characterize 
different situations in the world federations. 
 In Chapter 3 an empirical model is developed to test the implications of the theoretical 
model. The hypothesis in Chapter 2 predicts that an increase in the federal share of rent at the 
expense of producing regions leads to a decline in investment in long-lived public goods. Such a 
policy change namely an increase in federal share of rent, has been mapped in the Russian 
Federation from 2002 to 2007. This experience offers a quasi natural experiment for empirical 
evaluation of the effects of the policy change on investment in long-lived public goods. A panel 
data of regions of Russia from 2000 to 2008 is used to test the theoretical results from the first 
paper. The summary statistics presented are normalized to assess application of program 
evaluation methods. The empirical models are discussed in the paper to lay out the assumptions 
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maintained on the model. Before testing for the effect of changes in resource rent revenue shares 
of regions, we have identified some determinants of new investment in fixed public capital in the 
regions of Russia. The variables that have a significant effect on new investment in fixed public 
capital in the regions of Russia are used as controls for the subsequent estimations. Using 
program evaluation methods, we employ two types of difference-in-differences estimators to 
study the effect of changes in the regional share of rent revenue on new investment in fixed 
public capital. The first set of estimators estimates the effect on new investment in fixed public 
capital separately for each post treatment year. The second type of estimator estimates the effect 
on new investment in fixed public capital for all the entire post treatment time period. The 
robustness of the results from the difference-in-differences estimators are then checked using two 
additional methods. First we estimate the effects using bias corrected matching estimator. The 
results corroborate the general findings obtained from the difference-in-differences estimation. 
Then, we use a propensity score matching to test the validity of the estimated effects. Again we 
find that the results are generally the same as obtained from difference-in-differences estimation.  
Chapter 4 offers some world examples of rent assignment and provides evidence that 
identity based ownership of resource rents may not be neutral to rent assignment. There we 
provide a brief review of the resource rent tax assignment in the major federations. The 
variations in the treatment are discussed. We also provide examples on rent tax instruments 
employed in these countries at different levels and conclude that resource rent tax assignment 
should not be left to the general assignment problem but should be given a special consideration. 
Using data from the Russian Federation we use a difference-in-difference-in-differences 
estimator to find out the differential effects of increases in the federal share of resource rent at 
the expense of regions. The differential effect is mapped out for producing regions and 
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producing republics. The results show that the new investment in public capital in the republics 
with claims to ethnic identity declines more than it does in the other producing regions. Using 
the percentage of ethnic Russian population in the total population we find that a higher 
percentage of ethnic Russians in the population increases the investment in new fixed public 
capital. The conclusion makes a case for enhancing the scope of issues that should be considered 
for rent assignment.  
Chapter 5 is a brief narration of the most important results obtained and it concludes the 
discussion. It argues for widening the scope of rent assignment discussions and recounts some of 
the reasons from earlier chapters in favor of subnational rights in exhaustible resource rents.  
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Chapter 2 A Theoretical Model for Exhaustible Resource Rent Assignment 
 
Introduction  
In this chapter we are presenting a model to analyze the effects of assignment of rent tax 
levied on an exhaustible resource and revenue sharing on investment in long-lived public goods. 
It is predicated on the main argument that rent tax assignment and rent revenue sharing are not 
neutral in terms of effects on investment in long-lived public goods. Producing regions may 
differ from non-producing jurisdictions in their preference for public infrastructure and other 
long-lived public goods. Such differences, if present among the two types of regions, render rent 
assignment non-neutral to rent allocation. In general such differences are not studied. The model 
that is laid out later in this chapter attempts to take differences in preferences into account and 
maps them out on rent allocation. The rent assignment is characterized by a change in the shares 
between federal and subnational governments. Tax base and revenue sharing are assumed to be 
equivalent to simplify the model. The theoretical discussion presents first a general case, 
modeling a federation with differential tax base endowments. Then it sets out variations on the 
general model by bringing in the role of intergovernmental transfers and differences in regional 
level preferences for long-lived public goods. The differences in preferences are allowed but not 
necessarily invoked as assumptions. They become relevant to some results.  
The assignment of rent tax in multi-tiered government has not been discussed from this 
perspective. In order to focus on the effects of assignment on investment in public goods, we 
abstract away from the tax design issues and present an approach that integrates tax assignment 
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and expenditure allocation. To lay out this approach the following narrative alludes to several 
issues that are germane to the discussion, focusing on a normative connection between 
exhaustible resource rent and investment in long-lived public goods, efficiency and equity as 
relates to use of exhaustible resources and the world federations endowed with asymmetric 
exhaustible resource endowments. These allusions at the outset allow me to characterize the 
model with its attendant arguments.   
Rent tax in general is an instrument for siphoning away economic rents from exhaustible 
resource extraction to the general benefit of the economy, endorsed in theory for the efficiency 
gains it provides to the society.
30
 As long as the tax instrument scoops up all of it, neither leaving 
any economic rent in the hands of mineral extracting private companies nor expropriating more 
than can be counted as the actual rent, it is efficient, providing a rare tool to policy makers. 
Discussions aiming to hone tax instruments that meet this surgical precision have been recorded 
from the points of view of feasibility of administration.
31
 Some other concerns are computation 
of profits with fluctuating commodity prices (Bahl & Bird, 2008). We do not pursue these 
discussions any further here, assuming that design and implementation of such taxation is 
feasible.
32
 Instead we are focusing on the outcomes of rent taxation in a federal setting.
33
 In 
doing so we are attempting to answer a question, as laid out above, that is important both from 
efficiency and equity perspectives: even if a rent tax is efficiently levied and administered, the 
                                                          
30
 Boadway and Flatters (1993) reiterate the generally held views that resource rent taxes are non-distortionary and 
allow a distribution of rents over all members of a society; Dasgupta, Heal and Stiglitz (1980) present a discussion 
of tax instruments with reference to their effects on depletion rates; Bergstrom (1982) argued that an excise tax on 
oil rents can efficiently capture rents. Similarly, Otto (2000) reiterates the theoretical certitude and in addition 
provides a description of rent tax instruments in developing countries.  
31
 Land (1995) gives a detailed treatment of progressive profit taxation of mineral resources. A discussion of tax 
instruments and their assignment in federal settings is presented in McKenzie (2006). Table 9.1 shows, using 
examples from 23 countries, that various types of taxes have been assigned among three tiers of government. 
32
 For a discussion of mining tax decentralization in a multi-tiered government, see Otto (2001).  
33
 I do not distinguish between royalties and natural resource taxes in my characterization of rent tax as essentially 
both are effectively taxing economic rent; Watkins (2001) presents a discussion of natural resource royalties, their 
justifications and usage distinguishing their legal application from natural resource taxes.  
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level of assignment in a federation has an effect on outcomes, and in turn an effect on efficiency 
(and equity, as laid out in the Hartwick rule). This examination broadens the scope of efficiency 
to include expenditure outcomes in addition to the traditional concern with tax efficiency, 
balancing the focus with regard to the use of rent tax revenue. If efficiency is achieved in this 
enlarged scope, it ensures equity by sustaining the level of productivity inter-temporally. The 
question is examined by positing the assignment of rent tax and expenditure questions in a 
general multi-tiered government framework. The implicit argument is that it is not only taxation 
alone but expenditures also that determine the efficient (and equitable) outcomes. Unless 
discussed together, efficiency is at best a partial achievement. This integrated approach of rent 
tax and capital expenditures adduces a wider scope of efficiency.   
The chapter is structured as five sections. Two important building blocks are crafted in 
the first two sections before the model is discussed. The place of public infrastructure, a type of 
long-lived public good, in development is the first one. Following a narration of this notion we 
present  a brief description of an important exhaustible resource, petroleum, in federations and in 
particular the type of revenue and base sharing arrangements that are used. Hence, Section 1 
recounts the importance of long-lived public goods and explores their connection with rent 
taxation from a normative policy perspective. The inclusion of this description is necessary to 
concretize the notion of efficiency of outcomes. The section sets the stage for the following 
theoretical framework. It also introduces the enlarged scope of efficiency for policy 
consideration. The discussion culminates by introducing the tradeoff in expenditure choices 
between long-lived and consumable public goods in development. Section 2 takes a slight but 
relevant detour to briefly visit world cases of federations and large countries where the 
discussion of rent tax assignment could be important. We are referring to these cases to identify 
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some basic parameters of rent tax assignment in federal countries to make use of them in setting 
out problems discussed under the theoretical model. The types of tax and base sharing in 10 
federations, inter alia, are presented. Here my position is that the sheer size of mineral extraction 
and related revenues, even whilst ignoring the political issues, dictates a relevance of tax and 
expenditure assignments that could only be ignored at the peril of loss of efficiency. Various 
types of instruments used for rent tax collection and sharing ratios are summarized.  
Section 3 presents a theoretical model for exhaustible rent assignment in a federation and 
constitutes the core of this discussion. The model builds a general case where long-lived public 
goods are pursued as the first objective of development. This pursuit is arguably made under the 
Hartwhick rule, genuine savings approach or simply infrastructure for growth approach. The 
provision of consumable public goods, competing for fiscal resources, form the second objective 
of development policy. In the general case, federal taxation on the general tax base and the 
natural resource rent operate as distinct policy variables. We allow for a differential social 
valuation of the two types of public goods across subnational jurisdictions, allowing policy 
choices which can emphasize one over the other. The choices are made in the subnational 
domain. The general case presents a model for  investments in the stock of long-lived goods in a 
federation with subnational governments operating under the tutelage of the center. This case 
applies to most established federations as well as large unitary countries under certain 
assumptions. The model is, however, sufficiently flexible to analyze the effects of some other 
policy variables.  
Section 4 contains a discussion of relaxing some of the strict assumptions of the general 
case.  We allow for additional scenarios to be depicted through variations in the model. First of 
all, federal level investment in long-lived public goods is brought into the model. This provides 
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insights into the impact of federal rent taxation on the development of long-lived public goods. 
The case allows for direct investment in long-lived public goods through a straightforward 
budgetary allocation, in the shape of vertical programs or establishing a savings fund. 
Developing the model further, we bring in the role of explicit transfers. The general case has 
implicit transfers built in the model. Equalization transfers in the model show that the results will 
vary with additional parameters when considered. In another iteration of the model, the regional 
fiscal resource is shown as a function of the subnational tax policy and administration. Whether 
changes in subnational taxation, given the federal taxes on general tax base and natural resource 
rent, would affect increase in long-lived public goods or not. The discussion of each case is 
validated by reference to cases from the federations around the world. Finally, in many cases, 
resource rich regions are poor and under-populated compared with the rest of the country. The 
question of whether these facts change the results of the earlier analysis or not, is also modeled. 
For the purposes of this analysis we bring in changes in distribution of the fiscal resource, which 
is a proxy for regions‘ wealth. 
Section 5 concludes the discussion of the theoretical model. The contribution of the 
model to the assignment question in federations is highlighted. The policy preference for long-
lived public goods (or lack thereof) varies across regions. Where there is a higher preference for 
sustainable improvements in welfare, as would be expected in regions with high resource 
ownership, resource rent tax (or revenue) assignment is not neutral to new investments in long-
lived public goods. The expectation for higher preference in regions endowed with exhaustible 
resources is based on its connection with ownership. But there may be cases where such 
preference is not found.  
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  Role of Long-lived Public Goods in Development  
Exhaustible resources are often key inputs in production processes sustaining the current 
level of social welfare in a country. For example, production processes with presently available 
technology are dependent on exhaustible resources, in turn generating a similar dependence of 
household consumption on them.
34
 At the same time, allocation of rent to production of 
consumable goods or new investment in long-lived goods is a choice that partially determines the 
stock of capital over time. If rents together with the exhaustible resource are consumed, then the 
outcome ceteris paribus, leads to lower productivity and consumption over time. If however, 
long-lived public goods are generated in addition to consumption, productivity is sustainable 
inter-temporally. If public infrastructure is one of the expenditures choices for accumulating rent 
revenue, it is pertinent to see if it is relevance and importance to development.  
Public good provision is central to pursuit of development. Governments pursue 
development through taxation, expenditure and regulation, but largely through public 
expenditure.
35
 As a result of this expenditure various types of public goods are provided. These 
public goods in various ways have a positive effect on human welfare (Anand & Ravillion, 
1993)
36
 and most public goods are known to have a positive income elasticity of demand.
37
 
Commonly recognized public goods like childhood vaccination, public health, urban planning, 
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 The production processes use both exhaustible and renewable resources as inputs. Here, and later in this section, 
only one type of resources is specifically mentioned because of the focus of this paper on exhaustible resource rents.  
35
 This assertion is made to focus on public expenditure made out of rent tax revenue but is by no means 
unsupported by evidence. Taxation, despite its redistributive effect is best treated as a revenue raising measure. The 
effects of taxation on economic development have been discussed as incentives to development (Wasylenko, 1999 
provides a survey of literature on taxation and economic development); regulation has its effects on welfare but is 
limited in scope.  
36
 As an indirect effect, Cellini, Ferreira and Rothstein (2010) set out empirical evidence showing there is increase in 
housing values as a result of school investments; Brandts and Rivas (2009) present experimental evidence 
demonstrating that institutional environment with a higher punishment possibilities results in higher well being 
controlling for income and other relevant variables; Sandler and Arce (2007) note the emphasis on public goods as 
means to development in international financial assistance to developing countries.  
37
 For example Hewitt (2007) presents empirical estimates of national public goods where the demand for such 
goods increases concavely with income;  
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education and road have well recognized effects for social welfare and a higher level of 
consumption of public goods in some ways indicates that they are synonymous with 
development. Not only that but centralized versus decentralized mandates of providing public 
goods in multi-tiered government have an effect on public investment expenditures.
38
 However, 
both development and public goods are understood very differently by individuals and 
development has been recognized as a set of choices that emerges out of a number of variables 
including but not limited to economic growth.
39
 The definitional spread results in changing 
relative emphasis on the type of public goods but a large fraction of public expenditure in long-
lived public goods is never absent from government decisions. In fact, large scale investments in 
long-lived public goods have been the hallmark of many government policies.
40
  
Discerning government policy distinguishes between types of public goods. When 
government chooses levels of public goods and the type of public goods that are to be provided, 
there exists a basic tradeoff between consumable public goods and new investment in long-lived 
public goods.
41
 Repair and maintenance expenditures would also be a complementary part of the 
choice. Public expenditure directed toward provision of security, system of courts, air traffic 
control, regulation and monetary policy are consumed in the present. Benefits are enjoyed in the 
current time period. In contrast to this type of expenditure new capital investment in buildings, 
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 Kochar, Singh, and  Singh (2009) using data from Indian Punjab show that central mandates overlaying 
decentralized public good provision mandates have a positive effect on creating intra-village equality in public 
expenditure. Using data from 2400 Chinese villages Luo, Zhang, Huang and Rozelle (2007) present evidence for the 
effect of direct village head election on increased investment in public goods.  
39
 A number of insightful discussions have been carried out to expand the scope of development. The classical 
version of development as synonymous with economic growth was replaced by the UNDP‘s adoption of Human 
Development Index as a measure of development, thus enhancing the scope of the term. For instance Pope (2009) 
uses measures of morbidity and mortality in addition to income; Collier (2009) discussed security and accountability 
as public goods for development;   
40
 For discussions of importance given to development of public infrastructure as a cardinal component of state‘s 
development policy see for China (Bai & Qian, 2009), India (Lall, 2007; Banarjee & Somanathan, 2007; Patel and 
Bhattacharya, 2009), Spain (Salinas-Jiménez, 2004), Canada (Harchaoui, Tarkhani & Warren, 2004), Singapore 
(Phang, 2002), and United States (Cain, 1997).  
41
 Adam and Bevan (2006) argue that public infrastructure has a positive effect on the non-tradable production by 
generating a productivity bias in favor of places where it is created.  
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roads, bridges and even research and development produces capital that contributes to higher 
welfare through technological change, growth and development, guaranteeing the same or higher 
consumption in the following time periods as well as lifting productivity in the present.
42
 
Expenditures on teachers and doctors are consumed in the present but have longer term 
consequences. As a result they would be difficult to classify.  
The contribution of public expenditure on long-lived public goods or public infrastructure 
to growth has been debated and empirically studied. The empirical results have shown the 
contribution of public expenditure can be positive, negative or may have no effect.
43
 But if 
public expenditure on infrastructure is separated out, it has been shown to have a positive effect 
on growth. It is due to the perceived or real effects of public infrastructure on growth that nearly 
all nations pursue an increase in the stock of public infrastructure by making new investments in 
public capital. Although not very clear, but public infrastructure contributed to development in 
several ways. Rural infrastructure is recognized to have a positive impact on agricultural 
productivity and rural economic development.
44
 Rural roads have been the touchstone of rural 
development in developing countries for their known benefits on agriculture productivity, rural 
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 The increase is growth rate is temporary and after sometime the growth rate to its earlier level; the increase in 
output is however permanent.  
43
 Arguments have been made in favor of the positive effect of public infrastructure on growth (Aschauer, 1989; 
Hulten & Schwab, 1991; Duffy-Deno & Eberts, 1991; Mankiw, Romer & Weil, 1992; Garcia-Mila & McGuire, 
1992; Tanzi & Zee, 1997; Eberts & McMillen, 1999;  Chandra & Thompson, 2000; Esfahani & Rameriz, 2003; 
Bronzini & Piselli, 2009;  Federke & Bogetic, 2009 ) and in some empirical studies on metropolitan economies only 
(Crifield & Panggabean, 1995); In some other studies the effects have been questioned on the basis of estimation 
techniques (Hotz-Eakin, 1994) or shown to be small (Holtz-Eakin & Schwartz, 1995; Garcia-Mila, McGuire and 
Porter, 1996). Alesina et al., 2002, find negative effects of public spending on private investment but use wage 
expenditures. Others have argued the positive effect to be through maintenance of existing stocks (Rioja, 2003). In 
case of Mexico, using general equilibrium analysis Feltenstein and Ha (1999) show the effect to be negative. 
Calderon and Serven (2004) present empirical analysis using panel data of 100 countries and show that 
infrastructure stocks have a positive effect on growth and reduction in income inequality. A recent discussion of an 
abstract model is contained in Gupta and Barman (2009).  
44
 Shenggen and Zhang (2004) present empirical evidence in support of the effect of infrastructure on rural 
development in China. Bond (1999) discusses the positive effects on public infrastructure on the poor communities. 
Gibson and Olivia (2009) provide empirical evidence of the positive effect of non-farm infrastructure on 
employment and incomes in rural Indonesia.  
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economy and poverty reduction. Development of regions is a result of government provision of 
infrastructure and other public goods.
45
 Development when seen as a wider pursuit, including but 
not limited to growth, places an even higher value on public infrastructure. Some types of 
infrastructure are almost a necessary condition for provision of different types of public goods 
that in turn have positive outcomes for development.
46
 For instance, school buildings and health 
facilities are built to provide public education and health. In other cases, it is both an 
intermediary good as well as a final consumption good (Eisner, 1991). Through private cost-
savings public infrastructure increases productivity.
47
 In all these practices of development, 
public infrastructure is given so much importance that budgetary classification separately lists 
out capital expenditures from recurrent public expenditures.
48
 The role of public infrastructure 
investment in attracting private investment is considered important, even if the empirical 
evidence is not watertight.  
Assignment of rent tax revenue in a federation assumes significance from another 
perspective also. Sustainable development as a policy objective is a potential replacement for the 
traditional economic development. A future decline in welfare is a valid concern for individuals 
who can enjoy their current consumption if they are relatively free of anxiety about the future. 
They also care about the welfare of subsequent generations, as their utility is a sum of their 
current consumption and discounted utility of future generations. Decay of current capital, 
decline in exhaustible resource stock and stagnation in technological change cause a decline in 
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 The case of three states of India has been presented in Wanmali and Islam (1995).  
46
 For instance see (Fay et al., 2005) for a discussion of the effects of access to basic infrastructure services on child-
health outcomes in the context of Millennium Development Goals with evidence from cross-country regressions. 
Huillery (2009) shows that early investments in education during colonial era has a persistent positive effect on 
educational outcomes in French West Africa.  
47
 Using state level data for the United States for the time period 1982-1996, Cohen and Paul (2004) find that public 
infrastructure results in increases in magnitude and significance of private cost-savings.  
48
 Operation and maintenance expenditure and other expenditures like teacher salaries or expenditure on purchase of 
essential drugs are closely linked with development. They are classified under recurrent expenditures.  
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consumption per capita (Cheviakov & Hartwick, 2009). In general sustainable development 
means that social welfare, discounted by the pure rate of pure time preference, should not decline 
over time. To achieve this end, capital formation attains not only a high significance but meets 
another challenge. The productive base of a nation, if declining over time, would lead to lower 
productivity and consumption in the consequent time periods, resulting in a decline in social 
welfare.  
The productive base includes capital in its various forms like manufactured capital, 
human capital and natural resources. In addition technology, in turn comprising of knowledge 
and institutions, complete a nation‘s productive base (Arrow et al., 2004). Maintaining a non-
decreasing productive base, at least at its current level and in the measurable domain, is largely a 
policy that ensures sustaining the achieved levels of capital, depicted by the unchanging sum of 
all three types of capital. The nature of development itself creates a challenge, namely use of 
exhaustible resources diminishes the stock of existing capital. Use of exhaustible resource may 
be a necessary input in the production function of goods in an economy and attain the current 
potential level of welfare. By definition, the stock of exhaustible resources is finite (Dasgupta & 
Heal, 1979). Even when exhaustible resource is used up in production of consumable goods and 
contributes to gains in social welfare, it may lead to decline in the stock of capital. From the 
point of view of sustainability, use of exhaustible resources in production raises important 
questions for development. Forgoing usage altogether may neither be desirable and practicable 
nor necessary under the available technology. But a recognition of the fact is required that such 
usage leads to a decline in the productive base. If usage of exhaustible resources is off the 
accounting matrices, it may shore up an incomplete picture of development. On the other hand 
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the recognition of depletion, even when accounted with new explorations, creates a platform for 
working out choices that can sustain a nation‘s productive base.  
The current level of capital stock can be sustained over time if exhaustible resource rents 
are invested in manufactured capital (Solow 1974; Dixit et al. 1980; Solow 1986). Investment of 
rents in manufactured capital increases its stock over time. It has been argued that all the rents 
from exhaustible natural resources if invested in manufactured capital, would sustain current 
productivity (Hartwick, 1977).
49
 The policy condition set up in this manner could insure both 
efficiency and equity considerations (Buchholz et al., 2005). The outcomes are based on the 
notion of substitutability between natural and manufactured capitals and to some extent, between 
material and knowledge stocks (Solow, 1993). Despite the normative clarity of these assertions it 
is not clear under what circumstances this is achievable. More poignantly, it is pertinent to 
pursue this inquiry to find out under what set of circumstances it is more likely achievable in a 
federation. From resource exploitation
50
 to rent collection and investment, a range of issues 
pertain to ownership rights and how they are assigned to different levels of government.  
Responding to the need for recognizing resource depletion in development measures, the 
concept of genuine savings has been worked out.
51
 So far the work has established that genuine 
savings provides an accounting docket which can periodically portray changes in a nation‘s 
productive base (Dasgupta & Maler, 2000). Various calculations, using some proxies for 
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 Use of exhaustible resource, with rents invested in manufactured capital can provide constant level of 
consumption over time, under certain conditions (Hartwick, 1978). Dixit et al. (1980) show in a general model of 
accumulation with heterogeneous capital goods that if valuation of net investment is constant over time, then it 
would result in intertemporal equity. The change in genuine savings relative to changes in interest rate determine the 
effects on consumption as rising, declining or remaining stable (Hamiltion & Hartwick, 2005)  
50
 Bohn and Deacon (2000) have shown that ownership risk has significant effects on the pace of exploitation.  
51
 ‗Genuine savings‘ (Hamilton & Clemens, 1999) and ‗genuine investment‘ (Arrow et al., 2004) are measures that 
account for resource depletion and adjust standard measures of investment or change in capital with this change. 
Hamilton, Atkinson and Pearce (1997) clarify the notion of genuine savings using questions of measurement, 
substitutability, depreciation of manufactured capital, exogenous versus endogenous technological change and 
preferences for natural assets.  
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exhaustible resource use, have been made (Arrow et al., 2003). Genuine savings measures, 
despite the need for further development and data, show that traditional measures of growth and 
development are majorly over-assessed. When use of exhaustible natural resources (or renewable 
resources, for that matter) are accounted for, the level of growth achieved by various countries 
diminishes. In case of oil producing nations it has been shown that growth rate falls in the 
negative range.
52
   
Given the importance of the normative policy prescription, it is important to note that 
there is often a mismatch between tax and expenditure decisions in this particular domain in 
federal countries. In federal countries it is the subnational levels that are mostly responsible for 
public infrastructure. As argued above, rent taxation is often centralized. Natural resource rent 
taxes are mostly levied by federal government. In some cases, subnational governments are 
allowed to levy some taxes on the same base or receive parts of the tax through revenue 
sharing.
53
 In federations, only some categories of infrastructure are kept with the federal 
government; airports, ports, railway tracks, dams, national highways may be built and 
maintained by federal government due to their trans-jurisdictional externalities. In most cases 
roads, urban infrastructure, irrigation networks and public buildings for service delivery would 
be built, operated and maintained by the subnational governments. Creation of public 
infrastructure by multiple levels of government becomes a complex pursuit.
54
 Add to this 
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 Arrow et al. (2004) show, using data for about three decades from 1976 to 2001, that genuine investment defined 
as a change in genuine wealth is negative for Middle East and North Africa (Table 1). For China, India and Pakistan 
it is positive but much less than the reported levels of investment as ordinarily defined.  
53
 Even in general, allocation of resources between different levels of government can have an impact on economic 
development. The evidence for China has been presented in Zhang and Zou (1998).  
54
 A discussion of infrastructure development in a federal structure can be found in Hulten and Schwab (1997). 
Presenting data for United States from the Congressional Budget Office for 1956-1989 for eight categories of 
infrastructure namely highways, mass transit, rail, aviation, water transport, water resources, water supply and 
sewage treatment, they demonstrate that most of the spending is by state and local governments. Out of the total 
expenditure on public infrastructure direct federal expenditures was 14 percent, federal grants accounted for another 
18 and state and local expenditures made up the remaining 68 percent. 
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financing from exhaustible resource rent taxation and the arrangement would demand a further 
careful consideration. In addition to the nearly ubiquitous political concerns regarding 
distribution of rent tax revenue, a key question is concerns creation of public infrastructure for 
development, whether it by or the federal government. What types of rent tax assignment or rent 
revenue sharing would be conducive to investment in public infrastructure is discussed here in 
this context.  
Pursuing development and increase in public infrastructure in a federal country where 
exhaustible resource revenue is an important component of public finance highlights the 
importance of rent tax assignment and rent revenue sharing within the consideration of 
investment in infrastructure. Development policy is a balancing act. The demand of consumable 
public goods has a high claim on public budgets. Growth in infrastructure stock has a tradeoff 
with current expenditures on education, health, agriculture extension, offices and regulation. 
While pursuing investment in long-lived public goods, governments attempt to provide public 
goods for current consumption. Equity demands a wider sharing of the resource. Stability 
concerns may warrant return of a major share of revenue on derivation basis. At the same time, 
pursuit of development would entail additional choices in revenue assignment from exhaustible 
resource rents. The theoretical model attempts to incorporate such choices and to provide results 
that would still be relevant to pursuit of development.  
 
  Federations with Asymmetric Resource Endowments  
The federations allow either one or both levels of government to siphon away economic 
rents of exhaustible resources. A number of tax instruments are available. Each option has its 
merits and some demerits. A brief review of rent tax assignment in federal countries shows the 
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wide variations in practice. Out of the 24 federal countries in the world, at least 12 have 
petroleum mining as an important component of the gross domestic product. The rent tax or 
revenue assignment is by no means a question exclusively relevant to the federations. There are a 
number of large sized countries with multi-tiered governments that are not formally federal but 
have petroleum mining as an important activity in their economy
55
 and distribution of rent 
amongst jurisdictions carries an importance for policy consideration resembling the assignment 
question in the federations. The model discusses the formal case of federations but could provide 
analogous analysis for this set of countries. But for the present, we continue to describe the 
question for federal countries for the most part. Over the last 20 years, petroleum mining and 
upstream revenue have been increasing in 12 of these federal countries.
56
 When the known 
reserves are included, 12 federal and large multi-tiered countries possess 52 percent of the total 
known world reserves of oil and gas.
57
 For some federal countries, the contribution from 
petroleum to GDP is almost or higher than one-fifth of the GDP. For example in Russia it is 
16.61 percent and in Venezuela it is 21 percent. In United Arab Emirates it is 34 percent,
58
 in 
Nigeria 39.59 percent and in Iraq 53.87 percent of GDP. Here we have used oil and gas as an 
example. Rent tax assignment pertaining to gold, diamonds and other minerals would be 
analogous to this discussion.  
Federal countries face a particular challenge in assigning rent tax revenue because of 
several reasons. First, the resource ownership is a contested territory. There is no universal 
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 Generally recognized federations are: Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Brazil, 
Canada, Comoros, Ethiopia, Germany, India, Malaysia, Mexico, Micronesia, Nigeria, Pakistan, Russia, St. Kitts and 
Nevis, South Africa, Spain, Switzerland, United Arab Emirates, United States of America and Venezuela are 
recognized as federations of regions, provinces or states. Iraq, Nepal and Sudan are evolving federations. Other large 
countries with important subnational regional entities are not formal federations but rent tax assignment issues 
pertaining to federations are validly applicable to their cases also. In this group would be countries like China, 
Indonesia, Kazakhstan and .  
56
 Based on calculations from the Oil and Gas Journal Energy Database.  
57
 Calculated from the Oil and Gas Journal data base.  
58
 Calculated from Table 1, IMF (2009).  
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principle to settle contending ownership claims of petroleum or mineral reserves in federations. 
The property rights to natural resources can be distinguished into several levels of ownership 
including ownership, management rights, development rights, revenue collection and 
regulation.
59
 Several shades of property right assignment can be seen among federal countries. 
Australia and Canada, for example, have settled the question of property rights in favor of 
subnational governments but Brazil and Venezuela have invested them in the federation. 
Pakistan and Russia allow joint ownership by subnational and federal governments. In case of 
offshore reserves, contrary to expectation, subnational jurisdictions have staked successful 
claims in Brazil and Australia. In Canada, despite the constitutional cases decided in favor of 
Canada, Nova Scotia and Newfoundland have gained access to control, regulation and revenue 
from offshore oil and gas reserves (MacDonald & Thompson, 1986; Jennifer, 2008).
60
 In 
countries where the federal level has vested the property rights in subnational levels of 
government, it often retains some measure of influence through environmental legislation and 
export tax provisions.  
In some other cases, the clarity of rights is subservient to functional definitions and some 
policy considerations. For example, arguments made for sharing of petroleum revenue for Iraq 
substitute a synthetic concept of social surplus, a sum of rents and economic development, for 
property right (Bishop & Shah, 2008). Second, development of exhaustible resources may 
impose costs and benefits differentially across regions and measures for mitigating 
environmental costs that are not located in regions of benefits may also require supra-territorial 
intervention. This is particularly relevant to offshore mining. Third, natural resource endowments 
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 Schlager and Ostrom (1992) present a taxonomy of property rights over natural resources and lay out the 
distinctions that stipulate rights to access, exclusion and alienation.  
60
 The Atlantic Accord was updated in 2005 as an agreement between Canada and the provinces of Nova Scotia and 
Newfoundland and Labrador.  
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translate into fiscal capacity for regions where they are located.
61
 Even if the revenues were left 
to the producing subnational jurisdictions, the arrangement creates demands on the federal 
government for equalization from the non-producing regions.
62
 The fourth issue concerns the 
macroeconomic effects of commodity exports. These effects visit on the manufacturing sectors 
due to exchange rate appreciation. Additionally, reallocation of factors of production may result 
in increase in wages and may be even cost of capital in the non-producing regions.
63
 Fifth is a 
related concern that rent tax revenue concentrated in some regions will induce migration of labor 
and capital leading to inefficient outcomes (McLure, 2003). This concern of course is 
constructed in a particular setting where the present allocation of factors is taken to be efficient 
and any change brought about by exhaustible resource mining, both upstream and downstream, 
would be considered to be a departure from the equilibrium.  
On the other hand decentralization of rent taxation, with or without natural resource 
management, is a meritorious option as it creates a higher level of political stability when strong 
demands for ownership rights are assuaged.
64
 The existence of royalties on mineral resources is 
an express recognition of ownership rights of communities, provinces or states or, as the case 
may be, of the nation. Due to their strong nexus with resource ownership and consequent 
political basis, they are often ensconced in law.
65
 Such ownership rights are recognized 
politically, consequently translating into begrudging fiscal regimes. Ownership per se is not 
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 In Australia, the rent tax revenues are counted toward a state or territory‘s fiscal capacity for calculation of 
relativities.  
62
 In Canada, the equalization scheme came under pressure when the revenues in Alberta and Saskatchewan 
increased as a result of oil and gas mining in their territories. A solution was found in the form of restricting the 
calculation of the equalization standard to 10 provinces, leaving out Alberta and Saskatchewan.  
63
 Boadway (2006) provides a description of such effects in a federal country 
64
 This position is certainly exemplified in cases of Australia, Brazil and Canada as the federal authorities have 
conceded some or all components of exhaustible resource management and shared major shares of rent tax revenue 
with the subnational entities. More recently, in Pakistan the constitutional amendments have recognized the 
ownership rights of the provinces over natural resources. Another viewpoint has been presented by McLure (1994) 
arguing that centralization of rent taxation would stabilize the Russian Federation.  
65
 Otto et al. (2006) present an analysis of the mineral royalty regimes for a select number of countries and find that 
they often defined and elaborated in the legal framework.  
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discussed as a reason for awarding rent taxation to a subnational jurisdiction primarily due to the 
concerns highlighted above. If rents are considered a patrimony and frittered away, conditions 
described as the ‗Dutch disease‘ or the so called ‗resource curse‘ would not be unexpected 
outcomes. It is however a valid question that would communities with strong ownership bias be 
more predisposed to frittering away rents by indulging in easy consumption or would they be 
more likely inclined toward making the optimal use of the finite rent. The model in this paper 
leaves the option of considering that communities with strong ownership rights may be inclined 
toward generating producible capital. Beyond arguments in support of the connection between 
ownership claims and preference for rent investment, this remains an empirical question.  
A number of imposts are used to siphon away rents by different tiers of government. 
Ranging from royalties to differential corporate income tax, the purpose of these imposts is to 
collect the exhaustible resource rents and place them in the general coffers for production of 
public goods. The theoretical clarity of rent tax efficiency is only matched by the operational 
difficulties of its administration. The rents, defined as the sum of sales revenues and extraction 
costs, are not easy to calculate with fluctuating world commodity prices, changeable 
technological solutions and information asymmetries abounding between mining companies and 
government entities. The governments attempt to scoop up rents by levying a number of taxes.
66
 
The instruments are not only multiple but they vary across nations and over time. Despite the 
medley of tax instruments, the effective tax base remains the economic rent in each case as long 
as the rate is chosen appropriately. For the purposes of the discussion in this paper, all the federal 
taxes are recognized as one effective tax. Similarly, all subnational taxes are defined as one 
effective subnational tax.  
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 Sometimes, the revenue from mineral resources is classified as non-tax item as in case of India (Noronha & 
Srivastava, 2010). Accounting classification however would not change the basic nature of the levies.  
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In addition to allowing subnational regions levy their own taxes on the shared base, 
federations in some cases share revenues with the regions. If the federation recognizes the 
property rights of the regions, then revenue sharing has higher sharing ratios in the formula in 
favor of subnational governments and sharing is on derivation basis. This is the most common 
case as exemplified by Australia, Brazil and Pakistan. In case the federation asserts its property 
rights on the resources, as is most commonly the case with offshore petroleum reserves, the 
revenues either form part of the general equalization pool or stay separately with the federation. 
Canada provides an example of the former treatment where the federal share forms part of the 
general distributable pool. On the other hand in India, upstream petroleum levies are not part of 
the distributable pool for the National Finance Commission Award.  The model presented in this 
chapter does not distinguish between tax rates and revenue shares and treats them as equivalent. 
This is because, it is assumed that when rent taxes are levied at an efficient level, base sharing 
and revenue sharing will results in the same amount of revenue for the producing regions.  
Equalization, an ongoing policy concern in federations, aims at bringing horizontal 
imbalances in subnational fiscal resources, the potential government revenues, within some 
acceptable range by instituting intergovernmental transfers. Treatment of natural resource rent 
revenues varies among different federations. In Australia, the Commonwealth Grants 
Commission includes rent tax revenues in the state‘s fiscal capacity for determining relativities 
(CGC, 2008). As a result if a state has a smaller than average share of general tax base excluding 
natural resource rents but the total tax base share is above average, it is not eligible for federal 
transfers. Its hemispheric opposite, Canada has revised its equalization scheme to exclude 
Alberta and Saskatchewan from the calculation of the standard fiscal capacity with the effect that 
the size of the federal distributable pool does not rise with an increase in oil prices, laying a 
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relatively smaller burden on the federal budget. At the same time, the rent tax revenue of 
Newfoundland and Nova Scotia is not included in the calculation of their fiscal capacity, 
allowing them to remain eligible for federal transfers. In general 50 percent of natural resource 
revenue is excluded from fiscal capacity calculation (Pourde, 2010). Pakistan‘s federal transfers 
treat rent tax revenues as a separate stream. In case of India, oil and gas royalties are channeled 
into the producing states‘ non-tax revenue excluding it from revenue sharing considerations 
(Noronha & Srivastava, 2010). The Russian equalization system uses oil and gas revenues for 
general transfers but allows revenue sharing from income tax on derivation basis 
(Kurlyandskaya, 2007). In Indonesia, the natural resource revenues are contested and an 
argument was made that they should be kept separate from the general equalization pool because 
they are shared as a compensatory measure for environmental costs (Bahl & Tumenassan, 2002). 
  
Various investment instruments are also in vogue. The best known are the stabilization 
and saving fund schemes. The effect on funds on public infrastructure depends upon the 
transparency and predictable rules. In Russia a fund was created in 2004. Since 2009 it has been 
replaced by a Investment Fund. In Canada, a fund exists at the provincial level named as Alberta 
Heritage Fund. The stabilization fund in Venezuela did not produce the results envisaged at the 
design stage. The funds despite their mixed experience remain an instrument of choice. Some 
more discussion is adduced under the model. For the purposes of the model, they may mean the 
same thing as investment depending upon the allowable expenditures.  
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 A Model for Exhaustible Resource Rent Assignment  
The federation comprises of two regions A and B and is denoted by two types of taxes 
and a pure public good that is non-rival and non-excludible in both regions. The federation has 
precedence over regions that is manifested in the shape of primary decisions on the level of taxes 
and the regions subsequently deciding in the residual policy space.
67
 Two types of fiscal 
resources are available, Y and M. Y is a general fiscal resource
68
 that is distributed in the two 
regions with        , where Yi is the resource located in region i, i = A, B. While defining 
the fiscal resource the social planner decides what is to be allocated to private goods.
69
  
Out of the total fiscal resource,   ,        , is located in Region A. In addition to this, 
an exhaustible natural resource endowment is placed in Region A. Mining of this resource results 
in an extracted value M, part of which is an ascertainable economic rent   . The federation 
shares the rent as a tax base with Region A while enjoying precedence in setting its tax rate. The 
rent tax is only administered at an efficient level. The efficiency condition means that      , 
where   is the federal rent tax and   is the regional rent tax applied by Region A only.70 To 
                                                          
67
 Most federations function in accordance with this principle.  
68
 The fiscal resource is defined as the outcome of tax policy and administration as:  
 
Where  is a function of total income and  is a vector of income brackets. The function  defines the tax 
base on total income I by laying down definitions of tax base (income, consumption or wealth), imposing 
exemptions and deductions and awarding credits. It is obvious that  is the after tax income and that remains 
decentralized to private individuals and is thus allocated to private goods. Tax policy, comprising of  and  
remains unchanged for the most part, in the discussion here. Therefore, for expositional simplification, I let  be the 
taxable base.  
69
 Further to the explanation in the last footnote hereinbefore: this is plausible to see as a result of the tax policy. 
Choosing a definition of a tax base itself involves applying exemptions and deductions, to state two possible ways, 
which in turn allow the social planner to allocate resources to private goods. The social planner in this case can 
make this decision because the subnational governments are not allowed to have an independent tax policy. In a case 
discussed as Problem 6, the regions can choose their own tax rates and this will constrain how much can the social 
planner allocate to private goods.  
70
 In practice a number of tax instruments are used to siphon away economic rents. The list includes royalty, excise 
duty, corporate income tax, severance tax.  denotes the effective tax rate. If there is only one tax on economic rent, 
then  will denote tax rate.  
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concretize the notion of   here it would be appropriate to clarify that it is the fraction of rent 
collected by the federal tax policy. It corresponds to all the levies enforced by the federal 
government. In other words it is the effective tax rate on economic rent. The federal precedence 
and efficiency condition together ensure that choosing   also constrains Region A in setting  . 
The federation levies a tax on the general tax base also in way that    is taken up by the 
federation, using it for the national pure public good G that is consumed all over the nation. To 
focus on the issue of rent tax assignment and its effect on long-lived public goods, we assume 
that there are no externalities of taxation at either level in the federation.
71
 As a result of the 
federal tax on the general base, only          is available as fiscal resource for regional 
expenditures in Region A and             in Region B. Rent revenue may be a substitute 
for a higher overall tax burden. While considering a linkage between rent assignment and 
expenditure choices, we assume that this substitution works for only the current consumption of 
rent and does not affect investment preferences.  
Each region provides regional public goods that are locally non-rival and non-excludable. 
The residents of the other region are excluded from local public goods. Budgetary decisions 
allocate the available fiscal resource in a region to two composite public goods    and some   . 
In each region,   is a long-lived public good and    is a consumable public good that once 
provided can only be consumed instantaneously. The political process of exercising citizen 
choices results in allocation of fairly stable shares of the fiscal resource to each type of public 
goods in each region such that    is the share of the total fiscal resource available in region i to 
long-lived public goods. Using the preferences in each region for long-lived public goods, 
        ,        , of the total resource is spent on building long-lived public goods, where 
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 The case for federal tax influencing subnational decisions and subnational jurisdictions producing horizontal tax 
externalities is discussed in Goodspeed (2000). The paper also provides empirical estimation of the size of effects.  
42 
 
 
 
               . Choosing q leaves             for consumable regional public 
goods,   . It is also clear that                embodies the results of the preference for 
long-lived public goods in each region.
72
 We assume that       to sketch out the results 
concretely. This assumption is relaxed for some of the analysis later on in the discussion. By this 
formulation, the omniscient legislative process by choosing q allocates       of the fiscal 
resource to provision of consumable public goods in the regions.
73
  
To focus on the relevant question of rent assignment and its effects on long-lived public 
goods, we assume that balanced budgets are a constitutional requirement at all levels. This 
ensures that available fiscal resource is equivalent to expenditures at each level of government 
and in every jurisdiction.
74
 For completeness, we assume that the expenditure on public goods is 
completely enshrined in the public expenditure and if there is any private production of public 
goods that is fully financed by the governments.  
The social planner seeking development optimizes an objective function that embodies 
the simultaneous choice between long-lived public goods and consumable public goods at the 
national and regional levels of government.
75
 In the first instance, the social planner seeks to 
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 Clearly q is not a choice variable for the policy maker with two cases of exception. The distribution of the general 
national fiscal resource Y and preference for long-lived goods πi are exogenous. The first case of exception can be 
readily understood and occurs when the definition of the fiscal resource can be altered through tax policy. The 
second case of exception is possible when the central planner overrides πi in the region by creating specific purpose 
grants for capital development.  
73
 The private goods  drop out of the model. 
74
 Some allocation of Y to    may mean transfer of benefits to future consumers. Since costs could also be shifted in 
this way, I assume the net effect is zero.  
75
 Government‘s objective function has been discussed in the literature as a device to model policy choices. In some 
cases, it uses policy rules other than the traditional Bergman-Samuelson social welfare function. An early discussion 
was presented by Behrman and Craig (1987) where regional inequality and output, with a mutual tradeoff, are 
placed in the objective function. In Grossman and Helpman (1994) government‘s objective function is the weighted 
sum of campaign contributions and net of contributions welfare. Kee, Olarreaga and Silva (2007) use a linear 
government objective function that is a sum of a matrix of foreign contribution to gain market access and a welfare 
measure that is in turn a sum of tariff revenue, consumer and producer surplus and foreign contributions made to 
gain market access. More recently Qiao, Martinez-Vazquez and Xu (2008) use the approach to specify a choice 
between growth and decentralization. Another formulation (Castells & Sole-Olle,2005) uses a variation of Behrman 
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increase public infrastructure or long-lived public goods. The first policy objective is represented 
by a function h such that 
                                              
where    are the changes in the stock of long-lived public goods in region i. The change in stock 
is weighted by the preference for long-lived public goods in each region.
76
 to take into account 
differential subjective valuation of long-lived public goods across regions. Through a choice of   
and  , the central planner seeks to influence the level of public goods in the nation. Assuming 
that the national public good G has an effect on the level of investment in long-lived goods in the 
regions,    is a function of   ,  ,  income, sectoral composition of regional product, urbanization 
and existing stocks of private and public infrastructure.
77
 In addition to these variables, 
government revenue will also affect   . Out of these variables, only   and   are the variables 
amenable to policy choices. Government revenue will have two components and only one of 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
and Craig (1987), incorporating a choice between output and regional inequality in the government‘s objective 
function. In Collie and Vandenbussche (2006) the government in the home country chooses its tariff to maximize an 
objective function, which is given by the weighted sum of consumer surplus, profits of domestic firms and tariff 
revenue. Breuillé and Gary-Bobo (2007) set up local government and central government objective functions. The 
arguments in the former are social value of public good, disutility of tax, cost of collection effort and landlords‘ 
rents. The latter has social utility of national public good, deficit and expected transfers to local governments and 
weighted local jurisdictions‘ utility specified in the former.  
76
 The function h is analytically equivalent to but more tractable than a traditional social welfare function. To see 
this, let the social welfare function be defined as: 
 
Where  is the utility gained by a representative agent in region i by consuming the benefits of long-lived public 
good . Maximization by choosing  gives  
 
which is same as the result from maximizing h with respect to , with wi as the weights in place of . Equivalent 
results would be obtained with maximization with respect to . 
77
 The demand of public infrastructure or long-lived public goods has been studied by Burkhead and Miner (1971), 
Fay (2001) and Sturm (2001, 2003). These studies classify per capita income, sectoral distribution of GDP, 
urbanization, farmland and a number of political variables to influence demand for investment in public 
infrastructure. 
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these will be affected by the two choice variables. Government revenue determined by 
intergovernmental transfers will be exogenous.
78
  
The second policy objective is captured by  , a negative of the ratio of the fiscal resource 
allocated to long-lived public goods in both regions to total fiscal resource in the nation. The 
negative sign ensures that reduction of this ratio is the policy objective that is pursued. The 
negative of the ratio embodies the political consideration where a certain level of current 
consumption of public goods is deemed important from the voter perspective. A reduction in   is 
defined as an increase in public expenditure on consumable public goods having an immediate 
positive effect on welfare.
79
 Following the preferences of the electorate, the government delivers 
consumable public goods contributing directly to gains in welfare.  
The policy question the governments are continually resolving, namely the allocation of 
the fiscal resource to long-lived goods and consumable public goods, is represented by an 
objective function defined as:
80
 
                                  
Where h, the increase in public infrastructure or long-lived public goods and   signifies 
the negative of the ratio of allocation to long-lived public goods to total fiscal resource available 
in the nation.
81
 The ratio
82
 is given as   
                                                          
78
 An exception to this statement is the case of conditional capital transfers. This case is discussed in Problem 2.  
79
 The two way effects of public infrastructure and private production for economic development have been 
discussed in Wang (2002) with empirical evidence from seven East Asian economies.  
80
 The objective function here uses a structure that is similar to the objective function portrayed in Qiao, Martinez-
Vazquez and Xu (2008) whilst using different arguments. They set up an objective function that moderates a choice 
between growth and decentralization. Other discussions have focused on the choice between consumption and 
investment of rents. The choice between upfront spending rents on consumption and investment has been discussed 
in Takizawa, Gardner and Ueda (2004) where they argue that if the economy is on a stable growth path the choice 
has no effect on long run growth but has adverse outcomes if the initial capital stock is low. Agenor (2009) presents 
a theoretical model of production of infrastructure and consumable public good tracing effects of infrastructure on 
long run growth.  
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The ratio is equivalent to the sum of expenditures on long-lived public goods in region i 
divided by the total public expenditure in the nation. This is so because total expenditure equals 
total fiscal resource in the nation by the balanced budget assumption.  
The two types of public goods and their effects on development are important to the 
policy makers.
83
 This signifies the composition of the public expenditure in the federation. c is 
the weight the planner attaches to long-lived goods and        . As c approaches infinity, the 
preference for long-lived public goods reaches a level where the state has negligible concern for 
current welfare levels.
84
  Conversely, as c approaches zero, the preference for current 
consumption overtakes investment in long-lived public goods.
85
  
The federal tax rate   denotes a key policy choice. The federal government enjoying its 
precedence can siphon away ever higher levels of rent from Region A but it would be 
constrained by the political instability it may generate in the federation. A very low   would 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
81
 The discussion on consumption against investment in the context of future production possibilities in well 
narrated in Arrow et al. (2004). Their paper while presenting the general problem also shows that for government 
policy it remains an important tradeoff.  
82
 For notational simplification, this can be rewritten as: 
Where  
Or simply as  
Where  is the expenditure in region i and  is the total national public expenditure.  
83
 Gupta et al. (2005), using data from 39 low-income countries demonstrate that the effect of capital expenditures 
on growth is positive whereas that of wage related expenditures is not. Devarajan, Swaroop and Zhou (1996) using 
data from 43 developing countries for 20 years show that given the initial levels of public infrastructure, the effect of 
current expenditure (consumable public goods in this model) is positive while at the same time the effect of capital 
expenditure in negative when their dependent variable is growth in per capita incomes. Alesina et al. (2002) find for 
OECD countries that there is a negative effect of wage related government spending on business investment.  
84
 It can be argued that the developmental states like South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore and lately Vietnam during the 
phase of massive investments in public infrastructure through forced savings depicted a high value of parameter c. 
For a review of the ‗developmental state‘ see Woo-Cummings (1999).  
85
 Major subsidy programs like interfering with commodity prices are a manifestation of a low value of parameter c. 
Among the resource rich nations subsidized commodity prices have a major stake in the budgets. For example see 
(Myers and Kent, 2000) for subsidies on both exhaustible and renewable natural resources.   
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unusually favor Region A leading to consequences for other regions.
86
 On the other hand, a very 
high value of   may become unsustainable politically leading to political instability in the 
federation.
87
 For a politically stable federation, the federal share should be constrained between 
the minimum efficient threshold and the maximum political stability level. We constrain the 
value of   to lie between two bounds as described below:  
  
                     
       
 
  
  
 
        
  
                    
Where  
                     
       
  
                     
       
                            
                                                                                                                         
    
        
  
    
        
  
          
                      
     
If the numerator in the first inequality is less than zero, than the inequality is replaced by 
an equality equal to zero. If the right hand side term of the second inequality is greater than 1, 
then it assumes the value equal to 1.  
The first inequality means that the share of federal rent tax revenue out of the total 
economic rent is no less than the difference in the fiscal resources of the two regions as a fraction 
of the total fiscal resource in the nation, when the general tax base in the producing region is 
higher than the non-producing region. Since the lower bound is at zero, it means that the non-
                                                          
86
 Boadway (2006) is a discussion of the effects of higher fiscal benefits of oil production in Alberta on the rest of 
the provinces in Canada. The case for a federal role is argued in this paper. However, the effects of equalization may 
in themselves be distortionary to factor mobility (for example see Petchey, 2009). Similarly, in special settings, 
equalization may have a depressive effect on natural resource taxes (Smart, 1998).  
87
 A number of conflicts in several countries pertain to disputes over siphoning of economic rent of exhaustible 
resources to the benefit of the entire country at the expense of the producing region.  
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producing regions would not object to very low values of   if they have more of the general base 
than the producing region. The left hand side in the first inequality is a measure of minimum 
fairness. The second inequality ensures that the share of federal rent tax revenue out of the total 
economic rent accruing from the exhaustible resource in Region A is not greater than the 
expenditure on long-lived public goods in the nation as a fraction of the economic rent. The 
inequalities can be simplified as: 
     
 
 
 
        
  
                                             
Or 
           
        
 
                                       
It would be appropriate to highlight the meanings of these inequalities further. When   is 
chosen between the two bounds and constraints are met with inequalities, the federation is 
politically stable. The operative interval between the two bounds represents the region of 
political stability where the resource region is not wary of siphoning of its rent into areas it does 
not value. For all values circumscribed within the two bounds,   denotes a working quid pro quo 
between the producing region and the rest of the federation, with the net gain to the region as 
positive but not necessarily strictly positive. These gains may accrue through consumption of the 
federal public good or in the form of other intangible benefits received by the region by 
association with the rest of the federation. At the lower bound the non-producing regions are 
indifferent to the producing region‘s inclusion in the federation. At the upper bound, the 
producing region is indifferent to participating in the federation. Hence both bounds spell 
political instability for the federation constraining the federal government to choosing a value of 
  that lies strictly within the interval.  
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These benefits could be exemplified by reduced cost of regional security due to 
internalization of some parts of a border, high value of diversity, access to a larger market or 
gain in size as a country on the international stage increasing importance in global fora. If such 
benefits to the region are highly valued compared to the total rent of the exhaustible resource 
(and the sum of the national investment in public infrastructure is greater than the accruing rent, 
creating a stronger template for national economic development that in turn will be shared by the 
resource region), then the upper bound for α may not lie within the unit interval and will not be 
binding.
88
 The upper bound is given by the ratio of the total investment in public infrastructure to 
total contribution to national income by exhaustible resource mining deflated by the preference 
of long-lived public goods in the resource region.
89
 The denominator includes the returns to labor 
and capital in addition to the economic rent. This case will denote the situation where the non-
producing region‘s investment in the public infrastructure is also large. In this case, the benefits 
of association outweigh the diminished share of rent. In cases where the upper bound equals  , 
the federation approaches political instability. The value of   is the maximum the producing 
region is willing to agree to. As   approaches the upper bound, the situation characterizes 
heightened political awareness in the producing region, ready to question the cost of association 
in relation to the benefits.  
                                                          
88
 This situation would arise when the exhaustible resource mining revenues of all sorts are not a major economic 
activity in the country. Understandably, in such cases the value of the exhaustible resource rent to the resource 
region will not be a major factor in its relationship with the center. In case of Pakistan, this situation is demonstrated 
by Punjab‘s relationship with the center. In India Gujarat, Assam, Tamil Nadu, Rajasthan and Andhra Pradesh are 
the five states that have oil mining (Noronha & Srivastava, 2010) but compared with the investment in national 
public infrastructure, the oil revenues are not very large. 
89
 The deflationary factor ensures that there is a higher impact of high preference for long-lived goods on the upper 
bound of α.  
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When   is equal to the lower bound, it symbolizes a federation approaching instability.90 
The lower bound is the minimum the federation is willing to get from the resource region and 
continue to bestow the benefits of association.
91
 In this case the locus of instability is outside the 
resource region. To avoid political instability, the federal tax share is chosen as        . A 
detailed description of this argument is given in Appendix B.2.  
With efficient rent taxation in place, fiscal resources completely measured and multi-
tiered government in existence, the social planner solves the following problems:  
Problem 1. The federation levies a tax   on the exhaustible resource rent, leaving the 
remaining to the resource region; it also taxes the general base in both the regions at the same 
rate. Since the federal tax on the general base levied on the existing bases in the regions, it takes 
a higher amount of revenue from the richer region (which is the resource region also), but 
provides an equal amount of national public good to both regions delineating an implicit transfer 
to the poor region.  The subnational taxes in this case are allowed to be equal to the remainder of 
the general base. The resource region, therefore, in addition to the regional tax on the general 
base, by this principle levies a tax on the rent that completely siphons away all the remaining 
exhaustible resource rent. When the overall level of fiscal resource is determined in each region, 
the allocation to private goods is determined.
92
 The social planner maximizes a development 
function that allows a tradeoff between long-lived public goods and consumable public goods 
with a potentially higher social and planning valuation of the former.  
More concretely, the social planner maximizes the following objective function 
                                                          
90
 A good discussion of this situation is contained in McLure (1994) with reference to the Russian Federation. At the 
point in time producing oblasts retained most of the rent.  
91
 Using a game theoretic analysis, Treisman (1999) argues that outcomes of redistribution in federations depend on 
heterogeneity of population and degree of initial decentralization. The analysis establishes stability of federation as a 
function of heterogeneity and benefits acquired by regions, with the former determining the characteristics of public 
goods that are generated.  
92
 This treatment is similar to Qiao, Martinez-Vazquez and Xu (2008). 
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Subject to the constraints 
           
       
   
   
The results of this maximization problem are summarized in the following proposition: 
Proposition 1. Let       be the solution to Problem 1. Given that        ,  at the 
optimum 
(i) Tthe effect of   and  , the federal share of fiscal resource from the 
general base and exhaustible resource rents respectively, on long-lived public goods 
is determined as 
  
  
   and 
  
  
  , when            
       
   
   
(ii) If the share of federal share in rents is fixed at the least desirable level, or 
          , then 
  
  
   and 
  
  
  . If     
       
   
   , or the maximum 
acceptable to the producing region, 
  
  
  , indicating that there is no further effect 
on producing region’s investment in long-lived public goods. 
A property of the solution to Proposition 1 is given below: 
Property. Given that   is a policy variable and indicates preference for investment of 
fiscal resource in long-lived public goods in the federation, 
  
  
   and more poignantly 
  
  
  . 
In case of inequalities,the effect of   on   and   is zero. 
 The latter result is intuitively appealing indicating that at this level of the federal share of 
rent, the producing region does not alter investment in long-lived public goods. At this level of α, 
  
  
   and 
 α
  
  . If α    
       
   
  or the maximum acceptable to the producing region, 
  
 α
  , 
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indicating that there is no further effect on producing region‘s investment in long-lived public 
goods.  
This proposition delineates the most general case. In most cases, the choice of   will be 
plausibly maintained as an interior point of the interval. In this stark case, the effect of   on 
long-lived public goods is such that a higher preference for long-lived public goods like public 
infrastructure would entail a lower level of   and higher level of the regional share in the 
economic rent. Proposition 1 shows that subnational discretion in expenditure allocation, 
manifested through the choice of investment of available fiscal resource in long-lived public 
goods, plays out differently in response to federal choices. It emphasizes in relation to   that a 
policy choice aiming to build a higher stock of manufactured capital would integrate a decrease 
in   in its portfolio under certain conditions. In turn the conditions are given by the range of   
within the federal agreement interval. When   is not constrained as an interior point of the 
interval but fixed at either of the bounds, the policy choice becomes free of the effects of federal 
rent tax on investments in long-lived public goods. In case where   equals the lower bound, the 
regional investment in response to changes in   having peaked no longer demonstrate a further 
response. On the other side, when   is set as equal to the upper bound of the federal agreement 
interval, the negative response to the federal tax is exhausted with no further decrease in the 
regional investment in long-lived public goods.  
 
 Additional Cases Of Rent Assignment 
The general case is based on a stark model. To increase the scope of the model, certain 
assumptions are relaxed. The following problems set out the cases where earlier assumptions are 
relaxed and in some cases, new factors are brought into consideration.  
52 
 
 
 
Problem 2. In this case the federal level creates a heritage savings fund to visibly direct 
its tax revenue from the exhaustible resource rent into a para-budgetary facility that may in turn 
allocate funds to investment in long-lived public goods.
93
 The same depiction would denote the 
case where the federation formally assigns a fraction of its rent tax revenue to vertical programs 
for investment in long-lived public goods without creating a heritage sort of fund.
94
 One way to 
achieve this would be to set up a circumscribed capital grant. The social planner maximizes an 
objective function that still seeks to increase the size of long-lived public goods whilst at the 
same time offering a certain level of consumable public goods.  
The problem is given by the following maximization: 
              
Subject to the constraints 
           
       
   
   
Where      
                     
    
  
And       is the size of the heritage fund facility or the vertical program of capital 
investment and    is the federal preference for long-lived public goods denoted by the share of 
                                                          
93
 Heritage sort of funds are operating in many countries with the more recognized ones in Norway, United 
Kingdom, Netherlands in Europe and  Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan in Central Asia (Kalyuzhnova, 2006). In case of 
federal countries important ones operate in the Russian Federation, Venezuela and at the provincial level in Alberta, 
Canada. The Russian Federation set up a Stabilization Fund in 2004 to hold down excess liquidity in the economy 
(Tabata, 2007). In 2008 it was replaced by an ‗oil and gas transfer‘ in the federal budget which was defined as a 
percentage of anticipated GDP, as 6.1 percent in 2008, 5.5 percent in 2009, 4.5 percent in 2010 and 3.7 percent from 
2010 for the subsequent years. The remaining Mineral Extraction Tax and export duty revenues are channeled into 
the Reserve Fund till it exceeds 10 percent of GDP. Any additional amounts accruing toward it would then be placed 
in the National Wealth Fund. The Reserve Fund is a facility to compensate for revenue volatility in the federal 
budget arising out of commodity price fluctuations and the National Wealth Fund is designated as a resource for the 
pension system. The Stabilization Fund has been criticized as an option with low returns on investment compared 
with investment in infrastructure (For critiques of the fund see Popova, 2008).  
94
 A savings fund can be simply used to stager the public expenditure over time, absorbing the inflationary impact of 
natural resource revenue, without necessarily directing it to investments (see Davis et al., 2001a). In such a case it is 
a tool of fiscal policy aiming to smooth expenditures over time (Davis et al., 2001b) The treatment in Problem 2 is a 
simplification of the purposes of the fund, aiming to focus on the issue at hand.  
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the federal rent tax revenue directed to the fund facility. This is also equivalent to the size of the 
capital grants in comparison to the total federal rent tax revenue.  
The results of the maximization problem after setting up a heritage savings fund sort of 
facility at the federal level are given in the following proposition. 
Proposition 2. If       be the solution to Problem 2, given that a special savings fund 
directs a fraction of its total amount into long-lived public goods and the federal offset of 
exhaustible resource rent is chosen as an interior point in the interval           
       
   
   , 
(i)  the effect of the federal share of rent on investment in long-lived public 
goods is negative, provided that the preference for long-lived public goods in the 
producing region is greater than the preference for such goods at the federal level. If 
the preference is reversed, such that      , then effect is also reversed or 
  
  
  . 
However, if there is no difference in the preferences in the producing region and that 
at the federal level, ceteris paribus, 
  
  
  .  
(ii) if   is chosen to match either the lower or upper bound of the interval 
then, 
  
  
  . 
 
The Proposition shows that that the effect of the federal share from the exhaustible 
resource rent α, is governed by the ascendency of preference for long-lived public goods in the 
producing region.A property of the proposition is given below: 
Property. The effect of   on  , is not only negative but independent of the relative 
preferences for long-lived public goods. showing that in these cases it does not have an effect on 
the investment in long-lived public goods.  
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If the preferences for investment in long-lived public goods are the same in the producing 
region and at the federal level, then the change in   has no effect on investment in long-lived 
public goods. In such a situation, rent tax assignment would also be neutral to change in the 
stock of long-lived public goods. This result however, is subject to a stringent requirements. In 
addition to the equivalence of preferences, it will require the fund facility to be transparent, 
predictably managed and buttressed against perverse usage. The real life examples of natural 
resource savings funds do not provide many examples which could meet these conditions. 
Intuitively, Proposition 2 indicates that fixing   at the highest possible level would have no 
substitution effect on long-lived goods; any reduction in the fiscal resource in Region A would 
be adjusted in consumable public goods. The key point in this case is the decision to hypothecate 
a known fraction of the savings fund to investment in public infrastructure. In practice this may 
not happen as easily. In case of Norway, which is not a federation, the fund mechanism has made 
a transparent allocation to savings over current expenditures. On the other hand other 
experiences have not been always sanguine, current expenditures taking precedence over 
investment and discretionary policy holding sway over rules. Venezuela is characterized by 
centralization of oil revenue as well as failure to successfully operate a fund with transparency 
and predictability guaranteed by rules (Fasano, 2000).  
 
Problem 3. As before, two regions A and B, comprise a federation with exhaustible 
resource located in Region A only. An equalization transfer is made from the federal government 
to the poor region.
95
 For simplicity of exposition we assume that the transfer achieves complete 
                                                          
95
 The incentive effects of transfers in creation of infrastructure and locational efficiency are valid issues. For 
discussion see Petchey (2009). In the discussion here I am abstracting from this issue to focus on the effects of rent 
tax assignment.  
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equalization.
96
  The social planner maximizes an objective function under the same constraints as 
in the general case and the transfer is incorporated in the objective function. 
The problem can be written as: 
              
Subject to the constraints 
           
        
    
   
Where      
                 
    
  and              
The results of the maximization problems are given below in the proposition. 
 
Proposition 3. Let       be the solution to Problem 3. At the optimum,  
(i) if the federal  share of exhaustible resource rent is such that it is an 
interior point in the interval           
       
   
   , then  
  
  
    
(ii) if the federal offset share of exhaustible resource rent is chosen equal to 
either the lower bound or the upper bound of the interval, then  
  
  
   and  
  
  
  . 
From the proposition, it is evident that the effects of change in the policy variable   is 
manifestly characterized by 
  
  
   and  
 α
  
  . 
This shows that a general equalization transfer does not have any effect on the level of 
investment in long-lived public goods that is determined by the general model. In this 
formulation, the general equalization transfer is equivalent to the implicit transfer in the general 
model specified in Problem 1 as they result in the same effects on investment in long-lived 
public goods. An increase in the federal offset of the resource rent will still have a negative effect 
                                                          
96
 This is admittedly a strong assumption but it describes the highest impact of transfers on the variables of interest.  
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on investment in long-lived public goods. A general equalization scheme may serve some 
important purpose in a federation, but it does not take away the effect of federal offset from 
investment in public infrastructure. Given that there would be differences in regional preferences 
for long-lived public goods, equalization transfer per se does not have an impact on spending 
decisions in the non-producing region. The result shown in Proposition 3 however differs in one 
respect from that in Proposition 1. The negative effect of an increase in   will be smaller in this 
case compared with the case with implicit transfer.
97
   
 
Problem 4. The federation sets up an equalization transfer out of the rent tax pool 
generated through the federal rent tax α. Region A does not receive any transfer but only Region 
B is entitled due to its relatively weak general tax base.
98
 For simplicity of exposition, we assume 
that in this case, the federal government does not set up a heritage sort of savings fund facility.  
The social planner in this case maximizes an objective function that incorporates this type 
of transfer but is subject to the same constraints. It is given by: 
              
Subject to the constraints 
           
       
    
   
Where      
                        
    
   and         is the share of the federal 
rent tax revenue set aside for the transfer pool, taking a value equal to zero if no transfers are 
                                                          
97
 Comparing equations (1.6) and (3.4) in the Appendix, it is evident that the denominator in (3.4) is greater than the 
denominator in (1.6). This is because , as the former includes the equalization transfer.  
98
 This problem is a simplified version of the case of the Russian Federation from 2004 onward. The equalization 
transfers in Russia are not made explicitly from a fund financed by oil and gas revenues. However, the size of the 
total federal transfers to regions compares as half of the total oil and gas revenue accumulating to the federal budget 
(Kurlyandskaya, Pokatovich & Subbotin, 2010). Considering the fungibility of the funds in the federal budget, it is 
easy to argue that a fraction of the equalization transfer pool is financed by the oil and gas rent tax revenue.  
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made from the rent tax revenue of the federal government and equal to one when the entire 
amount of the federal rent tax is designated as the transfer pool.  
The results obtained from this maximization are summarized in the following proposition 
and the proof is recorded in the Appendix B.1.  
Proposition 4. Let’s say       is the solution to the maximization set up in Problem 4. At 
the optimum,  
(i) given that the federal rent tax   is chosen from the interior of the interval 
          
       
   
   , the effect of change in   is such that 
  
  
   if    is greater 
than    deflated by  , the share of the federal rent tax set aside for the transfer pool.  
(ii) If   is set equal to either of the bounds, then 
  
  
  .  
A property of Proposition 4(i) is that:  the effect of the policy variable is on the federal 
rent tax is given by 
  
  
  . 
This important result demonstrates that both the preference for long-lived public goods in 
the non-producing regions and the share of the federal rent tax revenue designated for the 
transfer pool will influence the effect on investment in long-lived public goods. Since       
by assumption and the upper bound of the value of   is no greater than 1, the transfer scheme is 
still a weaker arrangement compared with decentralization of rent taxation. There would be 
however, no difference between derivation based sharing and decentralization of rent tax. As 
long as the producing region has a higher preference for long-lived public goods, the transfers 
financed by the federal rent tax revenue do not provide a more efficient mechanism to increase 
investments in the stock of national infrastructure. The limits of the potential of this policy 
choice are further clarified if the assumption on preferences is relaxed. If      , showing a 
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reversal of preferences, the results do not immediately change to a positive effect on long-lived 
public goods. Since the direction of effect is still controlled by the product     , the only 
straightforward case with the change to a positive effect is when    . However, if     then 
despite      , the effect of an increase in the federal rent tax may not be positive. The 
minimum condition for reversal of the effect of   on  of course would be         .  
 
Problem 5. In this case, the resource region is the poorer region with only a small 
fraction of the general tax base located in its jurisdictional confines.
99
 Assuming there is a federal 
grant set up to provide resources to Region A, the impact will be the same as the case set out in 
Problem 3 with the exception that the choice of the transfer will be from the rent tax pool. In this 
case, the claim on economic rent of the exhaustible resource becomes even more significant with 
a higher local political appeal. These aspects are incorporated in the model by primarily 
redefining the first inequality in Equation (6). Since      , it implies that       and the 
lower bound of   is negative.100 This means that only if   is not strictly positive and      , 
the desired high expenditure on long-lived public assets in Region A will be sustained.
101
 The 
maximization problem is:  
              
Subject to the constraints 
           
       
    
   
Where      
                  
    
  and                   
                                                          
99
 This is not atypical of many exhaustible resource mining regions in the world.  
100
 In fact the lower bound of  is not strictly positive, if , indicating relative poverty of the producing region 
in terms of the general tax base.  
101
 Since  is a tax rate or effective tax rate, it can be easily understood as non-negative. The negative range can be 
understood as a case for explicit federal transfer as a stability condition.  
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The results of this problem are summarized in the following proposition and the sketch of 
a proof is given in the Appendix B.1. 
Proposition 5. Let       be the solution to the maximization set up in Problem 5.  
(i) Then if   is chosen as an interior point of the interval            
       
   
    such that    , then the effect of a change in the federal tax rate on the 
exhaustible resource rent is given as 
  
  
  . If   is chosen as equal to the lower or 
upper bound, there is no effect on the investment on long-lived public goods, same as 
discussed under earlier propositions. The same results will apply if    , except that 
it is better understood as a transfer.  
A property of Proposition 5(i) is that: A policy with increasing consideration for long-
lived public goods would see 
  
  
  . 
In some cases the producing regions are poorer than the rest of the country. This is 
probably the case in most developing countries. Problem 5 shows that in this situation the 
producing region‘s claim on the economic rent of its exhaustible resource is even stronger. Even 
when the main results as summarized in Proposition 5 are no different from the general case, it is 
the low range of the federal rent tax that is noteworthy. The low values of   denote the higher 
tolerance for low federal taxes in the federation. The stability condition at the lower bound may 
be    , indicating a recognition of the region‘s low general tax base. If the stability condition 
is in this range, it is not binding. In other words, very low   will be acceptable to the federation 
and there is no strictly positive value of the federal rent tax that will be considered too low to 
affect the stability of the federation.  
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Problem 6. Federal government may have instituted a reasonable degree of tax 
decentralization. This notion can be captured in two ways. First, by simply ensuring that 
     , the tax decentralization on the general base can be spelt out. In this case the analysis 
presented under Problems 1 to 5 will apply except that the marginal impact of increases in   and 
  would be smaller than in those cases. The results would extend to 
  
  
 and 
  
  
. The second way 
of explicitly allowing for differential tax choices in the regions offers more interesting analysis, 
depicting specific ranges of local tax policy choices. To allow for this, the available fiscal 
resource in the regions is itself considered a function of local tax policy after the federal 
government has made its tax known. Hence             and              , where   
and   are the regional tax levels defined as          , such that if either   or   is chosen equal 
to 1, then the region chooses its tax at the maximum level in their respective regions. It would be 
useful to clarify that   and   are repositories of tax policy and administration. Higher tax rates 
and effective administration will be denoted by higher values getting closer to 1.
102
    is the level 
of tax capacity in each region.
103
 Given, these details, the social planner in this case solves the 
following problem.
104
 
              
Subject to the constraints 
                                                          
102 It is easy to argue, following (Bahl & Linn, 1992) that local tax policy and administration together constitute the 
tax effort : 
 
Where  tax revenue,  demand or calculated revenue, assessed value, tax base as defined under the 
policy and  total income;  collection efficiency,  administration effect,  assessment ratio and  
base effect. Here  , for region i.  
103
 If  and the regional tax is levied at the maximum feasible level so as to collect all the available revenue, the 
problem reduces to the general model.  
104
 The regional taxes are not choice variables for the central social planner.  
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The results of the maximization problems are given in the following propositions. 
Proposition 6. Let       solve the maximization set out in Problem 6.  
(i) If Region A lowers its tax after the federal government has levied   on the 
economic rent from the exhaustible resource, the effect on long-lived public goods 
investment is given by 
  
  
  . 
(ii) In Region B the effect of change in the applicable regional tax is given by 
  
  
  .  
The results here show that the effects of local taxes on infrastructure investment are 
independent of the federal rent tax. For the general model and its various variations, we assumed 
local taxes to be at the efficient level to focus on the effects of federal rent tax on public 
infrastructure. When the local taxes are allowed to vary, they indicate an income effect on 
investment in long-lived public goods that is independent of the difference in preference for 
long-lived public goods in each region.  
 
In all the cases presented above, the preference for long-lived goods    is treated as a 
constant. However, it is plausible to say that it may change over long range due to immigration 
and urbanization. In both cases but in the latter eventuality in particular,    may increase due to 
the type of infrastructure that is required.
105
 Using the general model for simplicity of exposition 
we allow for changes in   . The results of this analysis are presented in the following property of 
Proposition 1 and sketch of a proof is provided in the Appendix B.1. 
                                                          
105
 In case of India, Pradhan (2007) argues that infrastructure has contributed to the degree of urbanization in the 
states.  
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Proposition 7. When Problem 1 is solved by      , then at the optimum, a change in the 
preference for long-lived public goods over consumable public goods is given by    and 
  
   
 
 .  
This proposition lays out an important policy consideration: if a community owning an 
exhaustible resource is initially inclined toward meeting higher levels of consumption of public 
goods due to historically lower standards of public goods, it is quite conceivable that this may 
not be a long term preference. Once the threshold is crossed and a higher preference for long-
lived public goods in manifested, the effect on investment in long-lived public goods will 
become positive. Secondarily, if government follows a policy of urbanization, the preference for 
long-lived public goods may change in an erstwhile rural producing region and it will have 
implications for the federal rent tax.  
 
Increase in economic rent is possible if world commodity prices increase while the costs 
of inputs do not change majorly.
106
 Using the general model, the maximization problem 
remaining the same but the impact of changes in revenue from the exhaustible resource on 
investment in long-lived goods can evaluated. The results are summarized in the following 
property of Proposition 1 with the sketch of a proof in the Appendix B.1. 
Proposition 8. Let       solve the maximization problem set out in Problem 1 as before. 
Then a change in  can be modeled as 
  
  
   and the effect of federal tax on long-lived public 
goods as before will be 
  
  
  .  
                                                          
106
 The increase in oil prices Between 2005 and 2007 provide ready examples of increase in rent tax revenue in 
Russia and Canada.  
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Property of Proposition 8. The two effects work in opposite directions and depend on the 
size of general tax base relative to natural resource revenues accruing to the economy. The effect 
of  , dominates even for small ratios of 
 
        
 or the size of the natural resource revenue 
relative to a product of public expenditures and investments on long-lived public goods. The 
dominance is an increasing function of preference of long-lived public good investments in 
Region A,   . The higher the   the lower will be the ratio of  to the product of total public 
expenditure and investment on long-lived public goods.  
This result provides an important insight. If the total revenue from exhaustible resource 
extraction increases due to a change in world prices, the overall effect on investment in long-
lived public goods will be positive, an income effect. At the same time, an increase in the federal 
rent tax, will depress such investments, going counter to the income effect. Surprisingly, a larger 
  compared with the general tax base ensure that the effect of change in   dominates the income 
effect.  
 
 Conclusion 
The theoretical model presented in this chapter attempts to link rent assignment with 
expenditure choices. It does not compulsorily constrain the producing regions to have a higher 
preference for investment in long-lived public goods. The model only posits that it may be 
plausible that producing regions do have higher preferences for investment of rents. Examples 
are there where subnational jurisdictions or countries have created facilities for retention of rent 
proceeds. The model contributes an analytic device which incorporates a number of variables 
toward building a theory of rent assignment: (a) it links rent assignment decisions to expenditure 
outcomes; (b) differences in preferences for investment in long-lived public goods among 
64 
 
 
 
regions are explicitly allowed;  (c) difference in tax base or general income levels is allowed and 
its impact on rent assignment outcomes are laid out; (d) the benefits derived from being in a 
federation, as opposed to an autonomous existence, are used as a constraint for describing the 
choices faced by producing regions; (e) the policy choice of rent shares are described by using a 
constraint which balances producing region‘s benefits of association against rent revenues; (f) 
the effect of changes in federal share at the expense of producing regions on investment in long-
lived public goods are shown to be non-neutral.  
The model provides a framework for observing the effect of rent sharing choices between 
producing regions and the rest of the country within the ambit of development policy. Policy 
preference may be different than resident preference. Governments may deem investment in 
long-lived public goods as a higher or lower public good, depending upon whether they are 
facing elections, embarking on a nation building exercise or attempting to attract private 
investment and businesses in a competitive international market.  
While rent revenues are important from a stabilization point of view, they have a place in 
development policy from the investment perspective. The subnational governments pursue their 
own investment (and expenditure) choices within the federal confines. One way to constrain such 
choices is to create conditional grants for pursuing federal objectives. While these may be 
necessary in some cases, they are not an instrument of choice for federal policy priorities in 
general. Investment in infrastructure can be financed by federal grants but due to substitution 
effects they may not achieve a sufficiently high investment in public infrastructure at the regional 
level. On the other hand, if producing regions exhibit a higher preference for investment in long-
lived public goods, federal policy may interfere with it by collecting higher percentages of rent at 
the federal level. The higher preference for long-lived public goods and higher emphasis of 
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federal policy on investment in infrastructure would together best be harnessed by allowing 
higher shares of rent revenue to the producing regions. The higher shares of course do not mean 
they should necessarily ignore the macroeconomic concerns. Such issues should be explicitly 
addressed through adoption of appropriate fiscal rules instead of the crude vehicle of rent 
assignment. Higher federal rent retention may help mitigate macroeconomic concerns but may 
also result in lower investment of rents.   
The model shows that rent assignment or sharing between federal government and 
producing regions may have effects on investment in long-lived public goods or public 
infrastructure. A development policy laying a strong emphasis on increase in the stock of public 
infrastructure or investment in public infrastructure may under certain circumstances plausibly 
reduce the federal share of rent revenues and allow them to flow to the producing regions. This 
result shows that some additional thought must be given to regional claims on rent revenue. In 
addition to assuaging political demands, it may well have a rational justification in the form of 
higher investment in public infrastructure.  
  
66 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 3 The Effects of Rent Share Changes on Public Investment in the Regions of 
Russia 
 
Introduction 
A decrease in the share of resource rent tax revenues may lead to a reduction in 
subnational government current and capital expenditures. Whether the decrease affects both 
current and capital expenditures or not depends on a number of factors, including the demand 
elasticity of expenditures by subnational governments, taxing powers of the subnational 
governments, and the existence of other types of transfers. An important but less emphasized 
factor is the ownership of exhaustible resources and under its influence expenditure choices 
made for the rent revenue. To study this question, an empirical analysis of the case of the 
Russian Federation is presented in this chapter. For this analysis the implicit assumption is that 
the producing regions have a higher sense of ownership than the federal government, having 
consequences for expenditure choices. This assumption is further elaborated in Chapter 4.  
Propositions 1 and 2 presented in Chapter 2 show that an increase in the federal share of 
rent will have a negative effect on investment in public infrastructure. Proposition 2 differs from 
Proposition 1 in that it includes explicit federal transfers to regions. The transfers are 
unconditional allowing regions to follow their own expenditure choices. This key theoretical 
result yields three testable questions: whether change in federal share at the expense of producing 
regions has an effect on investment in the regions, whether this effect is negative, and what is the 
quantum of this effect. Derived from these, following are the specific empirical questions studied 
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here: (a) what is the effect of a decrease in the share of resource rent tax revenues on investment 
in fixed public goods in the regions of Russia; and (b) what is the effect of rent tax share 
reduction on total expenditure when investments and total expenditures are simultaneous 
choices. Both questions use two different definitions of subnational investment in fixed public 
capital as explained later. The decrease in regional shares of rent tax may be compensated by an 
increase in federal (and in turn regional to local) transfers.
107
 To account for this, transfers and 
total subnational revenue are used as explanatory variables in addition to other controls. The 
three questions are part of the broader discussion  of the effects of tax assignment on subnational 
public goods. 
The changes in the regional shares of rent tax revenue accruing from taxation of oil and 
gas extraction in recent years offers a quasi natural experiment to study the questions. The 
Russian Federation reduced the regional share of rent tax revenue generated from oil and gas 
mining from 60 percent of total revenue that the regions received till 2002 to 20 percent from 
2002 onward. The regional share of rent tax revenue was further reduced to 15 percent in the 
following year. In case of gas revenue, the share was reduced to zero from 2004 onward whereas 
from oil mineral extraction tax, it was further reduced to 5 percent of the collections. The 
regional shares were calculated on derivation basis. A regional share of zero from all resource 
rent tax revenue will apply from 2010 onward. The progressive changes in the regional shares of 
resource rent tax have directly affected 37 producing regions only, while the remaining 46 
regions remain unaffected. This chapter uses three program evaluation methods to estimate the 
effect of rent tax revenue share reduction on subnational investment in fixed public capital. 
Different measures of investment in fixed public capital are annually reported and they serve as 
measurable additions to the stock of long-lived public goods. The terms long-lived public goods 
                                                          
107
 Unless the context implies otherwise, regional refers to regions and local governments in that region.  
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and fixed public capital are used interchangeably throughout the discussion although the former 
has a wider meaning.  
The empirical questions discussed in this chapter arise from the propositions of the 
theoretical model in the chapter above. The theoretical model for rent tax assignment in a 
federation was framed using the policy choice between investment in long-lived public goods 
and maintaining a certain level of current public expenditures. Given the assumed differential 
preferences for investment in long-lived goods across regions in a federation, the theoretical 
propositions show that a reduction in the subnational share of rent tax revenue will in general 
have a negative effect on subnational investment in long-lived public goods and this will be 
scaled by the differences in preference between current expenditure and investment. The increase 
in the federal share of resource rent taxes, at the expense of regions in Russia, is a real life 
occurrence that closely resembles the theoretical model. The second precept in the model 
assumes  a certain inertia in current public expenditures and a higher preference of long lived 
public goods in the producing regions. These are testable questions. If these assumptions hold 
there will be a decline in investments in long-lived public goods in the producing regions.  
The theoretical model also showed that there will be a decrease in the overall investment 
in long-lived public goods across all regions if the central government preference for long-lived 
goods is less than the producing region. Another important result was that federal to subnational 
transfers do not compensate for the increase in the federal share and the decline in investments in 
long-lived public goods will continue despite the transfers. The only exception to this result was 
the case of a conditional federal transfer for capital investment in the subnational jurisdictions. 
The quasi natural experiment of rent tax share reduction in Russia affords an opportunity for 
employing an empirical test of these theoretical propositions. In accordance with the theoretical 
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propositions, the effect on investment in long lived public goods is estimated using controls that 
comprise fiscal parameters, structural variables, demand variables and measures of economic 
activity. Three program evaluation methods are used although only the results from the first one 
are discussed in this chapter. The other two are presented in Appendix C.3. Using the first 
method, we have estimated the effect of rent share reduction using difference-in-differences 
estimators. The results of the matching estimator and propensity score estimation are given in 
Appendix C.3 as robustness checks. To provide an appropriate context to estimation of the policy 
change on investment in long lived public goods, we have also attempted to establish a set of 
determinants of public capital investment. Using some of the earlier studies, we have identified 
variables that have been found to significantly affect investment in long lived public goods in 
other countries. We have also added a set of additional controls drawing from structural, 
demographic, demand and economic variables that could intuitively influence public investment.  
The chapter is organized in five sections. Section 1 lays out the empirical models with a 
discussion of control variables and assumptions maintained on the data for identification of 
average treatment effects. Section 2 provides a description of the data. The variables of interest 
have been described along with source of data. Section 3 is an overview of descriptive statistics. 
They have been presented by treatment status to set the stage for the following analysis. 
Additional statistics suited to program evaluation methods have also been listed. Following this 
discussion, in Section 4 presents a summary of important results from different estimations. 
Section 5 concludes the paper.  
 
70 
 
 
 
 Empirical models 
 Multiple treatments and groups of regions 
Mineral Exrtaction Tax, levied under the Tax Code of the Russian Federation is the main 
rent tax collection instrument since the tax reform. At the beginning of the decade, in 2000 the 
producing regions were still awarded 60 percent of the revenue from resource rent taxes on 
derivation basis. The initial high shares were a continuing result of the successful bargaining of 
the resource rich regions with the center in the mid 1990s (Bahl and Martinez-Vazquez, 2006). 
These taxes were levied as license fees, royalty, excise duty and other  instruments. For the 
period of this dataset 2000 to 2007, Mineral Extraction Tax levied as a production excise 
remained the predominant resource rent tax.
108
 It has been levied at a uniform rate on all types of 
oil and gas mines
109
 not discriminating on the basis of differences in quality, cost of production 
or time of operation.
110
 The regional share of revenue collected under oil and gas taxes was 60 
percent of the total in 2000 and 2001. As part of the ongoing recentralization of assignments, the 
regional share of rent revenue was reduced to 20 percent of collections in 2002. The reduction 
applied to both oil and gas taxes. In 2004 the region‘s share in oil tax revenue was reduced to 15 
percent and that on gas to zero. From 2005 onward the share from oil revenue was further 
reduced to 5 percent while it remained at zero for the revenue from gas. The reductions of the 
two tax shares, those of rent taxes on oil and gas, are identified as multiple treatments. For the 
                                                          
108
 The Strategies and Measures to Improve the Tax System submitted to the Duma proposed simplification of taxes 
(Martinez-Vazquez, Rider & Wallace, 2008). The tax reform brought about by adoption of a new tax code in 2001 
simplified mineral taxation by eliminating most minor taxes and created a unified Mineral Extraction Tax by 
combining subsurface mineral tax and excise duty on minerals (Chua, 2003).  
109 The gross revenue of the oil sector increased from $53.1 billion in 2000 to around $200 billion in 2006; the tax 
revenue during this time period reached 125.2 billion from an initial collection of $14.8 billion (Yuriy Bobylev 
―Reformu nado prodolzhat‘ (Reform Should Be Continued),‖ Neft’ Rossii, 1:72–77, 2008) quoted in Alexeev and 
Conrad, 2009, p.98).  
110
 Of late some exceptions to the rule have been made (Kurlyandskaya et al, 2010). But these do not apply to the 
time period included in the data in general having application to new projects in three regions in the far east 
commencing from January 2007.  
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models, the treatments are specified as reduction in oil tax revenue share, gas tax revenue share 
and oil and gas taxes revenue share. There are three reductions in oil tax revenue shares, two in 
gas revenue share and three for oil and gas tax taken together. In all there are eight treatments but 
each applies only to a group of regions and not others.   
The regions fall in two broad categories of producing and non-producing regions. The 
latter are the control group for the policy change treatment. Out of the 83 subjects of the Russian 
Federation, either oil or gas or both have been mined in 38 regions during the time period 
between 2000 and 2007. Out of these regions 36 produce oil. From 2000 to 2007, oil was 
produced in varying quantities in all of the 36 producing regions although for some years there 
are missing observations. No production is indicated in case of 8 regions for two years or less. 
This indicates no production or no reporting. Similarly, gas is mined in 32 regions. No 
production is however reported in 6 of these regions for two years or less indicating no 
production or no reporting. In one case, Chukotka Autonmous District, mining was reported for 
2006 only. Out of these regions, both oil and gas are mined in 30 regions. Only oil production in 
this time period has been reported in 9 regions and only gas mining in 5 regions. The cases of 
missing values, where neither oil or gas production value is reported in an otherwise producing 
region, are 6 regions. We have classified the 37 regions where both oil and gas or either of the 
two commodities have been mined from 2000 to 2007 as the producing regions. They are further 
subdivided as oil only regions, 9 cases, gas only regions, 5 observations during the time period, 
and oil and gas regions, 30 observations over the years. The remaining 45 regions are the non-
producing regions which are spread across the territory of Russia. To avoid overlaps between the 
two groups, we do not reclassify producing regions out of this group even if no production is 
reported for a certain year. As indicated above, such years are not many except for one region, 
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Chukotka Autonomous Okrug. This region is kept in the non-producing category and dropped 
from estimation because of other missing values. On this basis, 37 regions are classified as 
producing regions. All of them are in the general treatment group. The remaining 46 regions 
constitute the control group. All the oil and gas producing regions have been included in this 
analysis. Some earlier discussions of mining regions and their effect on fiscal policy have 
focused on the rich oil producing regions only.  
The variation in the number of regions where oil and gas has been produced during 2000 
to 2007 presents certain problems as well as certain opportunities for analysis. The variation 
within the producing regions allows creation of more than one treated groups. This has been 
exploited as the multiple treatments. However, the fact that certain regions have missing values 
for some years creates an issue for their placement in the treated group in that particular year. To 
identify treatment effects no overlap can be allowed between the treated and control groups. To 
ensure that this requirement is fulfilled the membership of the two groups is defined as constant, 
with no year to year changes between them. This is plausible because a producing region‘s 
revenue shares apply have future expectations as well. The investment or expenditure decisions 
are influenced by the annual revenue shares as well as future expectation of revenue. Therefore 
even if production does not take place in a certain year, investment decisions will still be 
influenced by long term revenue expectations and remaining stocks of petroleum. 
 
 Specification 
The variation in treatments and the variation in producing regions is valuable and is 
exploited by the following models. The first model is based on the multiple treatment models 
presented in Gruber (1994), Waldfogel (1999) and Baum (2003). The model uses multiple 
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groups and multiple treatments to make full use of the variations in application of treatments that 
have changed over time. The model can be written as:  
                                                                 
Where     is a measure of investment in fixed public capital or acquisition of new capital 
by subnational government on account of debt financing or private sector donations,    is a 
treatment group,       ,     is treatment,        ,    is a vector of control variables, 
       ,         , is a vector of dummy variables for the regions and      ,        , is a 
vector of year dummies.
111
   s signify the difference between the mean values of the outcome in 
the groups in the pretreatment period.    s indicate the effect of treatment   and    is the 
difference-in-difference (DD) estimator. Inclusion of controls is important to ensure that factors 
affecting investment are included in the estimations. 
   is a vector of variables having a bearing on investment in public capital and includes 
fiscal variables, structural variables, measures of economic activity and demand factors 
(discussed in detail in the following sub-section). The inclusion of control variables creates an 
analytic framework where the effects on the outcome from other variables are allowed.  
The region and time dummies are included to pick up time-invariant region specific 
effects and time varying effects.  The inclusion of year dummies provides sufficient regularity in 
estimating effects of specific time period effects. Time trend on the other hand captures the 
overall growth in investment due to time.  . In this case, the following version is estimated with 
fixed effects: 
                        
                                                                     
                                                          
111
 In some estimations, year dummies are replaced by a time trend to manage collinearity between treatment periods 
and years.  
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The second model uses approximation in treatments to estimate yearly effects. All the 
producing regions in this case are placed in a single treatment group and the remaining regions 
serve as the control group. There is therefore only one treatment group dummy variable,   , 
which equals 1 if the region is a producing region, 0 otherwise. Each year after 2002 is specified 
with a separate dummy variable,      ,              . The argument for annualized 
effects of treatment is plausible due to the fact that investments may be decided with a certain 
time lag and would manifest through annual budgetary allocations. This model attempts to 
capture the well known fact that there is a time lag in planning and implementation of capital 
investments. Using the same control variables as employed in the first model, the following 
equation is used for estimation: 
          
                                                                    
Where    is a difference in differences estimator giving the effect of policy change on 
investment in the producing regions. Another version of the model is employed using fixed 
effects:  
                                                                              
In order to jointly estimate the effect of policy change on the entire post-treatment period, 
another version of the model is estimated:  
                                                                  
Where       is a dummy variable taking a value of 1 if the year is from 2002 to 2007, 0 
otherwise.   ,    , in this case is a difference in differences estimator capturing the effect of 
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rent tax share reduction on investment in infrastructure. The model is also estimated using fixed 
effects.  
Lastly, to estimate the treatment effects for both investments in public capital and current 
public expenditures, the choices are treated as simultaneous. The theoretical model laid out in 
Chapter 2 also incorporates a simultaneous choice between long lived public goods and total 
expenditure in its second term. The empirical model arising out of the theoretical model is a set 
of seemingly unrelated equations as below: 
                                                                                  
                                                                                   
Where the first equation is the same as equation (1) and in the second equation    is the 
current expenditure in region i in year t and    is vectors of variables having an effect on total 
expenditures. All other variables in equation (7) are the same as defined above.  
The estimations in most cases employ panel data with fixed effect, heteroskedasticity 
robust models. Ignoring the treatment in the shape of tax share reductions, the investment in 
fixed public capital is a function of explanatory variables 
               
where     is a type of investment in fixed public capital in region i in year t,          
and              .     is a m-dimensional vector of explanatory variables and     is the 
unobserved heterogeneity. To capture all the features of the regional level data, the structure of 
the error term includes both region and time variant heterogeneity and region specific 
components. In other words, 
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where    is the region specific, time invariant unobserved effect,    is the time effect that 
is the same to all regions and     varies for both regions and time periods.  
There are two measures of the dependent variable in equations (3.1) to (3.6). The first 
measure, investment in fixed public goods is a real value of investment financed from 
subnational government budgets. This measure captures only the formal budgetary choices. 
Although it does not capture the entire range of infrastructure investment by subnational 
governments, it does provide a clear indication of how much of the available fiscal resource is 
allocated to investment. In other words, rent revenues included in the fiscal resource are part of 
this variable and it indicates how much of the rent or other revenue is invested. The second 
measure is included to capture the peculiarity of lingering effects of the Soviet system of 
financing infrastructure. Subnational governments get developed infrastructure facilities from 
private sector and commercial state enterprises. This could be counted as a form of hypothecated 
taxation. Some infrastructure is financed by debt. The second measure of investment, labeled as 
acquisition of fixed public investment, comprises of budgetary investment, donated infrastructure 
and debt financing of fixed public capital.   
The empirical model uses changes in revenue shares as treatments. It could be argued that 
despite changes in shares, the actual revenues may change differently due to changes in 
extraction and world oil and gas prices. The model uses share changes to signify treatment for 
three reasons; (a) the implicit argument here, and explicitly included in the theoretical model in 
Chapter 2, is that the change in investment preference is linked to resource ownership 
perceptions manifested through higher shares for producing regions. It is this mechanism which 
creates a higher preferences for investment of exhaustible resource rents in the producing 
regions. (b) the revenue effects may not be distinguishable from other income effects and 
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therefore it would add little value to model them separately let‘s say from real GRP or general 
measures of real subnational revenue. (c) The changes in oil and gas prices are collinear with 
time. The extracted amounts are reported on annual basis. Inclusion of time trend and year 
dummies would be able to pick any effects due to changes in oil and gas revenues over and 
above changes in rent shares.  However, to insure that these are plausible reasons for not 
including the revenues flows from oil and gas mining in the producing regions, equations were 
re-estimated with inclusion of measures of oil and gas values. The discussion in Section 4 refers 
to these issues.  
It is also important to note that oil and gas are not the only exhaustible resources in the 
regions of Russia. Other precious minerals and coal mining also takes place in some regions. 
During the time period for which data have been included in this analysis, changes in revenue 
shares of other resource taxes were not made. Therefore, any effects should not overlay the 
effects of changes in the share of revenues flowing from oil and gas taxes. Assuming that rent 
revenues are diverted to long-lived public goods, it can be said that the results would be biased 
downward due to omission of any variable signifying other mineral stories in the model.  
 
 Control variables.  
A vector of control variables,   , is included in all the models. Estimation of policy 
change embedded in a structural model has advantages as discussed by Heckman (2010). The 
fiscal variables include gross regional product per capita (as a measure of the general tax base), 
revenue per capita, value of transfers per capita and total expenditure per capita. All the fiscal 
variables are computed as real values. As indicated in the correlation matrix (in a following 
section), revenue and expenditure have a high correlation through the balanced budget constraint, 
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so only one of them is used in alternative specifications. The structural variables include log of 
population, population density, urbanization, stock of fixed capital and farmland. Population 
below working age, public enrolment, number of outpatient visits fixed by available 
infrastructure, volume of transported goods, bus passengers and car ownership are the demand 
factors. The selection of controls is based partially on earlier work on establishing determinants 
of investment in public infrastructure. Additionally, controls that affect demand for public 
infrastructure have been added.  
Much guidance could not be found on determinants of public investment in long-lived 
public goods. The selection of independent variables for the model has relied on two methods. 
The first method uses variables discussed in other studies that have attempted to identify 
determinants of public investment. The second method uses theoretical considerations of demand 
for public goods. The first set of variables uses the few studies on the subject that are available. 
One such study is by Sturm (2001). The study has identified a number of variables as 
determinants of investment in public infrastructure and presented empirical estimates for 123 
non-OECD countries.
112
 In another study, using data on 22 OECD countries, Sturm (2003) finds 
that political and institutional variables account for much of the public spending on capital 
goods. The analysis uses cross country data and therefore controls for differences in 
macroeconomic situations have been also included. Similar results are found in the European 
Union context by Pitlik (2010).
113
 For the estimation of determinants of public infrastructure in 
the regions of Russia we have only included gross domestic product (real gross regional product) 
                                                          
112
 The study uses three sets of determinants: (a) structural variables: degree of urbanization, population growth; (b) 
economic variables: real economic growth, government budget deficits, interest payments, private investment, 
foreign aid, openness, foreign direct investment; (c) political and institutional variables: ideology, electoral cycles, 
coalition variables, economic and political freedom, political instability. It presents evidence of significance for 
urbanization pct., increasing deficits, private investment (as substitute), foreign aid, openness and political variables.  
113
 Others have tested for fiscal rules and structural factors; for example see Stančík and Välilä (2009).  
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and population growth rate from the list in Sturm (2001). We do not have data on subnational 
political composition of regional legislatures. The other reason for not including the political 
variables is that the Russian case is different than European countries included in the Sturm 
samples. Other variables included from the Strum studies are a measure of agriculture, 
urbanization and population growth rate.
114
  
The second set of variables included in the model is based on theoretical considerations 
for demand of long-lived public goods. These variables are of four types: fiscal parameters, 
structural variables, demand variables and measures of economic activity. Revenue per capita 
would plausibly have an income effect on investments. On the other hand real value of federal 
transfers to regions should also have a differential impact than total revenue.
115
 The conditions 
on transfers and inframarginal nature of most transfers may channel them toward existing 
regional priorities. Some transfers may carry conditions such as capital investment only. This 
will lead to an unclear effect of transfers on investments in public capital. We have therefore 
included the overall real revenue per capita and real value per capita of federal transfers to 
regions.
116
 The second subset comprising structural variables
117
 includes demographic variants 
also. The variables in this group are a measure of farmland, level of urbanization percentage, 
population growth rate, population density, log of population and existing stock of fixed 
capital.
118
  
                                                          
114
 The variables have been extracted from the model used by Fay (2001) and Fay et al. (2003) for ascertaining the 
demand for national public goods.  
115
 The discussion refers to federal to region transfers only because there are no direct transfers to local governments 
from the federal government.  
116
 The role of transfers has been discussed by Gramlich (1994) among others. 
117
 The structural variables allow the estimation equations to include demand for infrastructure investments to 
provide services in subnational functions of expenditure assignments subject like oblast roads, housing, drinking 
water, sewage, education and health facilities. The assignment of functions listed here were taken from Table 2.1, 
Martinez-Vazquez and Boex (2001).  
118
 These variables are extrapolations from the discussion of determinants of public capital formation presented in 
Burkhead and Miner (1971), pp.305-306.  
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The third subset of variables attempts to capture the differential demand for public 
investment arising out of demand for public goods. Since 2000, the federal government has 
increased controls over the regions diminishing the authority of subnational legislatures. After 
2002 all regional governors have been appointed by the federal government. It is plausible that 
the subnational level investment decisions continue to respond to other factors specific to each 
region. Demand for public goods like education, health and economic infrastructure needs public 
infrastructure.
119
 Non-working age population, enrolment in schools, hospital beds per 10,000 
population may be plausibly influencing investment in public infrastructure. This may occur in 
response to expansion of public infrastructure to cater to higher demand for public goods. The 
fourth set of variables allows the model to include economic conditions for investment in 
infrastructure. A number of economic flows indicate the level of economic activity. Important 
ones are the volume of good transported by rail, volume transported by road, passengers 
traveling by public buses, number of car ownership defined over population per 1000 population, 
product of number of passengers of public buses and kilometers of travel and industrial 
production index by volume. To see if the investment is anti-cyclical or otherwise, we have 
included consumer price index and unemployment rate.  
The fiscal variables like size of the tax base, revenue and transfers for instance would 
have an income effect on investments. This should result in a positive sign on these variables 
unless privatization is preferred. A higher need for infrastructure in captured by log of 
population, shown by a positive sign on the coefficient. At the same time, if population density is 
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 Martinez-Vazquez and Boex (1999), Table 11, reported real gross regional product, cost of living index, 
population not in working age bracket, population percentage below poverty level, transfers per capita and tax effort 
as significant determinants of public expenditure in the regions. These variables have been added in the estimation 
equations. The list has been updated using Tables 4.2 and 4.3 in Martinez-Vazquez and Timofeev (2006). These 
tables report higher shares of local government expenditures in housing and utilities, education and health up to 66 
percent in case of rural and 72 percent in case of urbanization percentagean local government.   
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high the demand for infrastructure should have a negative coefficient. Urbanization has been 
seen to have a negative effect on investment in infrastructure (Strum 2001). A higher fraction of 
farmland in total area requires more public infrastructure and should have a positive effect on 
investments. Hence the expected sign on urbanization is negative while that on farmland is 
positive. The existing stock of fixed capital may have an effect on investment but it is not easy to 
establish the direction of this effect. For example, if there is a high fraction of public 
infrastructure in the existing stock it may lead to a slowdown in investments and have a 
convergence effect among regions. On the other hand, high value of stock may also mean 
relatively new infrastructure requiring less replacement investments. A low value of 
infrastructure could mean depreciated stock or lag in development. The first situation may lead 
to high investment but the second could mean low investment as investment may be attracted to 
developed areas. The sign on existing stock of capital could be negative if convergence in there.  
Population below working age would mean a higher demand for education and other 
public services resulting in a positive effect on investment. This will be indicated by a positive 
sign on the coefficient. Public enrolment could mean either a higher demand for public education 
or higher percentage of school going children in population. In either case it should have a 
positive sign. Various measures of burden of disease also similarly signify demand for public 
goods that in turn require a higher investment in infrastructure, resulting in a positive sign on the 
coefficient. Car ownership, bus passengers and measures of volume of goods transportation will 
have a positive effect on demand for investment in infrastructure and this will be manifested in 
the shape of positive signs on their coefficients.  
The data come from observational study instead of a randomized experiment. That is 
quite in the nature of many economic inquiries. The fact that data are not random introduces a 
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concern about the identification of the estimates. We employ three estimation methods to invoke 
assumptions on the data to identify the treatment effects.  
The results of estimations for determinants of investments in fixed public capital and 
determinants of new acquisition of fixed public capital in the regions of Russia are provided in 
Appendix C.2.  
 
 
 Data description 
Russia is a two-tiered federation with the local governments in most cases constrained by 
regional tutelage on budgetary matters.
120
 Below the federal government there are 83 regions or 
‗Subjects‘ of Russia.121 Not all the subjects are alike. Out of them 21 are republics, 46 are 
oblasts, one is an autonomous oblast, there are 9 krais, 4 are autonomous okrugs or federal 
districts and 2 federal cities. The current number of subjects has emerged after mergers in the last 
decade. Although all the subjects are recognized at the same level, the autonomous districts are 
parts of the oblasts in which they are situated. Data are sometime reported separately for them. In 
other cases, they are included in the oblasts. For the analysis in this paper, three autonomous 
okrugs are important. They are Nenets Autonomous Okrug situated inside Arkhangelsk Oblast 
and Khanty-Mansi Autonomous Okrug and Yamal-Nenets Autonomous Okrug located in 
Tyumen Oblast. Mostly statistics are reported separately for these districts but they are at the 
same time included in the regional statistics. We have compiled data for all the subjects, 
including the autonomous districts. However, in most of estimations, the okrugs are dropped due 
                                                          
120
 This is the constitutional position as described by De Silva et al. (2009). Progressive recentralization has curtailed 
the regional level autonomy as well. Freinkman and Plekhanov (2009) argue that regions dependence on federal 
transfers and resource rents have strengthened subnational centralization.  
121
 In 2000 there were 89 regions. Due to mergers the number has come down to 83 in 2009.  
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to their special status whereby they do not control the same control over expenditures. Most of 
the main service delivery expenditures are controlled by the region. Revenues collected in the 
okrug also go to the oblast, except where there is a special agreement to override this 
arrangement.
122
   
The dataset of regional level variables used for analysis presented in this chapter was 
created using three sources. Annual data are reported by the Federal Statistics Service in the form 
of Regions of Russia, Socio-economic Indicators. The variables included in the data are 
primarily from the 2009 edition and most of the variables are drawn from this publication‘s 
online version. The Regions of Russia, Socio-economic Indicators 2009 reports data from 2000 
to 2009 for most variables. These time series have been used as they are unbroken and updated. 
However, for some time series some earlier years are absent in this edition. For these variables 
we have used the nine earlier editions namely the 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 
2007 and 2008 editions of Regions of Russia, Socio-economic Indicators. Out of these, only for a 
limited number of variables the data relies on the Regions of Russia, Socio-economic Indicators, 
2000. The details of the variables in the dataset are provided in Appendix C.1. The last 
population census in the Russian Federation was conducted in 2002. The data from the 
population census on national composition of regional population has been used from this 
source. The national compositions given in Table 3.2 of the population census online version 
have been used. For duration of stay, Table 6.1 from the same source has been used.  The area of 
each region is reported by Regions of Russia, Socio-economic Indicators 2009. We have used the 
regional areas from this source.  
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 This asymmetric arrangement for this class of subjects was instituted since 2005 as earlier asymmetries were 
done away with; see De Silva et al. (2009); p.53.  
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There are 112 regional variables in the dataset, in most cases as a time series of 8 years. 
For some variables, the time series stretches a bit longer and includes observations for year 1999 
also. We have dropped observations for 1990 and 1995 due to their weaker reliability and 
discontinuity. In addition to these variables we have created variables for treatment status and 
time period. For 2009, the region wise production of oil and gas is not reported. Only Federal 
District level mining data are available. Due to this discrepancy, year 2009 is also not included in 
the data. The changes in the status of some regions offer an obvious difficulty in getting 
comparable observations over this time period. The 89 regions of 2000 have become 83 subjects 
in 2009. However, this difficulty is mostly circumvented in the 2009 edition where the 
observations pertaining to earlier years have been updated and the reported data are only for the 
latest number of regions. It has been achieved by reporting data that are for the new region. In 
case of variables where we had to use the earlier versions of the Regions of Russia, Socio-
economic Indicators, the data are reported separately for each entity. In case of the variables 
where the data for the region includes the autonomous districts below it, we have dropped the 
observations pertaining to the sub-regional autonomous districts and only used the regional level 
observations. For example, the 2003 edition lists data for Chita Oblast and below it for the 
autonomous district of Aginsk-Buryat. The observation for Chita Oblast includes data for the 
district as well as the remaining region. We have used the regional observations in all such cases 
to complete the time series. In case of expenditure data, the autonomous districts data is reported 
separately. The regional observation includes the expenditures of the autonomous districts. The 
autonomous district total expenditures for years 2000, 2002, 2003, 2004 and 2005 are included in 
the regional observation and the time series are comparable. The fact that that autonomous 
okrugs are not included introduces a specification error. The preferences of the autonomous 
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okrug population may differ from those of the remaining oblast. They may identify strongly with 
the resource while the rest of the oblast may not. Due to this reason, the results need to be 
interpreted with the caveat that there may be a downward bias in the estimators.  
The expenditure data presents another issue. The classification is not uniform over the 
years. The total expenditure for regions is comparable across all the years but disaggregated 
expenditures are reported under different classifications that change over the years. Therefore, 
only total expenditures are used. The revenue tables, including transfers, were constructed using 
different years. The subnational tax revenue was not reported for all years in the data. Some 
other subclassifications of revenue were not continuous over time. Non-tax revenue is not 
reported for all the years. To avoid these issues, we have used total revenue and total expenditure 
data. By subtracting the budgetary investment from total expenditures, we have obtained current 
expenditures for each year.  
The data are reported for fixed capital investments on an annual basis for all regions. In 
the Regions of Russia, Socioeconomic Indicators 2009, Table 24.1 reports data on fixed capital 
investments in total in current prices for each region. The classification for investment by source 
of funds was used to derive investment in fixed public capital financed from subnational budgets. 
The nominal values of fixed capital investment by the public sector under ‗state‘, ‗municipal‘ 
and ‗mixed Russian‘ categories ownerships was calculated using the percentage scores on public 
and private investment reported in Table 24.5 (and comparable tables in earlier editions) The 
methodological notes at the end of Chapter 23 explain that the state category pertains to regional 
level investment and municipal to local governments. The mixed Russian category (as translated) 
is financed by both subnational and federal governments. These calculations generate variables 
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for public sector investment by ownership of level of government. The regional and municipal 
investments were added to generate subnational acquisition of fixed capital assets.  
The gross regional product is reported in the Regions of Russia, Socio-economic 
Indicators 2009 and earlier editions but the series was incomplete. It did not have data for 2008. 
Instead we used the time series for gross regional product reported in the National Accounts of 
Russia (online version). Using the regional populations given in the Regions of Russia, Socio-
economic Indicators 2009, the real gross regional product per capita was generated. The 
observations for the three producing autonomous okrugs are missing. These regions are therefore 
not included separately in the estimations. Instead they appear as part of their oblasts.  
More than one types of measures of investment in long lived public goods are included in 
the data. We have calculated real investment in fixed public capital by subnational governments 
in each region, real investment in fixed public capital directly financed by subnational budgets 
(regional and municipal) and real investment in fixed capital financed by federal budgets. We are 
considering all of these measures of increase in the stock of long-lived public goods. This term is 
used interchangeably in the paper with these measures when a general meaning is implied.  
The international oil price from the Oil and Gas Journal data was also included in the 
data. The oil production data are reported in thousand tons while the prices are reported per 
barrel. We have used oil industry conversion table taking 1 ton crude oil to be equivalent to 7.3 
barrels, assuming a specific gravity of 33 API. For gas prices we have used the time series 
indicated in Figure 3.1 in Tsygankova (2009). We have used the average gas prices for industry 
in Russia.  
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 Descriptive statistics 
 Summary statistics 
Table 3.1 presents summary statistics by treatment status. The left hand side five columns 
are for the producing regions. The right hand side five columns list the statistics for the control 
group, the regions where oil and gas mining has not taken place during the time period under 
consideration. The two sides of the table show that despite mining on average the two groups are 
not very different. For example the mean real expenditure per capita in the producing regions in 
19,000 rubles compared with 16,000 for the control group. The real value of fixed assets on 
average is higher in the producing regions compared with the control regions at 324 thousand 
rubles per capita against 187 thousand rubles per capita. The mean real revenue per capita 
coincides with the real expenditure per capita, although minima and maxima are different. 
Predictably, the control group regions receive more transfers in real terms on average, 5,000 
rubles per capita compared with 3,000 rubles per capita in the producing regions. The negative 
minimum value for producing region indicates mutual settlements between federal government 
and the regions in these years. Some non-producing regions also have negative transfers but the 
minimum value at 35 thousand rubles per capita for the producing group of regions is higher than 
17 thousand rubles per capita for the control group. The producing regions on average employ a 
higher number of people than the non-producing regions. The real gross regional product is 
higher for the producing regions at 75,028 rubles per capita. The mean value for the control 
regions is 64,610 rubles per capita. The minimum value on the hand for the producing regions is 
only 4,844 rubles per capita compared with 8,536 rubles per capita for the control regions. This 
shows that not all the producing regions are equally rich nor are all the control regions all poor. 
In fact the percentage of population living below subsistence level on average is only 2 
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percentage point higher for the latter. The maximum value of 94 percent indicates that there are 
some very poor regions in the producing group with some very rich regions. The mean real 
wages are higher in the producing regions as would be expected due to the mining operations and 
higher demand for labor.  
 Normalized differences in means of treated and control observations  
The normalized differences in average values of the variables by treatment status were 
computed. The normalization assumes the variables in the two groups, treated and control to be 
normally distributed with a joint normal difference distribution. The normalized statistics are a 
ratio between the mean and standard deviation of the normal difference distribution. The 
statistics are computed in this manner to establish the validity of the linear estimation models 
incorporating DD estimators. These statistics are reported in Table 3.2. The normalized 
differences in most cases lie below one-quarter. Only in case of enrolment in public sector 
schools, real investment in fixed capital by municipalities, goods transported by road, accidents, 
railway density, hospital beds by population, farmland, population growth rate and population 
below working age the difference are more than a quarter. Table 3.2 shows, as explained later, 
that the normalized differences are in a range where linear estimation models for differences-in-
differences can be used as plausible estimation equations. Secondly, in these cases, it is 
important to note that most of the differences in the average value of  intuitively point toward a 
higher need for investment in long-lived public goods in the producing regions. For example, the 
average volume of goods transported by road is higher in the producing regions with a 
normalized difference of 0.35 but road density is lower with a normalized difference in average 
values of -0.18. The differences in paved roads as a percentage of total roads are also negative. In 
another sector of service delivery, the difference in hospital beds per 10,000 population is also 
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negative showing a lower average value of the variable in the producing regions. Farmland 
difference is positive which means again a higher need for public infrastructure. The difference 
in population below working age is positive with a value of 0.45 showing a high need for public 
services like education. The population growth rate difference is also positive with a value of 
0.31 and the migration rate difference is 0.08. It may mean that a larger number of people are 
migrating into producing regions.  
Figure 3.1 shows the changes in the unconditional mean real values of two key variables, 
by treatment status, namely the real revenue per capita and real transfers per capita. It is 
important to note that real revenue in both cases increases without any dips, although the 
increase slows down before accelerating in case of the treated group. The revenue per capita in 
the treated group lies above the revenue per capita in the control group on average for all the 
years in the sample. The transfer paint a different picture. The real transfers per capita in the 
control group lie above the real transfers per capita to the treated group. They also show a small 
decrease for a year during 2003 in the treated group. Figure 3.2 graphs the unconditional means 
of three variables. Investment in fixed capital by subnational governments, acquisition of fixed 
capital and  and total subnational public expenditure, all three in real ruble terms and evaluated 
per capita are shown in the figure by producing and control group as mean values over time. 
There is an increase in public expenditure and the rate of change picks up after 2006. The 
expenditure in the treated group lies always above that in the control group. The unconditional 
mean of real investment in fixed capital in the treated group increases over time, lies above the 
unconditional mean of the control group except from 2003 to 2004 and becomes close to it again 
in 2007. For the acquisition of fixed capital, the graph for the treated group lies above the graph 
for the control group except during 2003 and 2004 when the position is reversed. The graphs 
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show that the increase in the unconditional means of expenditures for both groups is denoted by 
a higher positive slope compared with a flatter curve for real investment. The trends, especially 
the almost close and sometimes parallel graphs of real investment in the two groups, provide 
some justification for employing the difference-in-differences estimator described later. The 
assumption that the outcomes in the two groups may have continued parallel to each other in the 
absence of the treatment can be supported by the parallel part of the two graphs from 2002 to 
2003. Based on these years, the mean real investments in fixed public capital and mean real 
value of acquisition of capital by subnational government may be continued on parallel paths 
over time in the absence of treatment.  
 Key variables 
The key variables of interest include the real values of investment in fixed public capital 
by subnational governments, investment acquisition of fixed public capital by subnational 
governments, investment financed directly by federal budget, the real value of fixed capital 
(stock), real gross regional product, real transfers and real revenue. The mean value of 
investment in fixed public capital by subnational governments ranges from 23 to 30 percent of 
total revenue during 2000 to 2007. In the same time period investment financed by subnational 
budgets was between 11 and 13 percent of total revenue, over a smaller spread. The real value of 
investment by subnational government increased progressively over time from 1.72 thousand 
rubles per capita in 2000 to 10.20 thousand rubles per capita in 2007. During this time period, 
investment financed by subnational budgets increased from 690 rubles per capita in 2001 to 4.11 
thousand rubles per capita in 2007.  
The intergovernmental fiscal arrangement in Russia comprises of expenditure and 
revenue assignment. The 1993 constitution lays down exclusive federal responsibilities alongside 
91 
 
 
 
joint federal and regional responsibilities.
123
 Important sectors from the point of view of 
infrastructure development were given to the regions. Education, health, water facilities and 
housing fall in the subnational jurisdiction. Social protection and free public transport for some 
kinds of citizens were also given to the regions.
124
 The new assignment of functions became 
settled 2005 onward. A year later, the local responsibilities were also settled. Some of the 
regional functions are performed through municipal governments. For example, preschool, 
primary, secondary and afterschool education is provided by municipalities while vocational 
education is managed by the regions themselves. Important infrastructure responsibilities at the 
subnational level include construction and maintenance of roads, inter-settlement and intra-
settlement roads, intercity transportation, libraries, museums and housing for low income 
households. Regions and municipalities invest in fixed public capital to fulfill responsibilities in 
the areas of  water supply, waste disposal, health and education. Other than the case of 
autonomous okrugs, the asymmetric federal relations have been replaced by symmetric 
arrangements. In case of autonomous okrugs important functions including education, health and 
social welfare are performed by the respective oblasts. The tax shares are therefore assigned to 
the oblast even when collected in the territorial jurisdiction of the autonomous okrug (De Silva et 
al., 2009).  
Total revenue comprises of shared taxes, own tax revenue, non-tax revenue and federal 
transfers. Subnational taxes in Russia are levied under the Tax Code which specifies the base and 
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 According to article 72 of the Constitution of the Russian Federation, ratified on December 12, 1993, education, 
health, social welfare and management of mineral resources are some of the important joint responsibilities, The 
article provides for subnational legislation in addition to federal statutes to regulate and implement these expenditure 
responsibilities. The details of the expenditure assignment are given in the Law on the General Principles of the 
Organization of Government in Subjects of the Federation adopted in 1999. 
124
 The functions were assigned by the Federal Law No.84-FZ General Principles of the Organization of 
Governments in the Subjects of the Federation and amendments to various statutes approved by the State Duma in 
2004. See Table 3.1 in De Silva et al. (2009). The local government responsibilities were delineated through the 
Federal Law No.131-FZ on General Principles of the Organization of Local Self-Government.  
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the range of rates. Collection is by the central tax administration and regions and local 
governments have the authorities to vary the rates for their assigned taxes. This is constrained by 
the fact that there are rate ceilings for taxes. Enterprise property tax, transport tax and tax on 
gambling business are regional taxes and all the revenues is retained in the region of collection. 
Personal property tax and land tax are pure local taxes with local governments getting all the 
revenue collected in their jurisdiction. Regions and local governments also receive shares of 
revenue in some federal taxes including enterprise profit tax, personal income tax, excise taxes 
on alcohol and beverages, gasoline and beer, mineral resources extraction tax on common 
mineral and other minerals (not including oil and gas), simplified tax on small businesses, single 
tax on imputed income and single tax on agricultural enterprises.
125
 In addition to tax revenue, 
subnational government have access to non-tax revenue items that include income from use of 
property, paid services and funds accruing from civil, administrative and criminal penalties.
126
 
The mean value of real subnational revenue per capita was 6.11 thousand rubles in 2000 and it 
progressively increased to 32.23 thousand rubles in 2007. In the meantime the mean value of real 
transfers per capita increased from 1.18 thousand rubles to 9.80 rubles. As Figure 3.1 shows, the 
increase in transfers has not been as smooth as the increase in revenue. This could be attributed 
to discretionary transfers as well as arbitrary changes in the transfer pool on an annual basis.  
Intergovernmental transfers are an important component of the federation‘s fiscal 
architecture in Russia. On average, the sample data shows that transfers as a percentage of total 
subnational revenue remained between 24 and 32 with the maximum dependence on federal 
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 Based on Tax Code of the Russian Federation, Part Two No.117-FZ of August 5, 2000 amended in December 
2003. The shares of mineral resource extraction tax on oil and gas were reduced from 2000 to 2005 as described 
elsewhere.  
126
 This description is based on the definition of non-tax revenues provided in the methodological notes in Chapter 
23, Finance, Regions of Russia, Socioeconomic Indicators, 2009.  
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transfers as high as above 90 percent of total revenue for most of the years.
127
 A closer look at 
the data reveals that the higher amounts of transfers have gone to regions where there was 
conflict or mergers and regions with high political significance. The federal transfers comprise 
formula based equalization grants (37 percent of total transfers), gap filling subsidies (since 
2004, 9 percent of total), compensation for federal mandates (subsidized rent entitlements to 
some categories of federal beneficiaries, blood donors and cost of civil registration offices; 13 
percent), cofinancing for social expenditures established by federal or (and later on) by regional 
laws (5 percent), capital transfers under federally targeted or regional development programs (20 
percent), subnational finance reform grants (0.2 percent), ad hoc subsidies (0.4 percent), 
operating transfers to special territories and transfers to restricted-access cities (3 percent) and 
other grants (13 percent).
128
 The first two types are general purpose transfers while the others are 
conditional grants. Initially up to 2005, the gap filling subsidies were also meant for 
compensation to regions for loss of revenue on account of centralization of oil and gas rent tax 
revenues. Except for the first three types all the remaining transfers have been consolidated 
under the Fund for Cofinancing of Expenditures since 2007.  
 
 Correlation matrix 
The key parameters of interest in the estimations are those on the difference-in-
differences estimators. The inclusion of fiscal variables and other controls in the empirical 
models laid out in Section 1 was tested using pairwise correlations. The results of their 
                                                          
127
 Transfers as a percent of total regional revenue were equal to or greater than 90 percent in case of Kursk Oblast 
(1 year), Ingushetia (2), Karachay-Cherkessia (1), Chechnya (4), Republic of Mari El (1) and Saratov Oblast (1). 
The real transfers were negative for Moscow (6 years), Nenets AO (1), St. Petersburg (1), Samara Oblast (1), 
Sverdlovsk Oblast (1), Tyumen Oblast (1) and Khanty-Mansi AO (3). In case of Ingushetia and Chechnya the 
federal transfers were as high as more than 50 percent and upto 120 percent of real gross regional product in certain 
years.  
128
 The percentages represent a three year average from 2005 to 2007 calculated from the data reported in Table 3.6 
in De Silva et al. (2009). The data for 2007 were based on budgeted figures. 
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correlations are given in correlation matrices reflected as Table 3.3 and Table 3.4. The first 
number in each box is the correlation coefficient, below it is the number of observations. Only 
coefficients significant at 10 percent level or below are reflected in the matrix. The Correlation 
Matrix 1 (Table 3.3) shows that among the fiscal variables there is a high correlation between 
two tax base indicators namely, real gross regional product per capita and real value of fixed 
capital per capita. Only one of these two variables is included in the estimation equations. The 
correlation coefficient of real transfers per capita and real gross regional product per capita is 
0.24.  Both variables are retained as controls because of the low correlation coefficient and the 
fact that neither is used for inference based on the model. The real transfers do not exhibit a high 
correlation with real value of subnational taxes (correlation coefficient is 0.21). The correlation 
between transfers and gross regional product and between transfers and subnational taxes at this 
level may not be materially affecting the key results because the model estimates a difference-in-
differences estimator which is not the coefficient on either of the two variables. The strong 
correlation between local taxes and total revenue (0.88) again shows that only one of the two 
needs be in the estimation equations. Total revenue is used due to the availability of the longer 
time series of this variable. The transfers have high correlations with real expenditures per capita 
(0.61) and real revenue per capita (0.61). In some estimations only one of the two variables, 
expenditures or revenues, is included. On the other hand, real subnational revenue per capita has 
comparatively weaker correlations with real value of fixed capital (0.58) and real gross regional 
product (0.57). Since the empirical models do not provide inference on individual coefficients on 
the three variables, they are included in various estimation equations with the caveat that 
individual coefficients on them, when any two of them are included, may not be individually 
unbiased.  
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 The Correlation Matrix 2 given in Table 3.4 presents the entire range of pairwise 
correlations between fiscal variables and all other variables. The three variables built on 
estimated population of a region, population density, log of population and population growth 
rate have weak correlations or one that is not statistically significant. Among the remaining 
variables included as controls in the models none of the correlation coefficients is remarkably 
high.  
 
 Results 
Multiple treatment models  
Subnational investment in fixed public capital 
The estimations reported here are attempting to pick up the effects of revenue share 
changes on investments in fixed public capital in the regions. The null hypothesis is 
 
      
    
   ,  
or the change in investments in fixed public capital in region i  and time period t with a 
change in the share of region i is negative. The coefficient on the difference-in-difference 
estimators employed in the equations estimates this change.
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The first estimation uses the multiple treatment model with three treatment groups and 
seven different policy changes as treatments. The treatment groups are oil only regions (5), gas 
only regions (2) and oil and gas regions (30). All the non-producing regions form the control 
group (47).  The treatments include changes in oil tax revenue share, gas tax revenue share and 
the two changes combined together. Each treatment represents a reduction in oil and gas tax 
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unrelated equations models. The results have been placed in Appendix C.2.  
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share of the regions or reduction in one of the tax shares. The dependent variable is the 
investment in fixed public capital financed from subnational budgets, measures in real rubles per 
capita. The results in Table 3.5 are presented in three columns. The first column has a time trend 
while the second column includes a full range of year dummies. The first two columns estimate a 
fixed effect model presented in equation (2) in Section 1.2 above, using small sample correction 
for error variance
130
 with robust standard errors. The third column estimates the model using a 
full range of region dummies and robust standard errors as presented in equation (1). The year 
dummies and region dummies are not shown in the table.  
The results show that the effect on all three treatment groups is negative but not 
significant. The effect of individual tax share changes is also statistically not significant. Each 
DD or difference-in-differences estimator is specific for a treatment and a treated group, 
estimating the differential effect of each treatment on a treated group. The DD estimators for oil 
only and gas only regions are not significant except for the first treatment and oil only interaction 
where the coefficient is positive and significant at 10 percent level. For the gas only treatment, 
the DD estimator is almost always negative but statistically not significant. For the oil and gas 
regions, the DD estimators are always negative and statistically significant at 10 percent level in 
the first two columns. In the third column, they are statistically significant at 5 percent level. 
However, after the third treatment, the last change in the oil and gas tax shares, the DD estimator 
although still negative is not statistically significant. The negative sign on the estimators is in 
accordance with the theoretical propositions presented in Chapter 2. The DD estimators show 
that when rent revenue share are brought low as a result of federal policy the producing regions 
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scale down their investments. The effects are disproportionately absorbed in public investment. 
As we can see, there is no compensatory investment from the transfers.  
The coefficient on real per capita transfers is negative and significant at 1 percent level 
showing that with a real ruble increase in transfers per capita there is a decrease in investment in 
fixed public assets. For a thousand ruble per capita transferred to the region, there is a decrease 
in investment in fixed public capital amounting to 148-149 rubles. It is clear from the table, that 
the inclusion of full range of year dummies and estimation by a simple instrumental variables 
model with a complete range of region dummies do not change the results. However, the pooled 
model estimates the effects of tax changes better. In the oil and gas regions the average treatment 
effect was  reduction  of 215-216 real rubles per capita after the first treatment and increased to a 
reduction of 485-486 real rubles per capita.  
The coefficients on other variables have signs as expected in accordance with theory or 
earlier studies with some exceptions. The investment in fixed public capital increases with 
increase in revenue but decreases with real gross regional product. The coefficients on both 
variables are significant at 1 percent level. The positive coefficient on real revenue shows that for 
a 1000 ruble per capita increase in revenue, there is only 133-134 rubles invested in fixed public 
capital. This is in accordance with expectations. At the same time, a one real ruble increase in 
gross regional product per capita is associated with a small decrease in investment in fixed public 
capital, amounting to less than 1/1000
th
 of a ruble. The negative sign is an important result but 
diminished by the size of the coefficient. The decrease with increase in real gross regional 
product is not easy to explain. A one percentage point increase in population below working age 
decreases investment by 146-147 rubles indicated by the coefficient which is significant at 10 
percent level. This is contrary to expectation as a higher percentage of population below working 
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age would need a higher stock of public facilities for education and primary health. Similarly, the 
coefficient on population density is negative and significant at 10 percent level (5 percent in the 
third column). This means that thinly spread population requires a greater stock of public capital. 
The positive coefficient on log of population is statistically significant at 1 percent level showing 
that a 1 percent increase in population leads to a 10,210-10,560 rubles increase in investment in 
fixed public capital. Regions with large population invest more in new public capital to address 
congestion costs accruing on existing facilities. The sign on farmland, volume of goods 
transported by rail and urbanization are positive and except urbanization significant at 1 percent 
level. For urbanization, the coefficient is significant at 10 percent (5 percent in the third column) 
level. The positive sign on farmland and volume of goods transported by rail show that as 
expected there is a higher investment in new public capital associated with the higher needs of 
farmland and transportation. Contrary to other studies, the positive sign of the coefficient on 
urbanization shows that higher investment went into urban areas across regions of Russia. The 
coefficients on other controls are not statistically significant.  
The estimation included real gross regional product and real revenue as endogenous 
variables. The excluded instruments (also called instrumental variables) were paved roads as a 
percentage of total length of roads in a region, real value of paid services per capita and volume 
of waste water generated per capita. The first stage F-test statistics for joint significance of 
excluded instruments have been reported in the table. Using the Staiger-Stock (1997) method, 
since the F-test values are greater than or close to 10, it can be accepted that the instruments are 
strong. The value of Craig-Donald statistic computed for the equations, as reported in the table, 
is higher than the minimum threshold for the size of 10 percent bias. Choosing a significance 
level of 0.1, the values reported in the table are higher than the critical values of the statistic 
99 
 
 
 
reported in Table 2 of Stock and Yogo (2004). This corroborates the result that the instruments 
are not weak. To test for orthogonality of each of the excluded instruments, C-statistic
131
 was 
computed. The p-values for the first two columns are 0.308 and 0.275. The null hypothesis that 
the instruments in each case were orthogonal to the error term could not be rejected. The p-value 
for the Hansen-J statistic, as reported in the table, also show that the null hypothesis that the 
equations are not overidentified cannot be rejected. 
The equation was re-estimated with inclusion of oil and gas values computed as a product 
of extracted quantities and average annual prices. The results remained qualitatively the same 
without major changes in the size of coefficients. These repetitions were performed for all the 
models with similar results.  
These results provide some support to the theoretical predictions. An increase in the 
federal share of rent at the expense of producing regions results in a decline in investment in 
long-lived public goods. The regions make expenditure choice while keeping the ratio of current 
to total expenditures constant or even attempting to increase as a political objective, as portrayed 
in the theoretical model. The results emphasize that centralization of exhaustible resource rent, 
while arguably attractive from other objectives, may have consequences for investment in long-
lived public goods at the subnational level.  
 
  Subnational investment in fixed public capital (with stock of fixed 
capital) 
In Table 3.6 the results appear from the estimation of a model which uses real value of 
fixed capital stock per capita as a control variable. Due to the strong correlation between real 
                                                          
131
 Baum, Schaffer and Stillman (2002) have described the C-statistic obtained in instrumental variable estimations 
that provides a test for validity of instruments.  
100 
 
 
 
value of fixed capital and real gross regional product, only the former is included in this model. 
Both are measured as per capita values. In this estimation, the real value of investment in fixed 
public capital from the subnational budgets remains the dependent variable. This model, a 
variant of the one reported in Table 3.5, allows controlling for the effect of existing stock of 
fixed capital on investments in fixed public capital. The equations for the first two columns were 
estimated as fixed effects models to account for time invariant region specific unobserved 
heterogeneity. Robust standard errors and small sample correction for error variance have been 
used. The third column reports results from an instrumental variable estimation using a full range 
of region dummies. The results are qualitatively the same as those reported for the model using 
real gross regional product per capita in place of real value of fixed capital per capita in the 
region. In this case however, the DD estimators for the gas only regions in addition to the 
estimator for oil and gas regions for the second treatment are negative and statistically 
significant. The estimator for the oil and gas regions with the second treatment is significant at 5 
percent level (1 percent in the third column). The coefficient on transfers is still negative and 
significant at 1 percent level. Similarly, the coefficient on revenue per capita is positive and 
significant at 1 percent level. The real value of fixed capital per capita has a negative coefficient 
which is significant at 1 percent level. This is similar to the coefficient on real gross regional 
product per capita in the earlier model. Among the other variables, only the coefficients on 
farmland, volume of goods transported via rail and urbanization are significant. They retain the 
signs from estimation of the previous model.  
The real revenue per capita and real value of fixed capital per capita are endogenous in 
the model. Four variables, paved roads as a percentage of total roads, real value of paid services 
per capita, waste water generated per capita and residential area per capita, were used as 
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excluded instruments. The F-test statistics for joint significance of excluded instruments are 
large. Using the Staiger-Stock (1997) method, since the F-test values are always greater than 10, 
it can be accepted that the instruments are reasonably strong. The value of Craig-Donald statistic 
computed for the equations, as reported in the table, is higher than the minimum threshold for the 
size of 10 percent bias. Choosing a significance level of 0.1, the values reported in the table are 
higher than the critical values reported in Table 2 of Stock and Yogo (2004). This corroborates 
the conclusion based on Staiger-Stock method that the instruments are reasonably strong. To test 
for orthogonality of each of the excluded instruments, C-statistic was computed. The p-values 
ranged from 0.656 and 0.514. The null hypothesis that the instruments in each case were 
orthogonal to the error term could not be rejected. The p-value for the Hansen-J statistic, as 
reported in the table, also show that the null hypothesis that the equations are not overidentified 
cannot be rejected.  
The results show that the DD estimators are robust to inclusion of real value of fixed 
capital in the regions in place of real gross regional product. The signs and levels of significance 
provide qualitatively the same results. They again portray a decline in investment associated with 
decrease in regional share of rents from oil and gas mining.  
 
 Subnational gross investment in fixed public capital 
The subnational governments acquire fixed capital sometimes that is financed by other 
sources. Following the practice prevalent during Soviet times private enterprise may invest in 
infrastructure that is now publically managed. Some of these projects could assume the form of 
negotiated taxation. The regional level data report new fixed public capital by ownership and this 
measure takes into account infrastructure investments owned by the public sector financed by 
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budgets, debt or private sector. The null hypothesis remains the same for this variable. The 
multiple treatment models are then estimated substituting the dependent variable, acquisition of 
fixed capital by ownership in place of investments measured by source of funds. Table 3.7 
reports the results of the multiple treatment models with new public capital owned by 
subnational governments as the dependent variable. The models in the first two columns were 
estimated employing fixed effects. A full range of year dummies was also included in the 
estimation reported in the second column. Robust standard errors and small sample correction for 
error variance have been used. The third column shows the results when the model is estimated 
with a complete range of region dummies as a pooled regression. Robust standard errors have 
been used. The year and region dummies are not reported in the table.  
The treatment group dummies have negative coefficients that are statistically not 
significant except for oil only regions in the first and third column. In the first and third columns 
the coefficient on the oil only group is negative and significant at 5 percent level. On the other 
hand the tax on oil treatment dummies have negative coefficients that are significant at 5 percent 
and 1 percent levels in the first column and significant at 1 percent level in the second and third 
columns. The coefficients on other treatment dummies are not significant. The DD estimators on 
oil only regions and gas only regions are statistically not significant. The DD estimators on oil 
and gas regions have negative signs as expected in accordance with the theory model laid out in 
Chapter 2. For the first two treatments they are statistically significant at 10 percent level but for 
the third treatment they become significant at 5 percent level. As is clear from the table, the 
inclusion of full range of year dummies and estimation by a pooled instrumental variables model, 
with a complete range of region dummies, do not change the results. These results show that a 
reduction in rent tax shares resulted in a decrease in gross investment in new public capital in the 
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oil and gas regions. The effect increased with the third treatment. After the first treatment the 
average treatment effect in the oil and gas regions was a reduction in investment ranging from 
687 to 700 real rubles per capita. This increased to 929-943 real rubles per capita after the second 
treatment and 1,369 to 1,377 real rubles per capita after the third treatment.  
The control variables have the signs as expected according to theory and other studies 
with some exceptions. The coefficients on real gross regional product per capita and real revenue 
per capita are not significant. The coefficient on real transfers per capita is negative and 
statistically significant at 1 percent level indicating that with a 1000 ruble increase in transfers 
among the regions, there is a decrease in gross investment in new public capital amount to 332-
328 real rubles. The coefficient on volume of goods transported by rail is positive and significant 
at 10 percent level (5 percent in the third column). The coefficients on car ownership and 
hospital beds per 10,000 population are negative but only significant in the third column. In this 
column the coefficient on car ownership is significant at 10 percent level while the coefficient on 
hospital beds becomes significant at 1 percent level. The coefficients on other variables are not 
significant. The time trend is positive and significant at 10 percent level in the first column and 
becomes significant at 1 percent level when the full range of year dummies is included. The 
estimation was also done with world price as an independent variable. The coefficient was 
positive and significant as it substituted the time trend due to the continual increase in oil price 
during the time period.  
All three estimations in Table 3.7 have real gross regional product per capita and real 
revenue per capita as endogenous variables. Three variables, paved roads as a percentage of total 
length of roads in a region, real value of paid services per capita and number of doctors per 
10,000 population were used as excluded instruments. The first stage F-test statistics for joint 
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significance of excluded instruments have been reported in the table. Using the Staiger-Stock 
(1997) method, we can accept the instruments as reasonably strong. The Craig-Donald statistic 
on the other hand has a low value. The p-value for the Hansen-J statistic, also reported in the 
table, does not allow me to reject the null hypothesis that the equations are not overidentified. 
The C-statistic was computed for each excluded instrument and the p-values allowed me in each 
case to reject the null hypothesis that the instrument is not orthogonal to the error term.  
The results reported in Table 3.7 are important as they corroborate the earlier results and 
at the same time re-emphasize the effect of declining shares on a wider measure of investment. 
the dependent variable not only includes investments in fixed capital from regional budgets but 
also those made under the government influence by commercial and private enterprises and debt 
financing of infrastructure. The decline in this measure of investment indicates that regions carry 
out investment decisions under an inter-temporal revenue constraint and the future loss of rent 
may have effects on all means of financing investment in long-lived public goods.  
 
 Subnational gross investment in new fixed public capital with stock of real 
fixed capital 
Table 3.8 presents results of estimating a model with subnational acquisition of new fixed 
public capital per capita as the dependent variable. The model is the same as in Table 3.7 except 
that real value per capita of the fixed capital is substituted in place of real gross regional product 
per capita. Due to the strong correlation, both variables are not included. The results are 
qualitatively the same. The DD estimator after the third treatment for oil only group is however 
positive and significant at 10 percent level in the first column. The DD estimators for the oil and 
gas group are still negative but significant at 10 percent level after the first and third treatments.  
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Annualized effects models  
 Single treatment with annualized effects 
The estimations reported in this sub-section pertain to the empirical model laid out in 
equations (3) and (4) in Section 1.3. The treatment effects are defined as results of annualized 
application of share reduction, respecting the budgetary process.  
The models in equations (3) and (4) were estimated. The results are presented in Table 
3.9. The dependent variable is investment in fixed public capital financed by subnational 
budgets. The first column shows the results of a fixed effects estimation using time trend. The 
second column adds a full range of year dummies. Both estimations employ robust standard 
errors and small sample correction for error variance. The third column shows the results when a 
pooled model is estimated as instrumental variables specification with a full range of region 
dummies. Robust standard errors were used. The coefficient on the dummy variable for the 
treated group, including all oil and gas regions as well as oil only and gas only regions, is 
negative and significant at 1 percent level as shown in the third column. In the first two 
estimations the group dummies are dropped on account of collinearity. The interaction terms, 
p1g1, p2g1, p3g1, p4g1, p5g1 and p6g1, are the DD estimators for the annualized effects. The 
DD estimators in this case pick up annualized effects of the reduction in rent tax revenue share of 
the producing regions. They pick up lagged effects of earlier reductions in rent tax revenue 
shares as well as effects of tax share changes taking effect in the year. The estimators always 
have a negative sign except for year four. They are only significant at 10 percent level in the 
third year after the treatment began where the estimated average treatment effect is a reduction of 
358 real rubles in the treated regions. The coefficient lies between the coefficients for the first 
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and second treatment in Table 3.5. The coefficients on post treatment years, each depicting an 
annual application of treatment as a budgetary phenomenon, are negative but not significant. As 
in the multiple treatment cases above, the coefficient on real value of transfers per capita is 
negative and statistically significant at 1 percent level showing that for a 1000 real ruble increase 
in transfers, there is a decrease of 150 real rubles per capita in investment in fixed public capital.  
Among the other variables, the coefficient on farmland is positive and significant at 5 
percent level and the coefficient on volume of goods transported via rail is positive and 
significant at 1 percent level. Population density has a negative coefficient that is significant at 
10 percent level showing that for a thousand individuals per square kilometer increase in density, 
there is a reduction of 84.5 rubles in new public investment. On the other hand, urbanization has 
a positive coefficient that is significant at 10 percent level also. This shows that when population 
density is taken into account, urbanization is associated with an increase in investments. Again 
the size of the coefficient is small indicating a 69 ruble increase in investment as degree of 
urbanization among the regions increases by one percentage point of population. At the same 
time, a one percent increase in population leads to a higher investment in fixed public capital to 
the tune of 11 thousand rubles per capita. The size of the coefficient is quite close to the one 
estimated in the multiple treatment model. All other variables are not statistically significant.  
The model used real gross regional product per capita and real revenue per capita as 
endogenous variables. In this case, three variables, paved roads as percentage of total length of 
roads, real value of paid services per capita and air pollutions generated per capita in the region, 
were the excluded instruments. Testing for the validity of instruments, the first stage F-test 
statistics for the joint significance of excluded instruments have been reported in the table. The 
values are higher than the threshold of 10 proposed by Staiger-Stock (1997), indicating that the 
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instruments are reasonably strong. The Craig-Donald statistic at 25.19 is higher than the critical 
value of 13.43 computed for a significance level of 0.1 by Stock and Yogo (2004). The result 
corroborates the conclusion that the instruments are reasonably strong. The C-statistic was 
computed individually for the excluded instruments. The p-values allowed me to reject the null 
hypothesis in each case that the excluded instruments are not orthogonal to the error term. 
Finally, the p-value associated with the Hansen-J statistic comes to 0.514 indicating that the 
equations are appropriately specified as the null hypothesis that the equations are not 
overidentified cannot be rejected.  
The results again corroborate the findings from the multiple treatment model estimations 
reported in Section 4.1. They show that the decline in investment takes place in certain years 
after the regional rent shares decrease. These results capture the delayed effect which is expected 
given the nature of time lag in public investment decisions.  
 
 Subnational gross investment in fixed public capital  
Single treatment model with annualized treatment effects was then estimated with 
subnational acquisition of new fixed public capital. Table 3.10 reports the results from the 
estimations. The first column was estimated with fixed effects and time trend. The second 
column shows results when a full range of year dummies is included. Both estimations used 
robust standard errors and small sample correction for error variance. The results in the third 
column are for a pooled instrumental variable estimation with a complete set of region dummies. 
The DD estimators picking up the annualized effects of exposure to the treatment are negative 
for years 2 and 3 after treatment and statistically significant at 10 percent level in column 3. The 
only annual treatment estimator that is statistically significant (at 5 percent level) is for year 2 
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post treatment and is reported in the third column. The coefficients on other variables are 
qualitatively the same as reported for the multiple treatment model.  
 
Seemingly unrelated equations estimation with multiple treatments  
 With investment in fixed public capital financed from regional budgets 
To rule out the possibility of an income effect with no substitution effect, the multiple 
treatment model was estimated as a seemingly unrelated equations model with investment in 
fixed public capital and total public expenditures as the dependent variables. Table 3.11 reports 
the results of the estimation. The estimators are employed for both investments in fixed public 
capital and total public expenditure. The first column represents the result when investment in 
fixed public capital financed by subnational government budgets is the dependent variable and 
the second column has current expenditure as the dependent variable. A complete set of region 
dummies and time trend are included in both equations but they are not recorded in the table. The 
year dummies are not included due to their high collinearity with the treatments. The coefficients 
on treated group dummies are negative for all the three groups in the first column but statistically 
significant at 1 percent level for the oil only group. At the same time, the coefficient is negative 
and statistically significant at 5 percent level for the oil only group in the first column. The 
coefficients for the gas only and oil and gas groups are negative for investment and positive for 
total expenditure. In both cases they are not statistically significant. These results indicate that 
the direction of effect of reduction in rent tax shares on investments is negative but not so for the 
current expenditure. The coefficients on individual tax revenue share changes are not significant. 
The DD estimators show that the average treatment effects for investment and current 
expenditures have opposite signs in most cases. The DD estimators for oil only group are 
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positive and significant for both the new investments and for current expenditureafter the first 
treatment or reduction in shares. In the oil only regions, the effect is positive on both investment 
in fixed public capital as well as current expenditures. It is statistically significant at 5 percent 
level. It also shows that the current expenditures increased by about six times the increase in 
investments in fixed public capital. The estimator for current expenditures in the oil only group 
after the second treatment is positive and significant at 5 percent level and that for post third 
treatment is positive and significant at 5 percent level. In case of gas only regions, only the DD 
estimators after the second gas treatment is positive but not statistically significant.  
For the oil and gas group, the DD estimator for investment is negative for all three 
treatment applications but statistically significant at 10 percent level after the first treatment and 
at 1 percent level after the second and third treatment. At the same time, the coefficients for total 
expenditures for the group are not statistically significant even though they are positive for the 
second treatment application. The results indicate that the reduction in rent tax shares mainly 
affected investments in fixed public capital while having no effect and sometimes a positive 
effect on total expenditure. The magnitude of effect on investments picked up in this model by 
the DD estimators, a reduction of 182 real rubles after the first oil and gas treatment, 485 real 
rubles after the second oil and gas treatment and 327 real rubles after the third oil and gas 
treatment, is again close to the treatment effects estimated in the multiple treatment model of 
Table 3.5 and annualized effect model of Table 3.9.  
The coefficient on real value per capita of transfers to regions is negative for investments 
while being statistically significant at 1 percent level and positive but not statistically significant 
for current expenditures.. The real revenue per capita is positive and significant at 1 percent level 
for both investments and current expenditure. In this case the size of the coefficient under the 
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investment equation is 1.7 times the coefficient under the current expenditure equation. The 
coefficient on real gross regional product per capita is negative and significant at 1 percent level 
showing that it has a negative association with investment in fixed public capital. As in the 
earlier estimations, the size of the coefficient is very small amounting to a less than 1/1000
th
 of a 
ruble decrease in investment with a one ruble increase in real gross regional product per capita. 
In the investment estimation, the signs on population below working age, volume of goods 
transported via rail, population density, log of population, urbanization and farmland are the 
same as estimated in the multiple treatment and annualized treatment effects models.  
  
With gross investment in fixed public capital financed from regional budgets 
The second model given in equations (6) and (7) was estimated as seemingly unrelated 
equations. The results have been reported in Table 3.12. The estimators were deployed to pick up 
changes in both new subnational acquisition of fixed public capital and total expenditure. The 
first column reports the results when new subnational acquisition of fixed public capital is the 
dependent variable with total expenditure as the dependent variable in the second column. A 
complete set of region dummies and time trend were included in both equations without 
representation in the table. The coefficients on treatment dummies are negative for all the three 
groups in the first column but statistically significant at 1 percent level and 10 percent level for 
the oil only group and oil and gas group, respectively. At the same time, the coefficient is 
negative but statistically significant at 5 percent level for the oil only group in the second 
column. The size of the coefficient in the first column is about 2.2 times the coefficient in the 
second column. This means that for the oil only group the reduction in new subnational 
acquisition of fixed public capital is 2.2 times the reduction in total expenditures. The 
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coefficients are negative and statistically not significant for the gas only and oil and gas groups. 
These results indicate that the direction of effect on investments is negative but the effect on the 
total expenditure is smaller than the effect on new subnational acquisition of fixed public capital. 
The coefficients on individual tax revenue share changes are not significant except for three 
cases. For the oil tax share change from 20 to 15 percent for the regions, the coefficient under 
current expenditures equation is positive and significant at 10 percent level. The gas tax share 
from 15 percent to zero change in the new acquisition of public capital equation has a negative 
coefficient that is significant at 5 percent level.  
The DD estimators for oil only group are positive but statistically significant for the 
current expenditures  are positive and statistically significant at 1 percent levels for the second 
and third treatment and 5 percent for the first treatment or tax share change. This shows that the 
total expenditure in the oil only regions increased with tax share reductions. The coefficients for 
gas only group for total expenditure are positive but negative for investment in fixed public 
capital. They are statistically not significant in either case. For the oil and gas group, the DD 
estimators for investment are negative for all three treatment applications but statistically 
significant at 10 percent level after the first and second treatment, at at 1 percent level after the 
third treatment. At the same time, the coefficients for total expenditures for the group are 
negative but not statistically significant. The results indicate that the reduction in rent tax shares 
mainly affected subnational acquisition of fixed public capital while having no effect and 
sometimes a positive effect on current expenditure.  
The coefficient on real value per capita of transfers to regions is negative for investments 
and positive for current expenditures. In the first case it is statistically significant at 1 percent 
level and in the second case at 5 percent level.  The real revenue per capita is positive and 
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significant at 1 percent level for current expenditure.  The coefficient on real gross regional 
product per capita is statistically not significant.. In the investment estimation, the signs on 
population below working age and volume of goods transported via rail and farmland are the 
same as estimated in the multiple treatment and annualized treatment effects models but only 
significant in case of the latter. Population growth rate on the other hand is a significant 
determinant of current expenditures while other variables are not statistically significant.  
The multiple treatment model was estimated replacing subnational investment in fixed 
public capital by federally financed investment in fixed public capital. The DD estimators show 
that the coefficients are negative but not significant. So it suggests that there is no evidence that 
the increase in federal share of rent taxation increased federal investment in new public capital.  
 
The alternative methods for estimating average treatment effects were also used. Average 
treatment effects using matching estimators as defined earlier were used. The results have been 
summarized in Appendix C.3. The results corroborate the estimates presented here when 
acquisition of fixed capital is the dependent variable. Results for investments from regional 
budgets could not be corroborated with method. In the end, a model using propensity scores was 
estimated. The results are also given in the Appendix C.3. Again, the results for acquisition of 
fixed capital were corroborated by this method. For investment from regional budgets they could 
not be. Both alternative methods show that the average treatment effect on the treated was 
negative in case of acquisition of fixed capital by subnational governments. In some cases, the 
average treatment effect is also negative but the average treatment effect on the treated is of a 
higher magnitude.  
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 Conclusion 
This chapter has attempted to test two theoretical propositions from Chapter 2. 
Specifically, the empirical questions explored the effect of decrease in the share of resource rent 
revenues on investment in fixed public goods in the regions of Russia and the effects of the 
investment and current components of total public expenditure as simultaneous choices. The 
estimation equations used two different definitions of subnational investment in fixed public 
capital. The empirical models were developed to create estimators that could specifically provide 
answers to these questions. The models exploited a quasi natural experiment in the Russian 
Federation, namely the reductions in rent shares of producing regions between 2004 and 2006. 
The three reductions and three types of producing regions that formed the quasi natural 
experiment, provided a set of variations that were all used in the model to bring out the effects of 
each type of policy change and its variegated application. The chapter employs a program 
evaluation method embedded in a structural model of determination of public investment. In 
doing so, it attempts to make a methodological contribution.  
The theory model presented in Chapter 2 lays out an analytic framework for rent tax 
assignment. Given the priority of keeping current public expenditure, or consumption, at a 
certain level, a gain in federal share of rent tax revenue at the expense of regional share of the 
revenue needs to be viewed from the perspective of its effect on investment in new public 
capital. This chapter shows the real life changes in rent tax revenue shares in the Russian 
Federation took place in a context that was similar to the parameters defining the theory model. 
The estimations have been carried out using determinants of public capital investment in the 
regions of Russia. Using both an instrumental variables method and a seemingly unrelated 
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equations estimation, a set of variables was identified that have an effect on investment in public 
capital investment. 
Investment in in fixed public capital has been used as a measure of increase in long-lived 
public goods. The measure is defined in two ways, investment in fixed public capital from 
subnational budgets and acquisition of fixed capital by subnational government. The estimation 
results have shown that rent tax revenue assignment is not neutral to investments in public 
capital. Important as it may be to development policy, this finding holds implication for the 
discussion of rent tax assignment. The DD estimators employed in all the three models provide 
some evidence in favor of the theoretical propositions that an increase in the federal share of rent 
results in a decline in public investment. Inclusion of a longer time series for both pre-treatment 
and post-treatment time periods enhances the sample size and also allows for picking up specific 
time effects. The main results are consistent across the the three models. The multiple treatment 
method exploits the entire range of variations in treatment application and in addition to its 
methodological relevance, shows moderately strong evidence of decline in public investment. 
The annualized treatment method provides another analytic variation by allowing lagged effects 
of the policy change to appear over the subsequent years. This method in particular recognizes 
the nature of the budgetary process where any effects on capital investment programs would 
appear with some time lag due to their medium term planning horizons. The seemingly unrelated 
equations method is particularly of interest because it closely demonstrates the simultaneity in 
the choice of new capital investment and setting the overall size of public expenditure. It is also 
able to provide an empirical estimation method that very closely aligns the objective function 
elaborated for the  theoretical model in the previous chapter. All three methods recognize gross 
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regional product, value of fixed capital and subnational revenue as endogenous variables in the 
choice model.  
The estimation equations have been specified to separate out the effect of policy change 
from revenue effects and the effects of other variables. In addition to the results connected to the 
DD estimators, the findings show that real gross regional product per capita and measures of 
economic activity increase investment in fixed public capital in subnational jurisdictions, while 
controlling for other factors. Some structural variables like farmland and population density were 
significant but others like road density were not statistically significant. All these results except 
that on gross regional product are in accordance with expectations based on theory and earlier 
studies. The coefficient on the existing stock of fixed capital is negative but only significant in a 
few estimations. This result provides weak evidence that there may be convergence in the stocks 
of fixed capital across the regions of Russia. Demand variables like population below working 
age, public school enrolment and hospital beds per 10,000 population are significant only in 
some cases. The signs on their coefficients are not always easy to interpret. After demonstrating 
the effect of determinants on public investment, we have employed three program evaluation 
methods and the results provide insights into the effect of policy change on investment in long-
lived public goods.  
The tax sharing policy change has an effect on investment which is a component of 
development policy. Therefore, from a policy perspective the findings have an implication. The 
results show that the main brunt of reduction in subnational share of rent tax revenue was borne 
by investment in public capital.
132
 In terms of income effect, most of the response came on the 
recurrent expenditure side as the total revenue coefficient in 0.13 for the capital expenditure and 
0.85 for current expenditure. For oil and gas regions, however, there was also a price effect 
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 This is in line with the earlier findings of Oxley and Martin (1991) in case of other OECD countries.   
116 
 
 
 
exclusively for capital expenditure. There is some evidence that total public expenditures 
inclusive of social expenditures were protected compared with investment spending.
133
 The 
decline in infrastructure expenditure is noteworthy because it cannot be explained by 
convergence as was the case in the United States and some other OECD countries.
134
 The 
decrease in investment is not compensated by any upward trend in federally financed investment. 
This indicates that the increase in federal revenues is channeled into other areas. Transfers do not 
substitute shared revenues in this case. Mostly transfers are used for other types of expenditures. 
This result could be attributed to the particular nature of transfers in Russia where existing 
facilities account for measures of fiscal need.  
Investment in long-lived public goods is a variable that is amenable to direct and indirect 
policy effects. The theoretical model in Chapter 2 shows that a higher value of increase in long-
lived public goods should result in lower federal share of rent revenues. It is difficult to say if the 
results could be interpreted in this way to say that there is a low value attached to increase in 
long-lived public goods. If the government in Russia deliberately planned to siphon resources 
away from investment toward consumption, the effect of the changes in rent tax shares may not 
be a matter of concern. On the other hand, if the policy seeks to carry out nation building and 
includes investment in long lived public goods, the effect of changes in tax shares is not neutral 
to investment in fixed public capital. In either case, it supports the view that rent tax assignment 
should be viewed from the perspective of investment outcomes and not necessarily treated as a 
matter of administrative advantages or macroeconomic concerns.  
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  A similar finding was reported by Sanz and Velazquez (2003) but contrarily to their findings productive 
investments decline.  
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 A discussion of these issues has been presented in Munnell (1993) for United States and other European 
countries.  
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The empirical evidence presented in this chapter supports the hypothesis that an increase 
in federal share of rent revenue at the expense of subnational governments will decrease 
investment in long-lived public goods. Whether this effect is due to differences in preference for 
long-lived public goods or due to inertia in existing current expenditure allocations can be further 
investigated. In the next chapter, we present some discussion addressing the first question.  
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Chapter 4 Resource rent sharing reconsidered in the context of regional identity 
 
Introduction  
Resource rent sharing between producing regions and rest of the country, through base or 
revenue sharing, are employed as conflict management tools in some countries. This is 
understandable due to the preponderance of conflicts arising from exhaustible resource benefit 
sharing. In this chapter, we present additional evidence that leaving more rent with the producing 
regions, where such regions have strong community identity, may stimulate investment in long-
lived public goods. In this context, the rent sharing question could be considered anew from a 
development policy point of view. The effect of rent tax assignment on expenditure choices, as 
demonstrated in the Chapter 3, is not neutral but often it is not studied from this perspective.  
In this chapter some additional arguments are made for reconsidering the role and effects 
of rent tax assignment. Importance of rent to development, connection of rent sharing with 
political stability of a federation and politically finalized sharing arrangements in some federal 
countries are presented to highlight the political significance rent sharing in several countries.  
These issues provide a background to the empirical results presented later in the chapter. The 
chapter begins with a discussion of rent related issues in federal countries, different types of 
ownership associated with it and also evidence on various ways in which federations deal with 
the issue of rent sharing. The importance of rent to development and its connection with political 
stability are recounted to provide a context to review the nexus of regional identity and claims of 
exhaustible resource rents. Federations are finely balanced institutional arrangements where 
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resource rent often is a contested issue. Due to strong community ownership claims on rent are 
made and pursued. A federal arrangement that bestows higher shares of rents where there is a 
higher sense of ownership is not only a political consideration as commonly understood. A valid 
question is if resource ownership claims intertwined with identity lead to expenditure choices 
that are different than those made by the federal government or other regions. Within the context 
of examples of rent sharing from different federations, an empirical test is applied to the case of 
the Russian Federation to find out if regional identity plays a role in preferences for investment 
of rents.   
We have seen that the case of the Russian Federation which comprises of producing 
regions where some are republics and regions with strong ethnic identity. Republics among the 
producing regions have historical claims to a distinct identity and may have a preference for 
preserving their identity. The evidence in the previous chapter showed that change in rent shares 
had an adverse effect on investment in long-lived public goods. In this chapter using the case of 
producing republic an attempt is made to find if there is any evidence that identity based 
community ownership of exhaustible resource endowments matters to investment choices and it 
should be included in the assignment question. Following this line of argument, it can be 
discussed if rent assignment, through rent tax or revenue assignment, should favor producing 
regions within the range of stability in a federation.  
Where investment of rent is a priority, rent assignment should be considered as a special 
case under the assignment question. If there is evidence that subnational entities have a 
differential preference for investment in long-lived public goods, then centralization of rent 
shares will not be neutral to investment. In such cases, rent tax assignment should favor 
producing regions if they have a higher preference for long-lived public goods. Development 
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policy goals often include increasing the stock of public infrastructure as well as reducing the 
possibility of conflict generated by unrequited claims to resource ownership. Assignment of rent 
revenue or taxes to producing regions will be conducive to development policy goals. 
Centralization on the other hand may run counter to the goal of increasing investment in long-
lived public goods. The macroeconomic considerations will still remain relevant. They should be 
addressed by setting clear fiscal rules that provide a limited set of allocation choices to producing 
regions, without necessarily burdening the assignment question with these objectives.  
Despite the well known association of resource riches and a mixture of conflict and 
opportunity for growth and development, there is not much guidance on rent tax assignment in 
the general tax assignment literature from these perspectives. The current thinking arises out of 
the general revenue assignment principles and does not provide a special treatment to taxes 
levied on exhaustible resource rents. The basic precept remains an agreed principle that the rent 
should be all picked up by some tax instrument and used for the general benefit of the society. 
Beyond this to whose benefit should it be applied is not clearly spelt out. There has been a 
considerable amount of concern in the literature about the macroeconomic effects and labor 
market efficiency.
135
 Community claims on rent are generally treated as almost an unwelcome 
aberration. The macroeconomic concerns and difficulties of administering a resource rent tax 
dominate the considerations.
136
  Due to these concerns, centralization of rent tax collection and 
revenue is favored as an assignment solution. Tax efficiency has been another area of interest 
that has been studied in some detail.
137
 The arguments for centralization are only qualified by the 
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 For example see Boadway (2006), and for a classical treatment of the subject see Dasgupta, Heal and Stiglitz 
(1980), Bergstrom, Cross and Porter (1981) and Bergstrom (1982). Otto (2000) and McKenzie (2006) have a similar 
emphasis. For a recent discussion see Boadway and Keen (2010).  
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 For example see Boadway (2006), Tordo (2007) and Boadway and Keen (2010).  
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need to pay for subnational services and political reasons.
138
 All these are important 
considerations. But given the close link of rent tax revenue and long-term growth, it can be 
argued that rent tax assignment is neither best treated as a general tax assignment not merely a 
function of political compromise. And if so, is there a model of rent tax assignment in a multi-
tiered jurisdiction.  
The theoretical model in Chapter 2 assumes that investment preferences may vary across 
regions. Proposition 2 shows that an increase in federal share of rent will result in a decrease in 
investment of rent in long-lived public goods if preferences are distributed likewise. The adverse 
effects in the regions will vary according to the extent that preferences for rent investment vary 
across regions. Could this be related to exhaustible resource endowments is a question that can 
be asked in the context of rent assignment. This proposition provides the theoretical context for 
the empirical model used in this chapter.  
Exhaustible resource rent is a finite asset often identified with strong community 
ownership. Two features of resource rents are noteworthy from a policy perspective. They are a 
strong claim to ownership by communities and an associated higher preference for investment of 
rents over consumption. The latter is by no means a ubiquitous practice but there are examples to 
show that communities prefer investment over immediate consumption.
139
 A number of world 
examples show that communities have chosen to allocate exhaustible resource rents to long-lived 
assets. A preference for long-lived assets over immediate consumption is an important behavior 
norm from a policy perspective.  
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 McKenzie provides these two cases as exceptions to the arguments for centralization of resource rent taxes.  
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 Fasano (2000) presents a review of oil savings funds in Norway, Chile, Venezuela, Alaska, Kuwait and Oman.  
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The world experience shows that claims to rent are made by communities who can assert 
ownership of land. At times, such claims are intertwined with identity politics.
140
 The exhaustible 
nature of rents makes them a patrimony to which outside claims can be thwarted.  On the 
positive side, the ownership rights may lead to efficient rent allocation, namely investment in 
long-lived assets. Exhaustible resource rent has demonstrably influenced allocation decisions. 
When producing regions are seen as distinct from other regions, rent sharing is not a 
straightforward option to be addressed in an equalization scheme. These distinguishing features 
of resource rent mean that it should merit a special treatment under the revenue assignment 
question, where assignment principles specific to exhaustible resource rents are adopted. Given 
these two features of resource rents, it can be asserted that rent assignment, tax base or revenue 
sharing, merits a special treatment under the general assignment question, catering to the distinct 
nature of this tax base.  
The central argument in this chapter is that exhaustible resource rent assignment should 
be given a special consideration under the revenue assignment question, using a rational 
framework distinctly different from the general arguments applicable to other sources of 
revenue. The importance of this question is shown with a discussion of the case of federal 
countries. We have argued in the earlier chapters that rent tax (or revenue) assignment, keeping 
in view the efficient use of the rent, should be an important consideration within the general tax 
and expenditure assignment frameworks. In doing so, we have attempted to demonstrate that 
resource rent revenue assignment is not neutral to outcomes like new investment in long-lived 
public goods. In addition to efficient tax instruments, revenue assignment decisions, which 
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 For example, see Akapalu and Parks (2007) in case of Nigeria; Billon (2001) for a more general discussion of the 
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include rent tax base and revenue sharing, also matter to development policy when investment in 
long-lived goods is a policy choice.  
The two preceding chapters have shown that with some assumptions on differential 
preferences of long-lived public goods in a country and a political stability constraint, it is 
possible to construct a model for rent tax assignment within the context of development policy. 
The empirical evidence lends support to non-neutrality of rent sharing and assignment for 
investment in long-lived public goods. In this concluding chapter we refer to different world 
federations alongside a discussion of rent tax assignment. The differences is rent sharing across 
federations could be due to different settlements of political stability arrived at between the 
federation and the producing regions. The discussion in this chapter is organized in five sections.  
In the beginning, Section 1 briefly lays out the importance of resource rent sharing in relation to 
conflicts in world federations. Section 2 presents a discussion of complexity introduced by 
different patterns of resource ownership. It explains that ownership could be constitutional or 
legal but not necessary leading to control over revenues.  Section 3 presents evidence from world 
federations and suggests that no uniform practice of rent sharing exists. Section 4 revisits the 
assumption made in the theoretical model of Chapter 2 that producing regions may have a higher 
preference for investment of rents in long-lived public goods. The argument for special 
consideration of exhaustible resource rent in this section uses empirical results from the Russian 
Federation to show that community identification with land and exhaustible resource endowment 
may influence rent investment choices. Based on these arguments, Section 5 concludes that a 
rational framework will be useful in analyzing rent assignment and may possibly help create 
efficient arrangements for use of rent in fiscal choices. The conclusion, based on this discussion, 
does not unambiguously support the commonly made centralization argument for resource rents. 
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 Resource rent issues in a federation  
The extent to which public investment of resource rents is important to a federation 
depends upon its development policy. The effects of rent tax base and revenue sharing influence 
on public investment are being discussed here with reference to ethnic diversity in a federation. 
A fiscal approach that employs efficient taxation and allocates rent revenue to creation of long 
lived public capital suits development objectives. The so called Hartwick rule suggests that all 
rents should be invested in long-lived goods to keep productivity from falling below current 
levels (Hartwick, 1977; 1978; Solow, 1986). This notion is also supportively captured by the 
discussions of genuine national savings and genuine national product (Hamilton & Clemens, 
1998). The fiscal approach on the whole needs to meet all three standards namely, efficient 
taxation, efficient levels of rent investment and mitigation of conflicts. Even when largely 
ignored in the revenue assignment question, it is apparent from world experience that while 
aiming at efficient taxation and levels of public investment, it is critical that the fiscal approach 
keeps the federation with minimum conflict and politically stable.  
In this context, design of taxes and arrangements for sharing of benefits from exhaustible 
resource exploitation are consequential issues for development outcomes. The constitutional and 
political status of subnational entities in a federation adds an additional dimension of importance 
to the treatment of resource rents in the fiscal architecture. In federal countries, the subnational 
entities have (mostly) clearly recognized political status and using this legal position they can 
stake claims on resource rents against the federation and against other subnational entities. This 
constitutional situation makes the claims on resource ownership and arrangements for sharing of 
benefits more intricate and complex under a federal arrangement, as they become intertwined 
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with the constitutional scheme and identity politics. The fact that subnational entities in a 
federation have a recognized constitutional locus standi allows them to make claims and raise 
issues with rent sharing arrangements within the pales of law, with stronger legitimacy and 
higher political acceptability. Unlike a unitary state, a federation may become politically unstable 
if these issues are not resolved.
141
 Therefore, settlement of resource related rights and sharing of 
benefits receive (and should receive) added attention in a federal country.  
Natural resources are important to development policy and its outcomes. They are 
associated with conflict as well as a number of development opportunities in the producing 
countries. For countries with a lower capital labor ratio, natural resource endowments attract 
investment and if managed and harvested properly, natural resources provide financing for 
development. Many countries, despite these advantages, have been unable to gainfully employ 
their natural resource to their advantage and follow a path leading to higher development.  In fact 
in some contexts, a negative relationship between natural resource abundance and growth has 
been found to operate (Sachs & Warner, 2001). The well known notion of the ‗Dutch disease‘ 
has been developed to explain this relationship. According to this concept, preponderance of 
natural resource in the economy crowds out other sectors. The related ‗resource curse‘ 
hypothesis, explains the relationship through weak institutions and rent seeking behavior. Studies 
have also established the relationship between natural resources and conflict under certain 
circumstances (Collier & Hoeffler, 1998; Le Billon, 2001; Olsson, 2007).  
At the same time, it is also recognized that the negative outcomes are not inexorable 
consequences of resource endowments in a country. Strong institutions may prevent conflict and 
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 I do not imply that such conflict cannot occur in a unitary state. In fact Aceh in Indonesia and the interregional 
distribution of canon revenues in Peru (Ahmad & García-Escribano, 2006) are examples from unitary state. In the 
federations due to already defined positions of subnational entities, the conflicts are more tangible and intermixed 
with identity politics. The discussion here for federations may also be generalized to unitary states.  
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lead to positive outcomes. The putatively negative resource-growth relationship is therefore more 
a consequence of missed opportunities than an immutable curse. It can be deduced from these 
discussions that it is the absence of appropriate incentives, rules and systems to siphon rents to 
the general public weal that leads to adverse effects on growth and development (Sala-i-Martin 
& Subramanian, 2003). However, despite this recognition, no clear guidance is available on 
building up the framework for rent collection and allocation. Clearly, rent assignment will be an 
important component of what could be called an optimal institutional scheme to guarantee 
positive outcomes from exhaustible resource exploitation. The effect of rent tax assignment on 
expenditure choices, as demonstrated in the last chapter, is not neutral but often it is not studied 
from this perspective. An appropriately designed tax system in a resource rich economy can 
efficiently pick up rents from resource mining and channel them to pursuit of welfare 
maximization. But it is only optimally chosen expenditures that can provide long term productive 
sustainability. A tax and expenditure system that is efficient for extracting economic rent as well 
as channeling it to optimal investments will be required for pursuit of development objectives. 
When both the tax and expenditure choices can be influenced by rent assignment arrangements, 
the case for centralization of rent revenue as a general dispensation under the assignment 
question becomes considerably weakened.  
It will be pertinent to refer to some conflicts that arise out of benefit sharing on account 
of natural resources in various countries and recognize that resource rent-sharing arrangements 
are often a cause for concern in the federal policy context. In Canada for example, Alberta and 
other producing provinces have asserted their right to petroleum rent (James, 1993). Depending 
upon the international price of oil, the arrangement may be questioned vigorously or less 
strenuously. Nigeria has an ongoing conflict in the Niger delta where three of the nine producing 
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states are located (Iledare & Suberu, 2010). The conflict over resource rights rises and ebbs when 
faced with different settlements. The latter in this case are nothing but revenue sharing 
arrangements. The Russian Federation during the 1990s saw producing regions claiming major 
share of the rent from oil and gas production.
142
 The quantum of stability in the Russian 
Federation has varied over time. From a fragile federation in the 1990s it has emerged as a 
country with a strong and assertive center (Mitin, 2008). At a subliminal policy plank, the 
resource rent sharing has changed over time as well. Pakistan only recently attempted to gain 
stability after conceding joint ownership of both onshore and offshore natural resources formally 
to the provinces through a constitutional amendment.
143
 Recently, in Iraq negotiations on 
resource rights were held as part of the constitution making exercise. The constitution making 
had to navigate between regional and national claims on petroleum reserves and mining 
operations. The question was so basic to the country and difficult to resolve that its constitutional 
resolution in favor of the ‗people‘ remains open ended, leaving room for interpretation and a 
long drawn out settlement. Nepal agreed in 2007 in a referendum to switch to a federal 
governmental structure after more than a decade long insurgency. Part of the strong demand for 
federalism comes from regional and community assertion of resource ownership. In Nigeria, the 
1999 constitution settled the ownership of petroleum in favor of the federation but allowing for 
asymmetric distribution of revenue to producing states. The fact that such conflicts have afflicted 
both rich and poor countries means that there is some evidence that rent tax assignment should 
lie in the interior of the stability constraint as we have argued in the first chapter. In other words, 
rent shares should neither tilt too aggressively toward the center nor completely ostracize non-
producing regions. Otherwise political instability and conflict may ensue.  
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 A detailed discussion in the first post-Soviet decade in presented in Alexeev, 1999. 
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 Article 172 (3) of the Constitution of Pakistan after the Eighteenth Constitutional Amendment.  
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Recognizing the importance of resource ownership related conflicts many countries have 
attempted to address the question at the constitutional or statutory level. The older federal 
constitutions did not avidly address resource ownership and sharing. In the later constitutions 
that have been written after experiencing conflict and arriving at new national consensus, natural 
resources have received more attention (Haysom & Kane, 2009). Various ways have been 
attempted to settle the ownership question and sharing of benefits. Rent tax assignment may or 
may not align with the ownership titles. Most rent tax assignments are at best compromises and 
not necessarily made under a rational framework.
144
 As long as they work politically, there is not 
much reason to reopen the question in any particular country. However, settlements are not 
constant over time. Changes in fiscal fortunes or political stability may call them into question. 
Therefore, there is a need for a rational framework to assign rent tax revenues to serve as 
guidance to assignment decisions in multi-tiered countries.  
 
 The ownership question and political stability  
Resource ownership matters to claims on rent and ownership question affects sharing 
arrangements. In many cases, claims lead to political action that results in changes in sharing 
arrangements. Therefore, the discussion in this section clarifies the concept of ownership, what it 
entails and how it relates to political stability. Together these issues provide a context in which 
rent assignment can be discussed.  
Resource ownership can be explained as three types of rights namely ownership as 
having a property title, management rights and as revenue share. Ownership and management, 
the first two, do not necessarily affect rent revenue assignment. But the latter is carried out 
within the confines of ownership rights. Resource ownership is only important because it may 
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allow regions (or the federation) to stake a claim to a higher share of rent. In other words, for 
rent assignment, ownership and management rights may or may not be relevant. If ownership is 
legally vested in the center, it does not bar subnational entities from staking a claim to rent. The 
assignment question, it seems, does not settle with constitutional and legal settlements but may 
additionally require responding to claims on rent by subnational entities in open political process. 
Rent belongs to the community, the usual refrain, manifests in different shares between 
producing regions and the federation across countries. The differences can be easily noted to 
conclude that no universal practice exists. It is also noteworthy that different sharing rules cannot 
be completely explained by political bargaining. The stability constraint, discussed in the last 
section, provides an analytical device to explain variations in rent sharing across countries, 
especially federations.  
Despite the importance of exhaustible resources to many economies, there is no universal 
practice of assigning resource ownership and management rights. In a federation there are a 
number of issues concerning use of exhaustible resources that require settlement. Some of these 
are long term institutional issues like ownership while others, unique to the nature of the problem 
like efficient rate of resource mining, rent collection, sharing and allocation, require continual 
work to address changes in the international capital and commodity markets. The first set of 
issues pertains to settlement of ownership and management. It would be difficult to argue that a 
normative prescription exists for conferring ownership of an exhaustible resource on a 
community, local jurisdiction, state or federation. In this regard, the general principle often 
repeated in discussions that rents should be collected and spent on the general welfare of the 
community has little practical use. The definition of community may be settled on the federation, 
a constituent state or a local community. The practice varies so much that is appears almost 
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arbitrary and any attempt to evolve a rational framework trivial. In practice, therefore, 
centralization or decentralization of rent revenue both will measure up to the principle under 
different definitions of community. It can also be said that federations are not uniform in the way 
they define common benefits. In some cases, the subnational interests and benefits are 
subordinate to national interest as defined by the center.
145
  
Table 4.1 shows the number of producing regions in case of federal countries where 
exhaustible natural resources are important to the economy and briefly lists how they have 
settled the ownership of such natural resources. The practice in the existing federations shows 
that wide variations exist in settlement of property rights. Argentina allows provinces to own 
onshore as well offshore reserves up to 12 miles. Australia has worked out a similar dispensation 
but with onshore reserves belonging to the states and offshore to the commonwealth government. 
In Brazil, ownership is vested in the union but subnational governments are guaranteed revenues 
through legal provisions. In Iraq, the constitution has vested ownership in the people under 
provisions that are open to interpretation in the future. India allows ownership to subnational 
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 In federations the national interest can be defined as a sum of subnational benefits plus additional benefits 
provided by the federal arrangements and it is this sum that is maximized.  
                                     
subject to         and                  
where   is a measure of total benefits that the federation generates, a function of   , and are consumed in every 
region in the federation
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 and    is the cost of maintaining the federation and is an increasing function of 
          ,    is the measure of local benefits that can be generated in region i, state or province on its own and    
is the cost that region i pays in joining a federation. The cost can be characterized as the fiscal resource taken away 
from the region by the federal government.                 are the weights attached by a social planner to the 
federal benefits and net regional benefits. The first constraint is the basic foundational condition for  a federation 
whereas the second is the stability constraints based on a compensation criterion.    increases with political conflict. 
The more the conflict endures, the higher is the cost of maintaining the federation. Any negative net benefits will 
increase the cost of maintaining the federation whereas positive net benefits reduce it. It is clearly possible to have a 
negative net benefit in a region as long as         or when      . In federations, where the first condition is 
met, regions may be willing to give up ownership of exhaustible resource endowments. Where the second condition 
is met, with or without the first condition, a political choice for nation building may be a dominant concern leading 
to federal ownership of resources. Indonesia settled the Aceh demands for ownership of oil mining in the form of an 
asymmetric sharing of 70 percent of revenue with the province. If the weights are some measures of social values of 
federal versus regional benefits in the population then the maximization allows the planner to choose a higher cost, 
in this case a higher level of federal share in the rents. Since such values vary across nations, it is expected that the 
level of federal share in the rent revenue will vary across countries.  
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governments but keeps management rights for the federal government. In Russia, onshore 
resources are jointly owned but in practice the regions do not have management role. Pakistan 
has worked out a joint ownership regime keeping management with the federal government. 
Venezuela keeps both ownership and management for the federal government.  
The assignment of ownership and benefits is not always with the same level of 
government. In Nigeria and India, ownership of onshore exhaustible resources vests in the 
federation. The countries that have given a clear ownership title to subnational governments are 
Canada, United Arab Emirates and Australia. The Russian Federation and Pakistan have declared 
a joint ownership of exhaustible resources between the federal government and the producing 
region or province. In the United States, there are two types of ownership regimes. Mining on 
private lands is privately owned whereas on state land, around 30 percent of the total area of the 
country, it is nominally vested in the federal government with sharing of management and 
revenue rights with the states (Mieszkowski & Soligo, 2010). In case of offshore mining, nearly 
all federations including Russia, Canada, the United States and Venezuela assign some level of 
ownership to the federal government.  
Once the ownership has been settled, management and regulation rights are largely, but 
not always, decided according to efficiency and scale considerations. Subnational governments 
may not have the technical capacity to design and implement resource mining contracts. Policing 
implementation and the requisite capacity for doing so would be another issue. The balance of 
the argument in such cases is mostly in favor of the higher levels of government with one 
exception. Local costs in the form of environmental damage can best be assessed at the local 
level. There is a higher motivation to act on such issues at the subnational level. When resource 
rich jurisdictions are landlocked, mining may require transportation across other jurisdictions. In 
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case of Russia, natural gas pipelines from Caucasus and other Russian oblasts cross several non-
producing regions before they reach markets in Europe. A similar situation applies to producing 
regions in Sudan.
146
 Such transboundary issues can best be internalized with a federal role in 
management (Silva et al., 2009). In practice federations have adopted increasingly a dual 
approach. The formal statutory management of mining is with the federal government. This may 
extend to regulation of exports, as in case of Australia. Local jurisdictions are given role in 
mitigating environmental costs. In many cases, mining firms deal directly with local 
communities in addition to regulatory compliance with the federal standards. The pace at which 
mining is carried out may have implications for macroeconomic stability. Federal governments 
may want to step in to regulate management for this objective also.
147
  
 
 Revenue sharing in federal countries—some examples 
Revenue sharing is perhaps even more important than the ownership question in federal 
countries. Exhaustible resource rent embodies the largest share of benefits. Other benefits like 
employment generation, power at negotiation tables and political strength are of lesser 
significance at the regional level. The importance of the rent revenue sharing question is a 
function of the size of rent tax revenue as a fraction of total government revenue. Federations 
have base sharing or revenue sharing arrangements essentially to deal with the remaining claims 
after settling the ownership question. In Canada and Australia the provinces and states tax the 
base with the federal government collecting some part of the rent through corporate income tax. 
The United States allows local jurisdictions to levy a severance tax while the royalty is collected 
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 Similar issues have been seen in centralized China.  
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 Corruption is a major issue and siphoning away rents for private purposes is a major concern in many countries. 
To focus my attention on the specific questions being discussed in this chapter, I have not included corruption in the 
scope of my discussion.  
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by the federal government and then shared with the states. The Russian Federation collects 
almost all the rent through the Mineral Extraction Tax since 2001 and shares part of the revenue 
with the producing regions. From 2010 it will retain all the revenue. Brazil, India, Nigeria and 
Pakistan collect all the revenue at the federal level and then share it with the producing 
jurisdictions. In India the transfers are recognized as non-tax income of the producing states and 
it is not an important issue in the general revenue assignment. Nigeria transfers the revenue in 
accordance with a formula to all the states, with some preferential allocation to producing states, 
and it is one of the most contested questions in the Nigerian federalism.   
Among the major federations, Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, India, Iraq, Mexico, 
Nigeria, Pakistan, Russia, United Arab Emirates, United States and Venezuela produce oil and 
gas in significant quantities and rent tax revenue is an important consideration for the national or 
subnational fiscal policy. Table 4.2 shows that oil alone is an important sector in the gross 
domestic product in several federations. Iraq depends on oil production with around 54 percent 
of GDP coming from this sector alone. In case of Nigeria, nearly 40 percent of GDP comes from 
oil. In the United Arab Emirates, it is more than 20 percent of GDP. This is closely followed by 
Venezuela where oil accounts for 20 percent of GDP and the Russian Federation with around 17 
percent of oil sector in GDP. A more precise measure of the significance of oil and gas sectors to 
government is the share of rent tax revenue collected to total revenue. Table 4.3 shows that in a 
number of federal countries, oil and gas rent tax revenues account for a major share of total 
revenue. In Australia, at 2.9 percent of total government revenue, it is noticeable. In Pakistan, at 
8.4 percent of total tax revenue, it is significant enough to create long drawn out political conflict 
between producing provinces and federal government. In the United Arab Emirates, with nearly 
75 percent of total revenue, petroleum becomes the mainstay of the fiscal regime. To a lesser 
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degree, in Venezuela with half of government revenue coming from this sector, it again becomes 
the main source of revenue. In the largest federation, Russia, it accounts for 36.7 percent of total 
revenue signifying that rent taxes make a major contribution to government operations.  
There are primarily two ways in which federations assign resource rent tax revenue. The 
first method is by tax assignment. Under this method, the rent is declared as the shared base 
among different levels of government. The right to levy a tax on the base defined as the 
economic rent of an exhaustible resource is either given to the federal government or to a 
subnational level or vested in multiple levels of government. This method has some advantages. 
It allows each level of government to set its own rate and carry out its own collection.
148
 Mines 
differ from each other in the quality of their deposits reflected in the differential costs of 
extraction. Subnational governments can choose different rates to ensure that the rent is siphoned 
away efficiently.
149
 This method also vests a higher degree of ownership in the subnational 
governments. When ownership of mineral endowments is politically sensitive, this method has 
the advantage of assuaging local community claims and providing political stability. On the other 
hand this method leads to some practical difficulties. Multiple instruments increase compliance 
costs. There is a higher administrative cost of the system due to coordination requirements.  
The second method is sharing. In this case the federal government sets the rate and 
collects the revenue. It is then shared according to some sharing rule with the producing 
jurisdiction. The rule, among other things, in general allows favorable shares on the derivation 
principle. The advantage of centralized tax policy and administration lies in its administrative 
efficiency. At the same time, it may lead to claims by subnational jurisdictions against federal 
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 Perhaps due to capacity concerns, no developing country allows complete tax discretion to subnational 
governments except in case of minor minerals.  
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 Elected officials with a short elected life, signifying a high discount rate, may want to expedite the pace of 
extraction. This could be dealt with by higher transparency and accountability.  
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government. Where there is a strong identity attached to producing jurisdictions, it may lead to 
conflict seeing federal tax on resources as unfair. Another undesirable effect, which is often 
ignored, could be a lower investment in long-lived public goods.  
Table 4.4 demonstrates that there is no universal scheme of sharing arrangements and 
they vary by country. In Canada, for example, the provinces primarily tax exhaustible resource 
rents. The federal government levies corporate income tax only. Australia allows the states to 
retain rents but adjusts them completely in the equalization scheme. The United States collects 
rents on federal lands but passes almost 90 percent of the royalties to the states (Mieszkowski & 
Soligo, 2010). Looking at the petroleum sector, Table 4.4 shows that there is no universal 
practice of tax or revenue assignment in the world federations. If there is a norm it is that a 
combination of tax instruments are allowed to capture exhaustible resource rents. Several reasons 
could explain the multiple instruments in use. Assessment of rents is difficult. When 
governments aim to siphon away all the rent multiple instruments have a better chance at 
meeting that aim. With a few exceptions, all the tax instruments collect from the same base. The 
payments are either in monetary units or in kind. The latter option is also kept in the tax regime 
to ensure that supernormal profits that may accrue due to unusual world commodity prices may 
also be captured by the government.  
This type of variation in selection of tax revenue shares and instruments shows that the 
effective rent shares of producing regions lie on a wide interval. This outcome can be explained 
by using the idea of a stability constraint as mentioned in Section 2. A region joins a federation 
trading off some of the benefits of independence with those derived from association. 
Association comes at a cost, which in this case it is the federal share of the rent revenue. Only if 
the net benefits of association are larger than the benefits of independence the producing region 
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joins or remains in the federation. In this simple characterization, assume no costs of 
dissociation. The benefits of association arise out of common identity, shares national defense, 
higher position in international fora, larger market and diversity. Since most of these variables 
have at least partially a subjective valuation, it is easy to see that different federations provide 
different benefits of association. As a general principle, where there are higher benefits of 
association, the federal share of rents will be higher. In cases where subnational identity is 
different than national identity the benefits may be valued considerably lower leading to 
instability and even exit. In such situations the federal share of rent will be smaller.  
Using data on fractionalization measures of ethnicity and linguistic diversity from 
Alesina et al. (2003) we calculated the correlation between federal share of rent and the 
fractionalization measures. We found that the correlation between federal share of rent and 
ethnicity fractionalization is -0.6732 and between federal share of rent and linguistic diversity in 
a federation it is -0.4909. The federations with clear assignment and rent shares were only used. 
The correlations indicate that where there is higher fractionalization it is associated with a lower 
federal share of rent.  
Once the rent is defined, the federal systems have a wide range of complex instruments to 
reach the base. Out of these, the Russian Federation after 2001 levies a simple tax regime. The 
Mineral Extraction Tax is levied at a uniform rate on the base of the value of extracted mineral 
not allowing any cost differentials across mines. The tax is administered by federal authorities. In 
India the tax is collected on sales and extraction and comprises of dead rent, royalty, sales tax 
and profit oil and gas. Similarly, in other federations rent tax is often a combination of various 
tax instruments not necessarily levied by the same level of government. Rent assignment seems 
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to respond to political characteristics of federations. This is an important issue for a rational 
framework of rent assignment.  
 
 
 The case of Russia’s regions 
Subnational identity is a strong motivation for decentralization. If the producing regions 
assert a subnational identity that is different from the federal nation state, then exhaustible 
resource rents assume a special importance. Regions with a strong sense of a distinct identity are 
very likely to see exhaustible resource rents belonging to the region (Green, 2010). If this is the 
case, will it influence how rent is allocated in the region? This being an empirical question, we 
have used data from regions of Russia to see if investment decisions vary between producing 
regions with a strong claim to a distinct identity versus those producing regions which are not 
distinguishable other than as Russian geographic unit. Out of the 36 producing regions of Russia, 
22 do not have an ethnic identity that is distinct from Russian. The remaining 14 however assert 
themselves as republics or regions with a strong claim to an ethnic identity. In case of republics, 
the status is a result of history and past assertions at establishing a separate identity. Some 
republics date back to the times prior to the October 1917 revolution. The 2002 population 
census provides estimates of subnationalities in each region. In the republics there are large 
groups which are ethnically distinct and in many cases lend their name to the republic. Tatarstan, 
Bashkortostan and Sakha Republic are some examples.
150
 The census data also shows that 
regions vary by percentage of population resident in the region by birth, indicating another 
measure of community ownership of land and resources. Using these variations among the 
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 The regions with a strong preference for subnational identity are: Nenets Autonomous Okrug, Adgygea, 
Dagestan, Ingushetia, Kabardino-Balkar Republic, Kalmykia, North Ossetia-Alania, Chechnya, Bashkortostan, 
Tatarstan, Udmurtia, Khanty-Mansi Okrug, Yamalo-Nenets Okrug and Sakha Republic.  
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producing regions and control group regions, we have estimated a difference-in-difference-in-
differences estimator to see if reduction in rent tax share of regions has a differential effect on 
both types of regions. The null hypothesis is that regions with an ethnic identity have a higher 
preference for investment of resource rents. The tax share changes, the reductions in regional 
shares of oil and gas taxes, made in 2002, 2004 and 2005 offer a quasi natural experiment to 
study the question.  
The data were used to estimate an empirical model: 
                                                                     
Where     is a measure of new investment in long-lived public goods,   ,       is a 
treatment differentiated by the type of region,       is the post treatment period,     is a vector 
of variables having an effect on new investments in long-lived public goods,         is a set of 
region dummies and       are the time dummies. The error term,    , allows for individual 
specific-time invariant and individual and time variant components. The treatment groups 
defined by treatment    are classified on the basis of identity of the regions. The producing 
regions with the status of a national republic are one treatment group and the remaining 
producing regions, without the national recognition at the subnational level, are the second 
treatment group. All other regions are in the control group. The difference-in-difference-in-
differences estimators separately estimate the effect of the policy change on each type of treated 
group.  
The empirical model described in equation (4.1) arising out the theoretical model given in 
Chapter 2. The theoretical model discussed under Problem 1 in Chapter 2 assumed that the 
producing regions may have a higher preference for long-lived public goods. This is based on the 
assumption that if subnational identity is important to the regional community, it may ceteris 
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paribus choose to invest a higher amount of rents in long-lived public goods. This choice would 
be in line with using resource rents to preserve productivity for the future generations of the 
same community. Proposition 1 in Chapter 2 provides an important result showing that the 
negative effect of rent centralization will be scaled by the preference parameter of producing 
regions. In other words, if republics have a higher preference for rent investment then the effect 
of rent centralization will be stronger in republics compared with other producing regions. The 
empirical model allows testing of this assumption. According to the theoretical model, an 
increase in the federal share of rents will have a higher negative effect on the regions with 
stronger preferences for long-lived public goods. If ethnic republics have a higher preferences for 
public goods than other producing regions (and the control regions) this should be estimated by 
the coefficient on the interaction term.  
The model was estimated using two measures of new investment in long lived public 
goods. First we used investment in fixed public capital financed by regional budgets and then 
subnational acquisition of capital. Both measures were real values in 2000 rubles and calculated 
on per capita basis. The difference-in-difference-in-differences (DDD) estimators,   ,      , 
pick up the average treatment effect on producing republics or regions with an ethnic identity 
and producing regions (that are not republics) separately. The control variables are the same as 
used in estimations reported in Chapter 3.  
The results of the estimations of the model depicted in equation (1) are given in Table 
4.5. New investment in fixed public capital per capita financed by the regional budgets is the 
dependent variable. The first column reports results of an estimation which used a time trend. 
The second column has an addition of individual year dummies. The third column is for pooled 
estimation using a complete range of region and time dummies. The DDD estimator on the 
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producing republic is negative and significant at 5 percent level in the first column and at 10 
percent level in the last column. The coefficient on the remaining producing regions is not 
statistically significant. This provides some evidence that a decrease in the regional shares of rent 
revenue has a stronger negative effect on public investment in the republics, as expected 
according to the theoretical model if as assumed, ethnic republics have a stronger preference for 
investment of rents. The equation was re-estimated when standard errors are clustered by region 
to allow an arbitrary correlation matrix within regions. Essentially, the same results are retrieved. 
The population measure of by birth residence, an indicator of stronger ties to the region, 
was also included in this equation. In case of republics the coefficient in negative and significant 
at 5 percent level. In case of all the regions, the coefficient on this variable is positive but not 
significant in the first two columns but becomes negative and statistically significant at 1 percent 
level in the last column. These results are not in accordance with the assumption that 
communities with stronger ties to the region will invest a higher amount in long-lived public 
goods. The percentage of ethnic Russians in the population interacted with population growth 
rate is positive and significant at 1 percent level. To separate the effects of rate change from 
changes in rent revenue, the dollar denominated values of oil and gas production have been 
included as control variables. All other variables are qualitatively the same as in the results 
presented in Chapter 3. The real gross regional product and revenue are endogenous in the 
model. The excluded variables used in the estimation, paved roads as a percentage of total roads, 
real value of paid services per capita and residential area per capita, are reasonably strong 
instruments as shown by the first-stage F-test statistics and Craig-Donald statistics reported in 
the table.  
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The model was re-estimated using acquisition of fixed public capital as the dependent 
variable. This measure captures the investments obtained by subnational governments but made 
by private sector entities and debt financing of infrastructure in addition to budgetary financing. 
This estimation attempts to capture the effects on the policy change on all sources of investment 
in fixed public capital. The results are reported in Table 4.6. The DDD for republics is negative 
and significant at 5 percent level in the first column in accordance with the theoretical model. It 
is not significant in the last two columns although has the expected negative sign. Again it is an 
indication that the decline in new gross investment in long-lived public goods is there. The 
coefficient on the remaining producing regions is not significant. Increase in percentage of 
population resident in a producing republic by birth is not statistically significant. The positive 
sign is in accordance with the expectation that longer residence may promote a stronger 
attachment to an area leading to higher investment in long-lived assets. Similarly, in all the 
regions the increase in the percentage of population resident by birth is associated with a higher 
acquisition of ownership in long-lived public goods.  
The DDD was estimated using seemingly unrelated equations approach. The first 
equation has new investment in fixed public capital per capita as the dependent variable while 
recurrent public expenditure is the dependent variables in the second equation. Real gross 
regional product and revenue, both measures as per capita values, are endogenous variables. The 
results reported in Table 4.7 were estimated with new investment in fixed public capital financed 
by regional budgets. The DDD on republics is negative and significant at 5 percent level. This 
indicates a higher decrease in new investments after reduction in the regional shares of rent 
revenue. The DDD on recurrent expenditure is positive but statistically not significant. The 
estimators on the DDD estimators for the remaining producing regions are not significant. The 
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coefficients on the three population measures are significant for investments but not for recurrent 
expenditure. All other results are qualitatively the same as those reported in Chapter 3. The 
model was again estimated with new subnational acquisition of fixed public capital. The 
estimation is reported in Table 4.8. The signs on DDD are as expected but only the estimator on 
producing regions that are not republics is significant at 5 percent level. The DDD estimator on 
recurrent expenditure is positive and significant at 5 percent level for the republics. The results 
for the remaining variables are qualitatively the same.  
The results reported in this section provide evidence that republics in Russia with strong 
claims to distinct identities have a higher preference for investment of rents in long-lived public 
goods. This could be attributed to strong ownership of land and resources and a preference for 
converting regional wealth into long term productive assets. Identity preservation through 
passing on higher levels of public infrastructure to succeeding generations could be another 
motive. The effects of the policy change, centralization of rent revenue, are captured by the DDD 
estimators and is in accordance with the theoretical assumptions made in Chapter 2. Although 
the evidence is specific to one federation and the causative factors for higher investment of rents 
are speculative, this does point to a link between investment outcomes and rent assignment in 
federation. Within the general tax assignment question, rent taxes merit a special treatment to 
ensure higher investment of rents.  
 
 Conclusion 
The current discussion of the rent tax assignment question addresses efficiency from the 
taxation point of view. It leaves out efficient expenditure choices for exhaustible resource rents. 
Mostly the discussions range from treating rent assignment as another source of revenue to 
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arguments for centralization due to distribution and stability considerations. The approach to rent 
tax assignment question has not been fully developed as it does not evaluate the effects of 
assignment choices on public investment of rent monies. It does not consider ethnic identity 
combined with claims on resource ownership to fall within its purview. However, federations are 
finely balanced institutional arrangements. If  some regions are endowed with natural resources 
other may not be so blessed. Sharing of benefits derived from natural resource endowments is 
often seen as a federal contest, sometimes even testing the strengths of the arrangement. Several 
federations have rich exhaustible resource endowments. A close look at the rent assignment 
practice reveals that there is no uniform practice in place.  
The several ways in which the rent tax assignment question has been discussed fall short 
of making a comprehensive case for efficiency. Mostly the discussions range from treating rent 
assignment as another source of revenue to arguments for centralization due to macroeconomic 
considerations. The approach to rent tax assignment question has not been fully developed as it 
does not evaluate the effects of assignment choices on public investment of rent monies. More 
specifically, the discussions about rent assignment do not consider regional identity to be of 
much consequence. If at all, it is mentioned as an unnecessary intrusion. Despite this, federations 
have mostly devised ways to share rent revenue with subnational government, with a 
preponderance of revenue shared with the producing jurisdictions on a derivation basis. The 
world evidence shows that there is no uniform practice. Different shares have been arrived at in 
various federations. What is noteworthy, however, is the implicit admission that political 
stability concerns work their way into rent assignment and sharing decisions.   
In this chapter an argument- has been made for reconsidering rent tax assignment. The 
discussion of federal countries shows that federations are finely balanced institutional 
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arrangements where resource rent often is a contested commodity. Exhaustible resources and 
shares of revenue from them are frequently contested areas between the producing regions and 
the center. Strong community ownership develops into claims on rent that are contested and 
pursued. A federal arrangement may choose to ignore and confront them or build on the  higher 
sense of ownership. In pursuing the second option, it may attempt to minimize conflict. In 
addition to any political gains, it should be noted that recognizing subnational claims on rent may 
not always lead to deleterious effects on the economy. The producing regions may act 
responsibly and invest rent revenue. If this happens, it has several advantages. The economy is 
protected from exchange rate appreciation, net fiscal benefits may remain comparably similar 
across jurisdictions and the subnational economy may gain some sustainability for its productive 
base.  
A valid question however remains as to what extent rent investment is a real possibility at 
the subnational level. It can be surmised that regions with strong subnational identity may hold a 
preference for sustaining their productive base currently raised by exhaustible resource 
extraction. Regions endowed with valuable exhaustible resources and preference for sustaining 
their productive base will invest rents in long-lived public goods. The case of the Russian 
Federation examined in this chapter shows that such expectations may not be farfetched. The 
results show that a decrease in the regional share of rent resulted in a fall in investments in the 
republics, regions with strong ethnic identity. Republics among the producing regions have 
historical claims to a distinct identity and may have a preference for preserving their identity. 
This preference is manifested as higher levels of rent investment. These results provides some 
evidence that community ownership of exhaustible resource endowments matters to investment 
choices and it should be included in the assignment question. Following this line of argument, it 
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can be concluded that rent assignment, through rent tax or revenue assignment, should favor 
producing regions within the range of stability in a federation.  
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Chapter 5 General Conclusions 
 
Generally the fiscal federalism literature argues for assignment of exhaustible resource 
rents to the centeral government. The main arguments in favor of this position are three. The first 
argument holds that central government is better equipped to absorb commodity price 
fluctuations and injection of large amounts of rent revenue in the economy. The subnational 
governments do not have access to monetary policy tools and therefore not well equipped to 
affect macroeconomic outcomes. The second argument states that subnational governments may 
not have the capacity to administer resource rent taxes due to complexity of rent calculations. 
The third argument is a concern about intra-national fiscally induced migration due to the lower 
tax price of public goods in producing jurisdictions. The literature treats rent assignment as 
neutral to investment in long-lived public goods. We show that this is not the case. Rent 
assignment may impact investment if there are differential preferences for investment in long-
lived public goods among regions and between regions and federal government.  
Another strand in the literature presents descriptive cases of rent assignment. It 
recognizes that in many countries, especially those with resource mining as a significant part of 
the gross domestic product, conflict over resource ownership and sharing of revenue develops 
into a threat to country‘s stability. Often political resolution can only be achieved by conceding 
ownership or at least substantial part of the rent to the producing regions. This approach, without 
presenting any arguments in favor of these resolutions, in fact recognizes an outcome that exists 
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in many countries. Even in case of stable federations, politics have dictated gradual concessions 
to producing regions. We show that community claims on rent may be important to investment in 
long-lived public goods.  
In practice, exhaustible resource rents are commonly assigned to the central government 
as a tax base. This arrangement is made in pursuance of reasons of administrative capacity and in 
cognizance of potential macroeconomic effects of rent revenue injections in the economy. At the 
same time, revenue sharing in some countries is devised to provide derivation based higher 
shares to producing regions. The question studied here is whether these arrangements are neutral 
with respect to investment in long-lived public goods. The fact that investment of rents in long-
lived public goods is a key element in preserving the productive base of the economy is not often 
brought into the fiscal structure discussion. In the discussion we have presented in the preceding 
chapters, we have attempted to demonstrate that neutrality may not be the case. Assignment of 
resource rent tax or revenue sharing, under certain circumstances, affects investment in long-
lived public goods. The theoretical model is developed to allow incorporation of differential 
resource endowments, general tax base, allocation choices and public investment in a rent 
assignment framework. It shows that increase in federal share may lead to effects on investment 
if differential preferences are allowed. Then using data on regions of Russia two hypotheses 
emerging out of the theoretical propositions are tested. These discussions show that assignment 
of rent taxes or changes in rent shares may have effects on investment in long-lived public 
goods.  
The theoretical model in Chapter 2 and the empirical results from the Russian Federation 
in the Chapter 3, point toward an important dimension of rent tax assignment in a federation. 
These results show that ceteris paribus, higher share of rent for the federation may lead to lower 
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investment in long-lived public goods and may be constrained by stability. In Chapter 4, another 
argument has been made for reconsidering rent tax assignment. Communities value ownership 
over land and exhaustible resource endowments in their areas. This may be the case especially if 
ethnic identity is important to the resource owning community. Due to strong community 
ownership, claims on rent are made and pursued in the political arena. A federal arrangement 
that bestows higher shares of rents where there is a higher sense of ownership is not only a 
political consideration. It works toward a higher investment in long lived public goods. The case 
of the Russian Federation shows that a decrease in the regional share of rent resulted in a fall in 
investments in the republics, regions with strong ethnic identity. Republics among the producing 
regions have historical claims to a distinct identity and may have a preference for preserving 
their identity. This preference is manifested as higher levels of rent investment. Following this 
line of argument, it can be concluded that rent assignment, through rent tax or revenue 
assignment, should favor producing regions within the range of stability in a federation, if the 
objective is achieving higher investment in long-lived public goods.  
We present a model for rent tax assignment that allows variations in preference for long-
lived goods and tax base endowments across regions, a situation that closely resembles many 
federal countries. At the same time, there is a stability constraint implicit in the federal bargain. 
Specifically, producing regions are willing to share their exhaustible resource rents if they are 
compensated by benefits of association. The extent of federal share is determined by the value 
the producing region attaches to the benefits of association. Given these factors, the theoretical 
model in Chapter 2 brings out a negative relationship between new investment in long-lived 
public goods and federal share of rent. An increase in the federal share of rent revenue is 
associated with a decrease in investment in long-lived public goods. If a country recognizes a 
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preference parameter for long-lived public goods, then the federal share of the rent decreases 
with an increase in policy preference for long-lived public goods. The model uses tradeoffs 
between operation and maintenance expenditure and investment in long-lived public goods.  
Using a quasi natural experiment and data on the Regions of Russia, we test the 
theoretical model in Chapter 3. The results demonstrate that an increase in the federal share of 
the rent was followed by a decline in new investment in long-lived public goods in the producing 
regions. This was not accompanied by an increase in the non-producing regions. At the same 
time, there was no increase in the federal investments. The Russian federal government 
progressively decreased regional shares in oil and gas rent between 2002 and 2005. This 
decreases applied to all producing regions but for obvious reasons did not affect non-producing 
regions. This offered a quasi natural experiment setting to test the hypothesis of the model.  
The policy parameter of the Russian Federation for long-lived goods is not clear. The 
results demonstrate that the parameter declined in the last decade and resulted in an increase in 
the federal share of the rent revenue accruing from the petroleum sector. These changes have not 
been accompanied by any short run political instability in the federation. The producing regions 
acquiesced in the decreases in their shares. This means that the federal share is still in the interior 
of the stability constraint. This could be because the relative preference of the non-producing 
regions for a higher retention of rent in the producing regions is very low. In other countries, for 
example Nigeria and Canada, it can be seen that the same (in)tolerance levels for retention of 
rent in the producing regions are not found. In fact there is a smaller value that the producing 
regions place on benefits of federation. Due to this reason, the federal share of rent is smaller.  
Where investment of rent is a priority, rent assignment should be considered as a special 
case under the assignment question. If there is evidence that subnational entities have a 
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differential preference for investment in long-lived public goods, then centralization of rent 
shares will not be neutral to investment. In such cases, rent tax assignment should favor 
producing regions if they have a higher preference for long-lived public goods. Development 
policy goals often include increasing the stock of public infrastructure as well as reducing the 
possibility of conflict generated by unrequited claims to resource ownership. Assignment of rent 
revenue or taxes to producing regions will be conducive to development policy goals. 
Centralization on the other hand may run counter to the goal of increasing investment in long-
lived public goods. The macroeconomic considerations will still remain relevant. They should be 
addressed by setting clear fiscal rules that provide a limited set of allocation choices to producing 
regions, without necessarily burdening the assignment question with these objectives.  
This research has attempted to contribute to the discussion of rent tax assignment and 
sharing. Following is a summary of important points that emerge from the research:  
1. The rent tax assignment literature ignores the community claims on rent 
often asserted as regional or subnational rights to exhaustible resource rent. This leads to 
conflict if assignment and sharing arrangements circumvent community claims. The 
discussion in this dissertation links community concerns and choices with development 
policy and lays out a way in which the two could be harnessed together to sustain 
productive base of an economy. This linkage adds to the discussion on rent base 
assignment question.  
2. We develop a theoretical model that incorporates differences in preference 
for investment, resource endowments and general tax base in a policy framework. It links 
policy objectives like pursuing increase in public investment to sustain or enhance the 
productive base of the economy, with expenditure choice made at subnational levels. The 
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model allows that identity based considerations and their consequent influence on rent 
investment choices brought into the analytical framework. The model has the flexibility 
to consider subnational taxes and differences in levels of wealth among regions. It also 
demonstrates the effect of unconditional and conditional transfers on the outcomes, which 
this case are investments in long-lived public goods.  
3. The first empirical model builds on the theoretical propositions generated 
by the model. It exploits a range of variations in policy changes and their applications. 
Consequently, it becomes a multiple treatment model with some capacity to provide 
insights differentially across various treated units. This adds a new dimension to 
evaluating impact of tax policy changes.  
4. The second empirical model was devised to take into account the time lag 
in capital investment projects. In being responsive to the medium term planning horizon, 
a common attribute of capital investment projects of any mentionable size, this model 
attempts to capture the annualized effects of policy changes on public investment. this 
model also adds to the discussion of evaluation of impact of policy changes that can only 
accrue through budgetary processes.  
5. The empirical analysis, using data on regions of Russia, presents a case 
where policy change, namely reduction in subnational rent shares, has adverse effects on 
investment in long-lived public goods. These results are sufficiently robust across 
different models and specifications to demonstrate that such policy changes may not be 
neutral. At least they show they were not so in case of the Russian Federation.  
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6. A case for determinants of public investment in the regions of Russia has 
been laid out. This is by no means a final word on the subject, but the inquiry makes a 
contribution on an otherwise obscure area of research. 
7. Regional identity is the elephant in the room of fiscal federalism. The third 
empirical analysis recognizes its existence and makes use of republic level identities in 
the Russian Federation. The results show that the decline in investment in long-lived 
public goods following rent share reductions is higher in republics than other oblasts. 
8. The research has raised some questions for further work namely, the 
extent to which identity drives investment choices of exhaustible resource rents, ways in 
which fiscal rules could insure decentralized rent taxes with macroeconomic stability, and 
what is the efficient range of rent shares in a federation for achieving investment 
according to Hartwick rule.     
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Figure 3.1 
Changes in unconditional mean values of key variables 
 
Variable Key 
rrevpc1: average real revenue, per capita, producing regions  
rrevpc0: average real revenue, per capita, control group  
rtransferpc1: average real federal to region transfers, per capita, producing regions  
rtransferpc0: average real federal to region transfers, per capita, control group  
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Figure 3.2 
Changes in unconditional mean values of key variables 
 
 
Variable Key 
rexppc1: average real public expenditure, per capita, producing regions  
rexppc0: average real public expenditure, per capita, control group  
rfixrbpc1: average real investment in fixed public capital, per capita, by subnational governments, 
producing regions from their budgets 
rfixrbpc0: average real investment in fixed public capital, per capita, by subnational governments, control 
group from their budgets 
rfixsnpc1: average real acquisition of fixed public capital, per capita, by subnational governments, 
producing regions 
rfixsnpc0: average real acquisition of fixed public capital, per capita, by subnational governments, control 
group 
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Table 3.1 
Summary Statistics by Treatment Status 
  
Producing regionsa) , g1 = 1 
 
Control group regionsb), g1 = 0 
Variable 
namec) Description Obs
d) Meane) 
Std. 
Dev. Min Max   Obs Mean 
Std. 
Dev. Min Max 
A. Expenditure 
          
rexppc real expenditure per capita 294 19 23 0 217 
 
368 16 25 2 235 
rexpobpc real fed obligatory exp.  per capitaf) 74 933 649 272 4802 
 
92 843 521 96 3020 
rexpsocpc real fixed capital per capita  295 9 11 0 109 
 
368 8 9 1 89 
rfixcappc real social expenditure per capita 295 44198 140110 670 1908022 
 
367 15253 17434 670 146399 
employp public employment, percent of total 287 6 2 2 20 
 
368 6 3 2 24 
             
B. Capital investment 
          
rfixvalpc real value of fixed capital, per capita 288 324 547 9 4526 
 
368 187 105 38 798 
rfixstatpc real investment, fixed public capital, regional  295 4 9 0 99 
 
368 5 14 0 147 
rfixmunpc real investment, fixed public capital, municipal 280 1 3 0 15 
 
358 1 1 0 9 
rfixpubpc real investment, fixed public capital, all sources 280 10 14 1 118 
 
357 6 9 1 116 
rfixsnpc real investment, fixed public capital, regional and municipal 280 6 10 0 102 
 
358 5 10 0 127 
rfix_fbudgpc real investment, fixed public capital, federal budget 294 2 2 0 14 
 
368 2 3 0 25 
rfix_rbudgpc real investment, fixed public capital, regional budget 291 3 5 0 38 
 
368 2 4 0 46 
             
C. Revenue 
          
rrevpc real revenue, subnational, per capita 295 19 24 0 211 
 
366 16 27 2 275 
rsngpc real tax revenue, subnational, per capita 259 12 18 0 107 
 
321 9 17 1 227 
rtransferpc real transfer, federal to subnational, per capita 293 3 6 -35 43 
 
367 5 13 -17 198 
             
D. Structural variables  
          
bus_pop buses per 10,000 population 293 63 31 2 219 
 
368 70 142 9 1982 
bus_pass million passenger kilometers 293 1383 1346 11 6318 
 
368 1663 2094 3 10839 
buspub public owned buses, millions 293 150 152 0 734 
 
368 226 405 0 2726 
cars car owners per 1000 population 295 147 47 34 269 
 
368 143 42 20 266 
roaden km of road per 1000 sq.km. of area 296 101 92 1 442 
 
352 124 86 1 525 
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raodimp percentage of improved roads, in total 296 66 24 8 99 
 
352 69 25 0 100 
roadpavd percentage of paved roads, in total 296 88 13 37 100 
 
352 91 12 31 100 
roadtrans goods transported by road, million ton-km 293 1752 1625 0 7814 
 
368 1087 971 30 7059 
tonnage goods transported by rail, million tonnes 293 49 50 0 246 
 
368 40 74 1 815 
accid accidents per 100,000 population 295 124 44 8 262 
 
368 150 44 45 275 
railden km of railway per 10,000 sq.km. of area 280 121 91 1 423 
 
320 201 179 27 1956 
railpass rail passengers, 000s 280 8446 8873 24 45432 
 
335 24515 59250 32 352454 
enrolpub enrolment public schools, percent of total 295 20 9 5 48 
 
368 15 7 0 35 
stu_sprof students in secondary professional education, per 10,000 221 167 44 41 243 
 
276 174 35 53 246 
             
E. Demand variables 
          
noworkage population below working age, percent 296 20 5 14 36 
 
360 17 3 12 33 
disburd first time diagnosis, per 1000 population  266 755 150 328 1092 
 
368 754 132 470 1297 
imr infant mortality rate 288 13 4 6 33 
 
360 13 5 4 42 
klinout 1000 visits per shift 290 44 29 1 112 
 
368 45 59 3 372 
klinik outpatient visits per 10,000 population 290 235 48 73 403 
 
368 260 63 183 614 
docs # per 10,000 population 290 47 9 21 71 
 
368 45 12 27 84 
hosp_bedk beds per 10,000 population 290 113 23 40 164 
 
368 124 25 86 252 
paramed # per 10,000 population 290 113 20 44 145 
 
368 114 14 73 155 
pop_para population per doctor 290 92 24 69 226 
 
368 89 12 64 137 
residpc residential area per per capita 289 0.03 0.07 0.00 0.50 
 
368 0.04 0.08 0.00 0.59 
exec_emp # employed by subnational governments 288 9042 5532 480 27198 
 
368 7437 5166 1012 31182 
rpaidser_pc real value of paid services, per capita 289 8880 6642 78 39469 
 
368 8342 7781 577 65894 
rpension_av real value of average pension payment 296 1802 938 446 5047 
 
367 1766 878 534 6055 
             
F. Other control variables  
          
sown farms all categories, 000 hectares 292 1269 1368 0 4575 
 
351 737 860 0 5424 
freshwatpc million cu ft usage, per capita 295 0.49 0.33 0.12 1.41 
 
368 0.42 0.62 0.04 3.83 
recywatpc million cu ft usage, per capita 295 0.80 1.08 0.00 6.19 
 
368 1.05 1.15 0.01 5.23 
wastwat million cu ft generated 296 207 236 0 1252 
 
368 247 383 0.4 2661 
airpoll from stationary sources, 000 tons 284 682 1686 0 14070 
 
368 792 1577 1 9932 
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electric kilowatt-hour, billions 281 15 19 0 89 
 
368 10 12 0 54 
indind aggregate production index, percentage change 288 107 11 43 167 
 
367 107 7 83 130 
pop population, 000s 295 1850 1260 41 5133 
 
368 1683 1816 50 10470 
popden population, 1000 per sq.km. area 295 30 31 0 139 
 
368 303 1443 0 9518 
popgr rate of population growth 296 0 2 -10 31 
 
360 -1 1 -7 2 
urb percentage urbanization  296 68 13 34 91 
 
368 70 14 26 100 
migrate rate of migration, per 10,000 population 296 3 174 -1170 2523 
 
368 -12 75 -704 239 
areasqkm area, sq. km. 296 347 645 4 3084 
 
368 125 172 1 788 
             
G. Economic variables  
          
rsgrppc real gross regional product, per capita 267 75028 86160 4844 721465 
 
368 64610 57882 8536 562576 
rincpc real income per capita 287 5477 4742 426 33318 
 
367 4594 3793 754 31177 
rconspendpc real monthly household consumption 287 3332 2471 206 15055 
 
368 2953 2364 421 20445 
inc_sub below subsistence level, percent of population 284 27 14 6 94 
 
368 29 13 9 78 
unemrate unemployment rate 289 0.1 0.3 0.0 4.3 
 
368 0.1 0.2 0.0 3.6 
cpi consumer price index 292 114 5 107 139 
 
368 114 4 106 133 
rwage real wage 295 6315 5418 638 32823 
 
365 5257 3725 805 27109 
gas million cu meter production 240 39504 137611 3 600881 
      
oil 000 tons production 277 20516 61049 0 325493             
Notes: 
            
a) Producing regions number 37 when the three autonomous okrugs are included; these are Nenets, Yamalia and Khanty-Mansiya  
b) The control group comprises of 46 regions.  
c) The variable names are abbreviated notations used in the dataset and estimation models.  
d) The number of observations is smaller for some variables when the time series does not include all the 8 years.  
e) The values have been rounded off. In case of zero, the values may lie between 0 and 1.  
f) The obligatory expenditures are for 2006 and 2007 only.  
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Table 3.2 
Normalized Difference in Averages between Producing and Control Regions 
a) 
Variable name Description Normalized difference 
A.   Expenditure 
rexppc real expenditure per capita 0.09 
rexpobpc real fed obligatory exp.  per capita 0.11 
rfixcappc real fixed capital per capita  0.21 
rexpsocpc real social expenditure per capita 0.10 
employp public employment, percent of total -0.07 
   B.   Capital investment 
fix.capital value pc real value of fixed capital, per capita 0.23 
rfixstatpc real investment, fixed public capital, regional  -0.04 
rfixmunpc real investment, fixed public capital, municipal 0.28 
fix.investment public 
(all sources) real investment, fixed public capital, all sources 0.21 
fix.investment, 
subnational pc real investment, fixed public capital, regional and municipal 0.06 
fix.investment from 
federal budget real investment, fixed public capital, federal budget -0.02 
rfix_rbudgpc real investment, fixed public capital, regional budget 0.18 
   C.   Revenue 
rrevpc real revenue, subnational, per capita 0.09 
revenue pc real tax revenue, subnational, per capita 0.13 
transfer pc real transfer pc, federal to subnational, per capita -0..09 
   D.   Structural variables  
bus_pop buses per 10,000 population -0.05 
public bus passengers million passenger kilometers -0.11 
public owned buses public owned buses, millions -0.18 
car ownership car owners per 1000 population 0.06 
road density pct. km of road per 1000 sq.km. of area -0.18 
raodimp percentage of improved roads, in total -0.10 
roadpavd percentage of paved roads, in total -0.16 
road transported 
goods, volume goods transported by road, million ton-km 0.35 
tonnage goods transported by rail, million tonnes 0.10 
accidents accidentsents per 100,000 population -0.43 
railden km of railway per 10,000 sq.km. of area -0.40 
railpass rail passengers, 000s -0.27 
public schools 
enrolment pct. enrolment public schools, percent of total 0.42 
public professional 
schools enrolment students in secondary professional education -0.13 
disburd first time diagnosis, per 1000 population  0.01 
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   E.   Demand variables 
dusburd 
 
-0.06 
imr infant mortality rate -0.02 
klinout 1000 visits per shift -0.36 
outpatient visits outpatient visits per 10,000 population -0.31 
doctors per 10,000 # per 10,000 population 0.10 
hospital beds beds per 10,000 population -0.34 
paramed # per 10,000 population -0.06 
pop_doc population per doctor -0.12 
residential area pc residential area per per capita -0.06 
exec_emp # employed by subnational governments 0.21 
rpaidser_pc real value of paid services, per capita 0.05 
raverage pension real value of average pension payment 0.03 
F.   Other control variables  
farmland, hectares farms all categories, 000 hectares 0.36 
fresh water 
consumption pc million cu ft usage, per capita 0.10 
recywatpc million cu ft usage, per capita -0.16 
waste water million cu ft generated -0.09 
airpoll from stationary sources, 000 tons -0.05 
electric kilowatt-hour, billions 0.23 
indind aggregate production index, percentage change 0.00 
pop population, 000s 0.08 
lpop natural log of population 0.14 
population density population, 1000 per sq.km. area -0.19 
population growth 
rate rate of population growth 0.31 
urbanization pct. percentage urbanization pct.anization  -0.14 
migration rate rate of migration, per 10,000 population 0.08 
population below 
working age population below working age, percent 0.45 
G.   Economic variables  
reg. gross product pc‘ real gross regional product, per capita 0.08 
rincpc real income per capita 0.15 
household monthly 
consumption real monthly household consumption 0.11 
inc_sub below subsistence level, percent of population -0.09 
unemployment rate unemployment rate 0.06 
consumer price index consumer price index -0.01 
rwage real wage 0.16 
Notes 
  a) The normalized difference for each variable is calculated as:         
       
   
    
 
   where subscript 1 is for 
treated group, 0 for control.  
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Table 3.3  
Correlation Matrix 1
a) 
 
Notes: 
a) The asterisk indicates level of significance at 10 percent or below. The first number is the correlation 
coefficient and the second number below the first is the number of observations. Only correlations that are 
significant are reported.  
 
  
              
                    655      633      660      659      579      662
      rexppc     0.5895*  0.5711*  0.9938*  0.6057*  0.8711*  1.0000 
              
                    574      555      578      577      580
      rsngpc     0.6273*  0.5526*  0.8826*  0.2045*  1.0000 
              
                             632      658      660
 rtransferpc              0.2398*  0.6110*  1.0000 
              
                    654      632      661
      rrevpc     0.5770*  0.5664*  1.0000 
              
                    632      635
     rsgrppc     0.9053*  1.0000 
              
                    656
   rfixvalpc     1.0000 
                                                                    
               rfixva~c  rsgrppc   rrevpc rtrans~c   rsngpc   rexppc
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Table 3.4  
Correlation Matrix 2
a)
 
Notes: 
a) The asterisk indicates level of significance at 10 percent or below. The first number is the correlation 
coefficient and the second number below the first is the number of observations. Only correlations that are 
significant are reported.  
 
. 
              
                    658      640      658      658      658      658      658
   hosp_bedk     0.1166* -0.1945* -0.2156* -0.2653* -0.1665* -0.1771*  1.0000 
              
                    663      643      661               663      663
    enrolpub    -0.3178* -0.0651   0.2258*          -0.2465*  1.0000 
              
                    663      643      661      661      663
        cars     0.4485*  0.1156*  0.1473*  0.3241*  1.0000 
              
                    661      643      661      661
   roadtrans     0.2905*  0.4160*  0.5871*  1.0000 
              
                    661      643      661
     tonnage     0.2751*  0.2387*  1.0000 
              
                    643      643
        sown    -0.0839*  1.0000 
              
                    664
         urb     1.0000 
                                                                             
                    urb     sown  tonnage roadtr~s     cars enrolpub hosp_b~k
              
                             634      655      655      657      650      657
   hosp_bedk              0.0945*  0.3833*  0.4776* -0.5018* -0.3960* -0.1138*
              
                    656      635      660                        655      662
    enrolpub     0.1063* -0.2434* -0.0783*                    0.3573* -0.2557*
              
                    656      635               660      662               662
        cars     0.2867*  0.4454*          -0.1971*  0.2743*           0.2352*
              
                    656      635               658      660      653      660
   roadtrans     0.2089*  0.4208*          -0.2211*  0.6477*  0.1062*  0.2002*
              
                    656      635               658      660      653         
     tonnage     0.1248*  0.1989*          -0.1623*  0.4433*  0.0680          
              
                    638      617      640      640      642               642
        sown    -0.1685* -0.0773  -0.2212* -0.1718*  0.5986*           0.1290*
              
                    656      635      661      660      663      656      663
         urb     0.2620*  0.3362*  0.1437* -0.1531*  0.3152* -0.1748*  0.3239*
              
                             634      661      660      663      655      663
      popden              0.3019*  0.0866* -0.0888*  0.2962*  0.0857*  1.0000 
              
                    648                                          656
       popgr     0.1456*                                      1.0000 
              
                    656      634      661      660      663
        lpop    -0.1315*  0.0950* -0.4123* -0.4449*  1.0000 
              
                             632      658      660
 rtransferpc              0.2398*  0.6110*  1.0000 
              
                    654      632      661
      rrevpc     0.5770*  0.5664*  1.0000 
              
                    632      635
     rsgrppc     0.9053*  1.0000 
              
                    656
   rfixvalpc     1.0000 
                                                                             
               rfixva~c  rsgrppc   rrevpc rtrans~c     lpop    popgr   popden
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Table 3.5 
The effect of change in rent revenue shares on investment in fixed public capital in regions of Russia –a 
difference-in-differences estimation (multiple treatment model) 
a) 
Dependent variable: new real investment in fixed public capital per capita  
VARIABLES
b) 
Fixed effects (1) 
c) 
Fixed effects (2) 
d) 
Pooled 
e) 
        
Real GRP, per capita -9.59e-06*** -9.55e-06*** -9.55e-06*** 
 
[3.14e-06] [3.13e-06] [2.84e-06] 
Real revenue, per capita 0.133*** 0.134*** 0.134*** 
 
[0.0115] [0.0113] [0.0103] 
Oil only regions -0.352 -0.343 -0.343 
 
[0.336] [0.340] [0.308] 
Gas only regions -0.152 -0.0993 -0.0993 
 
[0.355] [0.346] [0.313] 
Oil & gas regions -0.131 -0.100 -0.100 
 
[0.272] [0.278] [0.252] 
Oil tax share change 1 -0.0214 -0.187 -0.0436 
 
[0.0884] [0.241] [0.0734] 
Oil tax share change 2 -0.00281 -0.226 0 
 
[0.150] [0.347] [0] 
Oil tax share change 3 0.0697 -0.330 0 
 
[0.203] [0.597] [0] 
Gas tax share change 1 
  
0 
   
[0] 
Gas tax share change 2 
  
0 
   
[0] 
Oil & gas tax share change 1 
  
0 
   
[0] 
Oil & gas tax share change 2 
  
0 
   
[0] 
Oil & gas tax share change 3 
  
0 
   
[0] 
DD-1 (oil only) 0.340 0.345 0.345* 
 
[0.216] [0.220] [0.199] 
DD-2 (oil only) 0.111 0.122 0.122 
 
[0.256] [0.260] [0.235] 
DD-3 (oil only) 0.0633 0.0722 0.0722 
 
[0.231] [0.233] [0.211] 
DD-1 (gas only) 0.00305 -0.00756 -0.00756 
 
[0.468] [0.463] [0.420] 
DD-2 (gas only) -0.290 -0.294 -0.294 
 
[0.234] [0.227] [0.206] 
DD-1 -0.216* -0.215* -0.215** 
 
[0.117] [0.118] [0.107] 
DD-2 -0.485* -0.486* -0.486** 
 
[0.253] [0.255] [0.232] 
DD-3 -0.0224 -0.0278 -0.0278 
 
[0.143] [0.143] [0.129] 
Real transfers, per capita -0.148*** -0.149*** -0.149*** 
 
[0.0108] [0.0105] [0.00952] 
Population below working age, pct -0.146* -0.147* -0.147** 
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Notes: 
a) Robust standard errors in brackets; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
b) Real GRP, per capita and Real revenue, per capita are endogenous. Excluded instruments are: paved 
roads as percentage of total length of roads a region, real value of paid services per capita and waste 
water generated per capita.  
c) A time trend variable is included. 
d) A full range of year dummies included but not shown in the table.  
e) A complete set of region dummies and year dummies included but not shown in the table.  
 
 
 
 
  
 
[0.0802] [0.0811] [0.0735] 
Population density -0.0924* -0.0960* -0.0960** 
 
[0.0504] [0.0514] [0.0466] 
Population (log) 10.21*** 10.56*** 10.56*** 
 
[3.882] [4.077] [3.696] 
Urbanization, pct 0.0689* 0.0693* 0.0693** 
 
[0.0364] [0.0370] [0.0335] 
Farmland, hectares per sq km area 0.000635*** 0.000634*** 0.000634*** 
 
[0.000234] [0.000244] [0.000221] 
Volume of goods transported via rail 0.00187*** 0.00187*** 0.00187*** 
 
[0.000675] [0.000704] [0.000638] 
Volume of goods transported via road -1.91e-05 -1.66e-05 -1.66e-05 
 
[7.75e-05] [8.10e-05] [7.34e-05] 
Car ownership 0.00245 0.00254 0.00254 
 
[0.00249] [0.00251] [0.00227] 
Public enrolment, pct -0.0382 -0.0381 -0.0381* 
 
[0.0247] [0.0253] [0.0230] 
Hospital beds, per 10,000 population -0.000284 -0.000861 -0.000861 
 
[0.00382] [0.00414] [0.00375] 
Time trend variable -0.111 -0.0507 -0.0974* 
 
[0.0737] [0.114] [0.0590] 
Constant 
  
113.3 
   
[122.5] 
    Observations 600 600 601 
R-squared 0.829 0.830 0.929 
Number of ob_id 76 76 
 First-stage F-statistic 13.34 12.57 
 First-stage F-statistic 9.520 9.070 
 Craig-Donald statistic 24.72 25.37 
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Table 3.6 
The effect of change in rent revenue shares on investment in fixed public capital in regions of Russia –a 
difference-in-differences estimation (multiple treatment model) 
a) 
 
Dependent variable: investment in fixed public capital per capita      
VARIABLES
b) 
Fixed effects (1) 
c) 
Fixed effects (2) 
d) 
Pooled 
e)  
        
Real revenue, per capita 0.107*** 0.107*** 0.107*** 
 
[0.0168] [0.0167] [0.0151] 
real value of fixed capital, per 
capita -0.00333*** -0.00331*** -0.00331*** 
 
[0.000896] [0.000883] [0.000800] 
Oil only regions -0.447 -0.455 -0.455 
 
[0.388] [0.396] [0.358] 
Gas only regions -0.311 -0.259 -0.259 
 
[0.580] [0.573] [0.519] 
Oil & gas regions -0.256 -0.242 -0.242 
 
[0.469] [0.481] [0.436] 
Oil tax share change 1 0.0128 -0.201 0.0554 
 
[0.146] [0.331] [0.114] 
Oil tax share change 2 0.0964 -0.169 0.0816 
 
[0.248] [0.498] [0.163] 
Oil tax share change 3 0.0881 -0.394 0 
 
[0.345] [0.805] [0] 
Gas tax share change 1 
  
0 
   
[0] 
Gas tax share change 2 
  
0 
   
[0] 
Oil & gas tax share change 1 
  
0 
   
[0] 
Oil & gas tax share change 2 
  
0 
   
[0] 
Oil & gas tax share change 3 
  
0 
   
[0] 
DD-1 (oil only) 0.307 0.307 0.307 
 
[0.208] [0.211] [0.191] 
DD-2 (oil only) 0.0113 0.0212 0.0212 
 
[0.243] [0.250] [0.226] 
DD-3 (oil only) -0.00953 0.00717 0.00717 
 
[0.228] [0.236] [0.213] 
DD-1 (gas only) -0.0579 -0.0736 -0.0736 
 
[0.486] [0.475] [0.430] 
DD-2 (gas only) -0.645* -0.667** -0.667** 
 
[0.338] [0.333] [0.302] 
DD-1 0.0537 0.0533 0.0533 
 
[0.195] [0.195] [0.176] 
DD-2 -0.931** -0.935** -0.935*** 
 
[0.393] [0.394] [0.357] 
DD-3 -0.189 -0.196 -0.196 
 
[0.155] [0.155] [0.141] 
Real transfers, per capita -0.120*** -0.120*** -0.120*** 
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[0.0276] [0.0278] [0.0252] 
Population below working 
age, pct -0.103 -0.0815 -0.0815 
 
[0.152] [0.181] [0.164] 
Population density -0.00621 0.00129 0.00129 
 
[0.0779] [0.0784] [0.0710] 
Population (log) 4.628 4.757 4.757 
 
[4.558] [4.779] [4.329] 
Population growth rate 0.0361 0.0431 0.0431 
 
[0.0538] [0.0589] [0.0533] 
Farmland, hectares per sq km 
area 0.000496* 0.000486 0.000486* 
 
[0.000285] [0.000302] [0.000274] 
Volume of goods transported 
via rail 0.00158* 0.00156* 0.00156** 
 
[0.000822] [0.000867] [0.000785] 
Urbanization, pct 0.0803** 0.0791** 0.0791** 
 
[0.0367] [0.0370] [0.0335] 
Volume of goods transported 
via road 0.000139 0.000145 0.000145 
 
[0.000114] [0.000118] [0.000107] 
Car ownership 0.00181 0.00185 0.00185 
 
[0.00407] [0.00408] [0.00369] 
Bus passengers 0.000103 0.000105 0.000105* 
 
[6.67e-05] [6.71e-05] [6.08e-05] 
Public enrolment, pct -0.0582 -0.0587 -0.0587 
 
[0.0431] [0.0440] [0.0399] 
Hospital beds, per 10,000 
population -0.00254 -0.00355 -0.00355 
 
[0.00499] [0.00536] [0.00485] 
Time trend variable -0.109 -0.0265 -0.0743 
 
[0.115] [0.156] [0.129] 
Constant 
  
107.4 
   
[277.3] 
    Observations 624 624 625 
R-squared 0.615 0.617 0.896 
Number of ob_id 79 79 
 First-stage F-statistic 19.88 19.43 
 First-stage F-statistic 14.07 14.14 
 Craig-Donald statistic 38.82 42.77 
 Robust standard errors in brackets 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Notes: 
a) Robust standard errors in brackets; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
b) Real revenue, per capita  and real value of fixed capital, per capita  are endogenous. Excluded instruments 
are: paved roads as percentage of total length of roads a region, real value of paid services per capita, 
waste water generated per capit and residential area per capita.  
c) A time trend variable is included. 
d) A full range of year dummies included but not shown in the table.  
e) A complete set of region dummies and year dummies included but not shown in the table.  
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Table 3.7 
The effect of change in rent revenue shares on new acquisition of fixed public capital in regions of Russia –a 
difference-in-differences estimation (multiple treatment model) 
a) 
Dependent variable: new acquisition of fixed public capital (real rubles per capita)  
VARIABLES 
b) 
Fixed effects (1)
c) 
Fixed effects (2)
d) 
Pooled
e) 
        
Real GRP, per capita 1.54e-05 1.72e-05 2.43e-06 
 
[1.74e-05] [1.36e-05] [9.58e-06] 
Real revenue, per capita 0.156 0.137 0.326*** 
 
[0.209] [0.131] [0.0737] 
Oil only regions -3.743** -2.829 -2.880** 
 
[1.774] [1.871] [1.212] 
Gas only regions -2.470 -2.197 -0.506 
 
[2.759] [2.501] [1.700] 
Oil & gas regions -2.404 -1.639 -1.077 
 
[2.121] [2.008] [1.276] 
Oil tax share change 1 -1.030** -3.940*** -1.556*** 
 
[0.479] [1.273] [0.370] 
Oil tax share change 2 -2.298*** -6.118*** -2.358*** 
 
[0.864] [1.956] [0.412] 
Oil tax share change 3 -1.696 -8.162*** 
 
 
[1.163] [3.035] 
 DD-1 (oil only) -0.114 -0.105 0.638 
 
[0.879] [0.698] [0.864] 
DD-2 (oil only) -0.318 -0.557 0.253 
 
[0.976] [0.816] [1.102] 
DD-3 (oil only) 0.518 0.259 0.682 
 
[0.802] [0.711] [0.891] 
DD-1 (gas only) -1.374 -1.594 -2.269 
 
[1.052] [1.176] [1.823] 
DD-2 (gas only) -0.945 -0.686 -1.216 
 
[0.928] [1.066] [1.328] 
DD-1 -0.700* -0.687* -0.628 
 
[0.370] [0.365] [0.506] 
DD-2 -0.943* -0.929* -0.801 
 
[0.554] [0.554] [0.636] 
DD-3 -1.369** -1.377** -0.972 
 
[0.583] [0.573] [0.599] 
Real transfers, per capita -0.328*** -0.332*** -0.334*** 
 
[0.0347] [0.0335] [0.0168] 
Population below working age, 
pct 0.498 -0.188 -0.904*** 
 
[0.541] [0.470] [0.245] 
Population density 0.261 0.247 0.0694 
 
[0.474] [0.200] [0.181] 
Population (log) 6.426 
  
 
[22.81] 
  Urbanization, pct -0.169 
  
 
[0.139] 
  Farmland, hectares per sq km 0.00186 0.00145 0.00126 
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[0.00117] [0.00100] [0.00115] 
Volume of goods transported 
via rail 0.00827*** 0.00686*** 0.00685** 
 
[0.00279] [0.00223] [0.00302] 
Volume of goods transported 
via road -9.31e-05 -2.16e-06 5.86e-05 
 
[0.000155] [0.000158] [0.000219] 
Car ownership -0.0261 -0.0244 -0.0186* 
 
[0.0183] [0.0170] [0.00956] 
Public enrolment, pct 0.0647 0.0455 -0.0721 
 
[0.143] [0.119] [0.0822] 
Hospital beds, per 10,000 
population 0.0539 0.0650 0.0627*** 
 
[0.0455] [0.0464] [0.0195] 
Time trend variable 1.593* 2.370*** 0.0320*** 
 
[0.837] [0.769] [0.00996] 
Constant 
  
0 
   
[0] 
    Observations 588 588 588 
R-squared 0.717 0.726 
 Number of ob_id 76 76 76 
First-stage F-statistic 11 10.22 
 First-stage F-statistic 9.320 9.650 
 Craig-Donald statistic 1.780 4.452 
 Notes: 
a) Robust standard errors in brackets; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
b) Real GRP, per capita  and Real revenue, per capita  are endogenous. Excluded instruments are: paved 
roads as percentage of total length of roads a region, real value of paid services per capita and number of 
doctors per 10,000 population.  
c) A time trend variable is included. 
d) A full range of year dummies included but not shown in the table.  
e) A complete set of region dummies and year dummies included but not shown in the table.  
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Table 3.8 
The effect of change in rent revenue shares on new acquisition of fixed public capital in regions of Russia –a 
difference-in-differences estimation (multiple treatment model) 
a) 
Dependent variable: new acquisition of fixed public capital (real rubles per capita)     
VARIABLES
b) 
Fixed effects (1)
c) 
Fixed effects (2)
d) 
Pooled
e) 
        
Real revenue, per capita 0.208 0.188 0.188 
 
[0.183] [0.197] [0.178] 
real value of fixed capital, per capita 0.00684 0.00544 0.00544 
 
[0.00935] [0.00888] [0.00802] 
Oil only regions -4.213** -3.468* -3.468** 
 
[1.751] [1.815] [1.640] 
Gas only regions -2.062 -1.724 -1.724 
 
[2.325] [2.379] [2.149] 
Oil & gas regions -2.121 -1.373 -1.373 
 
[1.849] [1.830] [1.653] 
Oil tax share change 1 -1.056* -3.401** -1.264*** 
 
[0.593] [1.576] [0.470] 
Oil tax share change 2 -2.195** -5.268** 0 
 
[1.014] [2.366] [0] 
Oil tax share change 3 -1.123 -6.440* 0 
 
[1.281] [3.755] [0] 
Gas tax share change 1 
  
0 
   
[0] 
Gas tax share change 2 
  
0 
   
[0] 
Oil & gas tax share change 1 
  
0 
   
[0] 
Oil & gas tax share change 2 
  
0 
   
[0] 
Oil & gas tax share change 3 
  
0 
   
[0] 
DD-1 (oil only) 0.717 0.483 0.483 
 
[0.657] [0.767] [0.693] 
DD-2 (oil only) 0.755 0.392 0.392 
 
[0.729] [0.907] [0.819] 
DD-3 (oil only) 1.176* 0.968 0.968 
 
[0.653] [0.697] [0.630] 
DD-1 (gas only) -1.404 -1.482 -1.482 
 
[0.983] [1.112] [1.004] 
DD-2 (gas only) -0.879 -0.789 -0.789 
 
[0.865] [0.992] [0.896] 
DD-1 -0.736* -0.687* -0.687* 
 
[0.406] [0.389] [0.352] 
DD-2 -0.793 -0.783 -0.783 
 
[0.580] [0.570] [0.515] 
DD-3 -1.214* -1.125* -1.125** 
 
[0.619] [0.582] [0.526] 
Real transfers, per capita -0.329*** -0.333*** -0.333*** 
 
[0.0316] [0.0299] [0.0270] 
Population density -0.138 -0.0284 -0.0284 
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[0.300] [0.356] [0.321] 
Population (log) 22.10 15.97 15.97 
 
[16.05] [19.70] [17.80] 
Population growth rate 1.007* 0.814* 0.814* 
 
[0.559] [0.481] [0.435] 
Urbanization, pct -0.192 -0.210 -0.210 
 
[0.216] [0.226] [0.204] 
Farmland, hectares per sq km area 0.00130 0.000742 0.000742 
 
[0.000982] [0.000902] [0.000815] 
Volume of goods transported via rail 0.00709*** 0.00648*** 0.00648*** 
 
[0.00250] [0.00249] [0.00225] 
Volume of goods transported via road -3.32e-05 7.74e-05 7.74e-05 
 
[0.000213] [0.000202] [0.000183] 
Car ownership -0.0240 -0.0280* -0.0280* 
 
[0.0155] [0.0165] [0.0149] 
bus_pass 0.000515** 0.000549** 0.000549*** 
 
[0.000239] [0.000231] [0.000209] 
Public enrolment, pct 0.0573 0.0142 0.0142 
 
[0.143] [0.129] [0.117] 
Hospital beds, per 10,000 population 0.0546 0.0610 0.0610 
 
[0.0449] [0.0477] [0.0431] 
Time trend variable 1.101* 2.140** 1.064** 
 
[0.569] [1.060] [0.417] 
Constant 
  
-2,257*** 
   
[761.5] 
    Observations 588 588 588 
R-squared 0.740 0.746 0.964 
Number of ob_id 76 76 
 First-stage F-statistic 10.51 9.890 
 First-stage F-statistic 10.59 8.390 
 Craig-Donald statistic 1.193 1.047 
 Notes: 
a) Robust standard errors in brackets; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
b) Real revenue, per capita  and real value of fixed capital, per capita are endogenous. Excluded instruments 
are: paved roads as percentage of total length of roads a region, real value of paid services per capita, air 
pollution tons per 1000 real rubles of gross regional product and waste water generated per capita.   
c) A time trend variable is included. 
d) A full range of year dummies included but not shown in the table.  
e) A complete set of region dummies and year dummies included but not shown in the table.  
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Table 3.9 
The effect of change in rent revenue shares on investment in fixed public capital in regions of Russia –a 
difference-in-differences estimation (annualized treatment effect model) 
a) 
Dependent variable: investment in fixed public capital (real rubles per capita)       
VARIABLES
b) 
Fixed effects (1)
c) 
Fixed effects (2)
d) 
Pooled
e) 
        
Real GRP, per capita -9.74e-06*** -9.74e-06*** -9.74e-06*** 
 
[2.87e-06] [2.87e-06] [2.69e-06] 
Real revenue, per capita 0.134*** 0.134*** 0.134*** 
 
[0.0110] [0.0110] [0.0103] 
g1 
  
-41.57*** 
   
[15.22] 
p1g1 -0.0910 -0.0910 -0.0910 
 
[0.132] [0.132] [0.123] 
p2g1 -0.102 -0.102 -0.102 
 
[0.116] [0.116] [0.109] 
p3g1 -0.358* -0.358* -0.358* 
 
[0.213] [0.213] [0.199] 
p4g1 0.0214 0.0214 0.0214 
 
[0.174] [0.174] [0.163] 
p5g1 -0.0835 -0.0835 -0.0835 
 
[0.171] [0.171] [0.160] 
p6g1 -0.00622 -0.00622 -0.00622 
 
[0.175] [0.175] [0.163] 
post1 -0.109 -0.109 0 
 
[0.121] [0.121] [0] 
post2 -0.196 -0.196 -0.0349 
 
[0.200] [0.200] [0.0761] 
post3 -0.245 -0.245 0 
 
[0.272] [0.272] [0] 
post4 -0.212 
 
0.0568 
 
[0.343] 
 
[0.0984] 
post5 -0.341 -0.341 -0.0187 
 
[0.422] [0.422] [0.0892] 
post6 -0.376 -0.376 0 
 
[0.516] [0.516] [0] 
Real transfers, per capita -0.150*** -0.150*** -0.150*** 
 
[0.0100] [0.0100] [0.00937] 
Population below working age, pct -0.102 -0.102 -0.102 
 
[0.0784] [0.0784] [0.0733] 
Farmland, hectares per sq km area 0.000525** 0.000525** 0.000525** 
 
[0.000230] [0.000230] [0.000215] 
Volume of goods transported via rail 0.00191*** 0.00191*** 0.00191*** 
 
[0.000705] [0.000705] [0.000659] 
Volume of goods transported via road -1.43e-05 -1.43e-05 -1.43e-05 
 
[7.95e-05] [7.95e-05] [7.43e-05] 
Car ownership 0.00196 0.00196 0.00196 
 
[0.00229] [0.00229] [0.00214] 
Population density -0.0845* -0.0845* -0.0845* 
 
[0.0487] [0.0487] [0.0455] 
Urbanization, pct 0.0694* 0.0694* 0.0694** 
171 
 
171 
 
 
[0.0364] [0.0364] [0.0340] 
Population (log) 11.10*** 11.10*** 11.10*** 
 
[3.882] [3.882] [3.628] 
Public enrolment, pct -0.0404 -0.0404 -0.0404* 
 
[0.0250] [0.0250] [0.0234] 
Hospital beds, per 10,000 population -0.00152 -0.00152 -0.00152 
 
[0.00395] [0.00395] [0.00369] 
Time trend variable -0.00941 -0.00941 -0.0632 
 
[0.104] [0.104] [0.0581] 
Constant 
  
81.18 
   
[118.1] 
    Observations 600 600 601 
R-squared 0.825 0.825 0.926 
Number of ob_id 76 76 
 First-stage F-statistic 16.44 16.44 10.74 
First-stage F-statistic 10.74 10.74 16.44 
Craig-Donald statistic 25.19 25.19 25.19 
Notes: 
a) Robust standard errors in brackets; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
b) Real GRP, per capita and real revenue, per capita are endogenous. Excluded instruments are: paved roads 
as percentage of total length of roads a region, real value of paid services per capita and air pollution tons 
per 1000 real rubles of gross regional product.   
c) A time trend variable is included. 
d) A full range of year dummies included but not shown in the table.  
e) A complete set of region dummies and year dummies included but not shown in the table.  
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Table 3.10 
The effect of change in rent revenue shares on new acquisition of fixed public capital in regions of Russia –a 
difference-in-differences estimation (annualized treatment effect model) 
a) 
 
Dependent variable: new acquisition of fixed public capital (real rubles per capita)       
VARIABLES
b) 
Fixed effects (1)
c) 
Fixed effects (2)
d) 
Pooled
e) 
        
Real GRP, per capita -1.97e-05 -1.97e-05 3.44e-06 
 
[1.48e-05] [1.48e-05] [2.04e-05] 
Real revenue, per capita 0.453*** 0.453*** 0.219 
 
[0.0892] [0.0892] [0.242] 
g1 
  
25.05 
   
[74.91] 
p1g1 0.0267 0.0267 -0.188 
 
[0.451] [0.451] [0.371] 
p2g1 -0.501 -0.501 -0.686* 
 
[0.472] [0.472] [0.378] 
p3g1 -0.480 -0.480 -0.861* 
 
[0.746] [0.746] [0.513] 
p4g1 0.0159 0.0159 -0.508 
 
[0.615] [0.615] [0.505] 
p5g1 0.0329 0.0329 -0.637 
 
[0.711] [0.711] [0.661] 
p6g1 0.506 0.506 -0.259 
 
[0.862] [0.862] [0.850] 
post1 -0.622 -0.622 0 
 
[0.523] [0.523] [0] 
post2 -0.827 -0.827 -1.288** 
 
[0.802] [0.802] [0.514] 
post3 -1.494 -1.494 0 
 
[1.086] [1.086] [0] 
post4 -0.147 -0.147 0 
 
[1.382] [1.382] [0] 
post5 -0.0961 -0.0961 0 
 
[1.697] [1.697] [0] 
post6 1.273 1.273 0 
 
[2.112] [2.112] [0] 
Real transfers, per capita -0.330*** -0.330*** -0.325*** 
 
[0.0563] [0.0563] [0.0324] 
Population below working age, pct -0.624 -0.624 -0.267 
 
[0.391] [0.391] [0.343] 
Farmland, hectares per sq km area 0.000389 0.000389 0.000950 
 
[0.00110] [0.00110] [0.00127] 
Volume of goods transported via 
rail 0.00645*** 0.00645*** 0.00742*** 
 
[0.00246] [0.00246] [0.00226] 
Volume of goods transported via 
road 0.000140 0.000140 -2.41e-05 
 
[0.000338] [0.000338] [0.000172] 
Car ownership -0.0214 -0.0214 -0.0234 
 
[0.0155] [0.0155] [0.0152] 
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Population density 0.130 0.130 0.129 
 
[0.155] [0.155] [0.451] 
Population (log) 
  
6.428 
   
[27.52] 
Urbanization, pct -0.0197 -0.0197 -0.137 
 
[0.127] [0.127] [0.168] 
Public enrolment, pct -0.156 -0.156 -0.0309 
 
[0.0963] [0.0963] [0.129] 
Hospital beds, per 10,000 
population 0.0580 0.0580 0.0672 
 
[0.0426] [0.0426] [0.0446] 
Time trend variable -0.161 -0.161 0.800 
 
[0.457] [0.457] [0.628] 
Constant 
  
-1,665 
   
[1,124] 
    Observations 588 588 588 
R-squared 0.552 0.552 0.958 
Number of ob_id 76 76 
 First-stage F-statistic 13.47 13.47 16.44 
First-stage F-statistic 20.43 20.43 10.74 
Craig-Donald statistic 11.99 11.99 25.19 
Notes: 
a) Robust standard errors in brackets; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
b) Real GRP, per capita and real revenue, per capita are endogenous. Excluded instruments are: paved roads 
as percentage of total length of roads a region, real value of paid services per capita and air pollution tons 
per 1000 real rubles of gross regional product.   
c) A time trend variable is included. 
d) A full range of year dummies included but not shown in the table.  
e) A complete set of region dummies and year dummies included but not shown in the table.  
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Table 3.11 
The effect of change in rent revenue shares on investment in fixed public capital and total public expenditure 
in regions of Russia –a difference-in-differences estimation  
(multiple treatment model using seemingly unrelated equations) 
a) 
  (1) (2) 
VARIABLES
b) 
qRfixrbpc
c) 
qRexprpc
d) 
      
Oil only regions -0.209 -0.685 
 
[0.229] [1.345] 
Gas only regions -0.608* 2.174 
 
[0.364] [2.118] 
Oil & gas regions -0.0947 1.777 
 
[0.231] [1.577] 
Oil tax share change 1 -0.149 0.654 
 
[0.0946] [0.528] 
Oil tax share change 2 -0.283* -0.995* 
 
[0.157] [0.560] 
Oil tax share change 3 -0.139 0 
 
[0.190] [0] 
Gas tax share change 1 0 0 
 
[0] [0] 
Gas tax share change 2 0 0.767 
 
[0] [1.153] 
Oil & gas tax share change 1 0 0 
 
[0] [0] 
Oil & gas tax share change 2 0 0 
 
[0] [0] 
Oil & gas tax share change 3 0 0 
 
[0] [0] 
DD-1 (oil only) 0.334** 1.898** 
 
[0.163] [0.917] 
DD-2 (oil only) 0.172 2.966** 
 
[0.206] [1.206] 
DD-3 (oil only) -0.0342 2.078** 
 
[0.167] [0.962] 
DD-1 (gas only) 0.736 1.488 
 
[0.479] [2.785] 
DD-2 (gas only) 0.498 3.200 
 
[0.375] [2.212] 
DD-1 -0.182* -0.112 
 
[0.0976] [0.558] 
DD-2 -0.485*** 0.532 
 
[0.123] [0.685] 
DD-3 -0.327*** -0.214 
 
[0.105] [0.610] 
Real revenue, per capita 0.148*** 0.835*** 
 
[0.00504] [0.0877] 
Real GRP, per capita -2.48e-05*** 8.64e-07 
 
[3.97e-06] [4.21e-05] 
Real transfers, per capita -0.144*** 0.0506 
 
[0.00410] [0.0327] 
Population below working age, pct -0.0788 -0.0924 
175 
 
175 
 
 
[0.0716] [0.441] 
Volume of goods transported via rail 0.00113* 
 
 
[0.000609] 
 Volume of goods transported via road 1.10e-06 
 
 
[4.24e-05] 
 Car ownership 0.00349* 
 
 
[0.00200] 
 Population density -0.0734** 
 
 
[0.0324] 
 Population (log) 6.362*** 2.412 
 
[1.932] [11.62] 
Urbanization, pct 0.0113 0.0385 
 
[0.0226] [0.168] 
Farmland, hectares per sq km area 0.000447** 
 
 
[0.000227] 
 Public enrolment, pct -0.0113 0.113 
 
[0.0135] [0.0814] 
Hospital beds, per 10,000 population 0.00620 
 
 
[0.00377] 
 Value of oil extracted, real dollars per 
capita 0.0301*** -0.0106 
 
[0.00458] [0.0438] 
Value of gas extracted, real dollars per 
capita -0.000452* -0.000345 
 
[0.000259] [0.00153] 
Time trend variable 0.0878 -0.125 
 
[0.0815] [0.824] 
Burden of disease 
 
-0.00433 
  
[0.00598] 
Outpatient visits 
 
-0.00646 
  
[0.0206] 
Population growth rate 
 
0.152 
  
[0.110] 
Unemployment rate 
 
-0.0187 
  
[0.410] 
Average pension 
 
0.00124 
  
[0.00126] 
Population below subsistence, pct 
 
0.00168 
  
[0.0342] 
Constant 0 0 
 
[0] [0] 
Observations 596 596 
R-squared 0.956 0.988 
Notes: 
a) Standard errors in brackets; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
b) Real GRP, per capita and real revenue, per capita are endogenous.   
c) Dependent variable: investment in fixed public capital, real rubles per capita. A time trend variable and 
full range of year and region dummies are included. The year and regions dummies not shown in the table.  
d) Dependent variable: subnational current public expenditure, real rubles per capita. A time trend variable 
and full range of year and region dummies are included. The year and regions dummies not shown in the 
table.  
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Table 3.12 
The effect of change in rent revenue shares on new acquisition of fixed public capital and total public 
expenditure in regions of Russia –a difference-in-differences estimation  
(multiple treatment model using seemingly unrelated equations) 
a) 
VARIABLES
b) 
(1) qRfixrbpc
c) 
(2) qRexprpc
d) 
Oil only regions -5.179*** -2.315** 
 
[1.476] [1.135] 
Gas only regions -1.117 0.0312 
 
[1.947] [1.612] 
Oil & gas regions -2.893* -0.212 
 
[1.734] [1.198] 
Oil tax share change 1 -0.493 0.946** 
 
[0.486] [0.383] 
Oil tax share change 2 -1.140 -0.909 
 
[0.805] [0.598] 
Oil tax share change 3 -0.451 0 
 
[0.971] [0] 
Gas tax share change 1 0 0 
 
[0] [0] 
Gas tax share change 2 0 1.578* 
 
[0] [0.890] 
Oil & gas tax share change 1 0 0 
 
[0] [0] 
Oil & gas tax share change 2 0 0 
 
[0] [0] 
Oil & gas tax share change 3 0 0 
 
[0] [0] 
DD-1 (oil only) 0.0789 2.160** 
 
[1.001] [0.848] 
DD-2 (oil only) 0.0877 2.993*** 
 
[1.178] [1.014] 
DD-3 (oil only) 1.022 2.510*** 
 
[0.864] [0.799] 
DD-1 (gas only) -4.217 0.381 
 
[3.161] [2.171] 
DD-2 (gas only) -4.366 0.945 
 
[3.020] [1.874] 
DD-1 -0.975* -0.0611 
 
[0.522] [0.424] 
DD-2 -1.196* 0.345 
 
[0.628] [0.518] 
DD-3 -1.772*** -0.256 
 
[0.540] [0.457] 
Real revenue, per capita 0.0287 0.673*** 
 
[0.277] [0.187] 
Real GRP, per capita 0.000108 3.51e-05 
 
[7.95e-05] [3.29e-05] 
Real transfers, per capita -0.391*** 0.0489** 
 
[0.0474] [0.0237] 
Population below working age, pct -0.587 -0.334 
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[0.577] [0.369] 
Volume of goods transported via rail 0.0114*** 
 
 
[0.00347] 
 Volume of goods transported via road -0.000320 
 
 
[0.000256] 
 Car ownership -0.0360*** 
 
 
[0.0113] 
 Population density -0.0131 
 
 
[0.271] 
 Population (log) 3.955 7.203 
 
[13.76] [7.349] 
Urbanization, pct 0.0393 0.102 
 
[0.147] [0.123] 
Farmland, hectares per sq km area 0.00292 
 
 
[0.00195] 
 Public enrolment, pct 0.244 0.121 
 
[0.188] [0.108] 
Hospital beds, per 10,000 population 0.0299 
 
 
[0.0269] 
 Value of oil extracted, real dollars per capita -0.0939 -0.0435 
 
[0.0812] [0.0339] 
Value of gas extracted, real dollars per capita 0.00130 -0.000799 
 
[0.00133] [0.00112] 
Time trend variable 0.316 -0.660* 
 
[0.487] [0.364] 
Burden of disease 
 
-0.00222 
  
[0.00233] 
Outpatient visits 
 
-0.0108 
  
[0.00793] 
Population growth rate 
 
1.544*** 
  
[0.329] 
Unemployment rate 
 
-0.115 
  
[0.314] 
Average pension 
 
0.00170 
  
[0.00149] 
Population below subsistence, pct 
 
-0.0131 
  
[0.0195] 
Constant -637.3 0 
 
[1,009] [0] 
Observations 583 583 
R-squared 0.947 0.992 
Notes: 
a) Standard errors in brackets; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
b) Real GRP, per capita and real revenue, per capita are endogenous.   
c) Dependent variable: new acquisition of fixed public capital, real rubles per capita. A time trend variable 
and full range of year and region dummies are included. The year and regions dummies not shown in the 
table.  
d) Dependent variable: subnational current public expenditure, real rubles per capita. A time trend variable 
and full range of year and region dummies are included. The year and regions dummies not shown in the 
table.  
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Table 4.1 
Settlement of Exhaustible Resource Ownership in Federal Countries  
Country 
Federal 
units 
Producing 
units151 
Natural resource property rights 
Argentina 24 7 
Provinces own natural resources in their territories152 and those that lie within 
12 miles from the coast; the offshore reserves from 12 miles to the end of the 
exclusive economic zone in the sea belong to the national government. The 
national government has regulatory authorities over natural resources153.  
 
Australia 6+2 2 
Onshore resources belong to the states or territory in which they are located. 
Offshore resources on the other hand are vested in the Commonwealth.  
 
Brazil 27154 3 
The Union has property rights over natural resources onshore and offshore but 
subnational governments‘ right to revenue is guaranteed by law  
 
Canada 10 + 3 5 
Provinces own onshore resources located in their jurisdiction155 with the 
exception that reserves located in First Nations reservations are owned by the 
federal government. Offshore resource are owned by the federal government 
but through political settlements like the Atlantic Accord management rights 
have been awarded to Newfoundland and Labrador and Nova Scotia for 
reserves off their respective coasts156.  
 
India 28 5 
States have property rights over natural resources157 but the central 
government has management rights over them.  
 
Iraq   
Ownership is vested in the people, keeping it open to interpretation in the 
future.  
 
Pakistan 4 + 3 4158 
Onshore resource are owned by the provinces with management rights vested 
in the federal government; offshore staring from the coastline are owned by 
the federal government  
 
                                                          
151 Offshore production is not counted toward any region, state or province.  
152 Section 124, Constitution of the Argentine Nation; Senate (1998)  
153 Section 41, Constitution of the Argentine Nation.  
154 Brazil has 5,563 municipalities that have a constitutional status with claims on rent tax revenues.  
155 Under section 109, of the Constitution Act and Canada Oil and Gas Act 1980-81-82, Black (1986), p.446-447.  
156 Jennifer (2008).  
157 Articles 294-297, Constitution of India.  
158 Oil and gas is mined in all four provinces but in two of them namely Baluchistan and Sindh, the production is significant.  
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Russian 
Federation 
83 39 
Onshore resources are jointly owned by the Federation and its subjects but the 
management rights are with the Federation; offshore are exclusively owned 
by the federation.  
 
United Arab 
Emirates 
7 4 
Natural resources are owned by the emirate in which they are located. The 
federation only has limited management rights.  
 
United States 50 6 
States have property rights over onshore resources. Offshore resources are the 
property of the federal government. 
  
Venezuela 23  
Mineral and hydrocarbon deposits are the property of the federal 
government159 
 
 
 
Table 4.2 
Importance of Oil to GDP in federal countries 
Federation/country 
Oil production   
(million barrels) 
a) Oil as percent of GDP 
b) 
Argentina 224.78                        4.99  
Australia 163.17                        1.01  
Brazil 652.50                        2.63  
Canada 931.67                        3.05  
China 1,368.92                        2.11  
Germany 21.64                        0.04  
India 243.72                        1.48  
Indonesia 308.49                        4.48  
Iraq 858.75                       53.87  
Kazakhstan 490.20                       24.47  
Malaysia 270.00                        7.44  
Mexico 37.32                        0.89  
Nigeria 699.90                       39.59  
Pakistan 23.91                        0.86  
Russian Federation 3,509.10                       16.61  
Sudan 176.40                       13.25  
United Arab Emirates 932.40                       20.30  
United States 1,785.54                        0.56  
Venezuela, RB 846.60                       21.18  
Notes:  
                                                          
159 Article 12, Constitution of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela.  
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a) 
Production of oil for year 2008; calculated using Oil and Gas Journal database for monthly oil production.  
b) 
Value of oil and gas produced calculated by multiplying production with average weighted world price of crude oil 
and gas; the monthly production of oil and gas and monthly world weighted prices from Oil and Gas Journal 
database were used. GDP at current US$ from WDI 2008 used for calculation.  
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Table 4.3 
Rent as a percent of total revenues and federal-regional shares 
 
Country Rent tax revenue as a 
share of total revenue 
Federal share of rent Subnational share of rent 
Argentina  34 percent to 8 percent 
of total provincial 
revenue in the 
producing provinces  
22 (export tax) 29 (royalty) 160; the national 
government uses export tax to 
decouple domestic prices from 
international prices, depressing 
investment and royalties  
Australia 2.9 percent of total 
government tax 
revenue161 
In case of royalty for onshore 
mining, federal share is 32 to 
54.8 percent  
In case of royalty for onshore 
mining, the state shares range 
from 68 to 45.2 percent  
Brazil   39 61 percent of royalties and 
special entitlements; 48 percent 
of CIT (through entitlement 
funds and regional funds)162 
Canada     
India 3 percent of total 
revenue  
Federal oil and gas taxes not 
shared with the states except 
the case mentioned in the 
next column 
50 percent of profit petroleum 
under the Twelfth Finance 
Commission Award for some 
fields 
Pakistan 8.4 percent of total tax 
revenue163 
2 percent collection charges 
are retained by the federal 
government; CIT forms part 
of the divisible pool; area 
rent is retained 
100 percent of royalty minus 2 
percent collection charges; Gas 
Development Surcharge and 
specific excise duty on 
derivation basis  
Russian Federation 36.7 percent of total 
revenue164 
100 percent of MET, export 
duties, 40 percent of CIT; all 
revenue from offshore 
reserves 
60 percent of CIT; no share from 
offshore revenue165  
United Arab Emirates 74.3 percent of total 
government revenue166 
  
                                                          
160
 Zapata (2010).  
161
 Calculated from Australian Petroleum Production & Exploration Association‘s Financial Survey 2007-2008 and 
Table 1, Statement 9, Budget Paper No.1, Budget Strategy and Outlook 2007-2008, Australian Government.  
162
 Gobetti et al. (2010).  
163
 Calculated for fiscal years 2009 and 2010 from Tables 3a and 3b of IMF (2010). Only petroleum surcharge and 
gas development surcharge have been added in the numerator. According to the revised program, only Gas 
Development Surcharge is 6.4 percent of total tax revenue in 2010.  
164
 Table 4, IMF 2005; the percentage is for the fiscal year 2005.  
165
 The shares of the regions have progressively declined from a high 60 percent share of taxes levied on mining 
operations going to the regions till end of 2001. From 2002, the share of the producing regions declined to 20 
percent, then to 15 percent in 2004, to 5 percent in 2005 and to has come to rest at zero in 2010.  
166
 It ranged from 77 to 70 percent of total government revenue from 2003 to 2007, with an average of 74.2 percent; 
Calculated from Table 14, IMF (2009).  
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Country Rent tax revenue as a 
share of total revenue 
Federal share of rent Subnational share of rent 
United States    
Venezuela 50 percent of total 
revenue167 
75 percent of oil royalty; 
windfall special 
contribution168 
25 percent of oil royalties; 0.7 to 
producing states and 0.3 to all 
other states  
 
  
                                                          
167
 From 1994 to 1998, oil revenue as a share of total government revenue ranged from 43 to 59 percent with an 
average value of 51 percent; calculated from Table 30, Statistical Appendix to IMF (1999).  
168
 Manzano et al. (2010).  
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Table 4.4 
Type of Taxes Levied to Collect Economic Rent in Federal Countries 
Country Federal levies  Subnational levies  
Argentina   Offshore reserves beyond 12 miles of 
coast:  royalty 
onshore: export and import duties; VAT, 
CIT, specific taxes on sale of oil 
products  
 Onshore and up to 12 miles of coast: 
royalty 
Australia Onshore: royalty which is 6 to 8.5 
percent of the production value; CIT; 
export levies   
Offshore: Petroleum Resource Rent Tax, 
Crude oil excise tax, CIT169 
Onshore: royalty that is 4 percent of the 
production value 
Offshore: royalty only on mining in 
coastal waters  
Brazil  Onshore: royalty; special entitlement, 
landowner participation, signature 
bonus, occupation or retention fee, CIT 
Offshore: same as onshore 
No direct levy but guaranteed revenue 
sharing   
Canada  Onshore: CIT170 
Offshore: CIT 
Onshore:  bonus or bonus bids; royalty 
(either in cash or kind); land use fees; 
local property tax  
Offshore: royalty allowed by joint 
contracting ; equity participation 
India Onshore: Profit oil, profit gas, dead rent, 
cess, CIT and sales tax 
Offshore: royalty  
Onshore: royalty 
Offshore: none 
Pakistan CIT at the rate of 40 percent of corporate 
income; area rent; GST at the rate of 16 
percent  
Royalty171; Gas Development Surcharge; 
Specific excise duty172 
Russian Federation Onshore: MET on oil and gas 
production, CIT, export duties 
Offshore: same as onshore 
Onshore: regions get 60 percent of CIT 
proceeds  
Offshore: none  
United Arab Emirates   
                                                          
169 Table 5.1, Productivity Commission (2009). Review of Regulatory Burden on Upstream Petroleum (Oil and Gas) Sector. 
170 From 1977 till recently, royalty payments were not deductible for federal CIT payments.  
171 Collected by the federal government at the rate of 12.5 percent of the quantity sold at prices laid down by the government. The 
federal government retains 2 percent collection charges.  
172 Collected by federal government and transferred to provinces on derivation basis.  
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Country Federal levies  Subnational levies  
United States Onshore: none 
Offshore: royalty 
Onshore: royalty 
Offshore: none  
Venezuela Only federal levies: royalties, 
exploitation tax, CIT (rate higher than 
non-oil companies) and windfall special 
contribution  
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Table 4.5 
The effect of rent tax share on investment in fixed public capital on regions of Russia (DDD estimation)
a) 
    VARIABLESb) Fixed effects (1)c) Fixed effects (2)d) Pooled (3)e) 
        
Real GRP, pc -2.00e-05*** -2.15e-05*** -2.17e-05*** 
 
(3.59e-06) (3.89e-06) (3.59e-06) 
Real revenue, pc 0.134*** 0.135*** 0.134*** 
 
(0.00813) (0.00783) (0.00715) 
DDD (republics) -0.316** -0.253 -0.253* 
 
(0.156) (0.166) (0.151) 
DDD (other producing regions) -0.0214 0.0401 0.0582 
 
(0.0926) (0.0973) (0.0882) 
By birth population, pct-republics -13.39** -13.99** -13.84** 
 
(6.702) (6.338) (5.808) 
By birth population, pct-all regions 642.8 654.5 -0.00711*** 
 
(395.5) (398.8) (0.00210) 
Ethnic Russian x population growth 
rate 0.469*** 0.584*** 0.577*** 
 
(0.149) (0.163) (0.148) 
Real transfers, pc -0.143*** -0.143*** -0.143*** 
 
(0.00755) (0.00730) (0.00670) 
Population below working age, pct -0.0445 -0.121 -0.120 
 
(0.0778) (0.0833) (0.0770) 
Population growth rate -0.0227 -0.0301** -0.0294** 
 
(0.0144) (0.0139) (0.0129) 
Population density -0.0968** -0.109*** -0.105*** 
 
(0.0399) (0.0387) (0.0353) 
Population, log 5.470** 4.758* 4.415* 
 
(2.243) (2.611) (2.376) 
Urbanization, pct -0.0248 -0.0372 -0.0390 
 
(0.0236) (0.0260) (0.0242) 
Farmland, hectares/sq.km. 0.000619*** 0.000525** 0.000555*** 
 
(0.000202) (0.000212) (0.000192) 
Volume of goods transported via rail 0.00146*** 0.00110** 0.00108** 
 
(0.000457) (0.000475) (0.000435) 
Volume of goods transported via road -3.02e-05 3.15e-06 1.10e-06 
 
(6.25e-05) (6.35e-05) (5.75e-05) 
Car ownership 0.00263 0.00233 0.00226 
 
(0.00183) (0.00183) (0.00168) 
Public bus passengers 1.97e-05 3.24e-05 3.43e-05 
 
(4.66e-05) (4.76e-05) (4.37e-05) 
Public school enrolment, pct 0.0121 0.00570 0.00529 
 
(0.0157) (0.0158) (0.0144) 
Population per hospital bed 0.00601* 0.00897** 0.00913*** 
 
(0.00311) (0.00347) (0.00319) 
Oil, value produced 1.09e-08*** 1.11e-08*** 1.10e-08*** 
 
(4.02e-09) (3.92e-09) (3.58e-09) 
Gas, value produced -6.81e-10 -6.67e-10 -6.46e-10 
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(4.64e-10) (4.53e-10) (4.14e-10) 
Time trend 0.0714 0.144 0.0452 
 
(0.0734) (0.0917) (0.0739) 
Constant 
  
-88.96 
   
(155.7) 
    Observations 600 600 600 
R-squared 0.900 0.902 0.958 
Number of Regions 76 76 
 First-stage F-statistic 17.00 20.01 
 First-stage F-statistic 10.88 10.30 
 Craig-Donald statistic 84.84 12.68 
 size 10 
  val 13.43 11.04 
 Hansen-J p-value 0.934 0.359 
 sizerb   11.04   
endog:Real GRP, pc Real revenue, pc :roadpavd rpaidser_pc residpc 
Notes: 
a) Robust standard errors in brackets; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
b) Real GRP, per capita and real revenue, per capita are endogenous. Excluded instruments are: paved roads 
as percentage of total length of roads a region, real value of paid services per capita and residential space 
per capita.   
c) A time trend variable is included. 
d) A full range of year dummies included but not shown in the table.  
e) A complete set of region dummies and year dummies included but not shown in the table.  
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Table 4.6 
The effect of rent tax share on acquisition of fixed public capital in regions of Russia (DDD estimation)
a) 
 
 VARIABLESb) Fixed effects (1)c) Fixed effects (2)d) Pooled (3)e) 
        
Real GRP, pc -4.64e-05* -5.78e-05** -5.75e-05*** 
 
(2.39e-05) (2.44e-05) (2.19e-05) 
Real revenue, pc 0.537*** 0.531*** 0.524*** 
 
(0.124) (0.117) (0.105) 
DDD (republics) -1.185** -0.837 -0.833 
 
(0.555) (0.619) (0.561) 
DDD (other producing regions) -0.604 -0.121 -0.0527 
 
(0.417) (0.453) (0.406) 
By birth population, pct-republics 31.02 25.01 25.64 
 
(25.79) (29.63) (26.07) 
By birth population, pct-all regions 2,525* 2,672* -0.0106 
 
(1,375) (1,450) (0.0184) 
Ethnic Russian x population growth rate 1.665 2.241* 2.134* 
 
(1.296) (1.320) (1.180) 
Real transfers, pc -0.297*** -0.300*** -0.300*** 
 
(0.0693) (0.0640) (0.0572) 
Population below working age, pct 0.836** -0.0897 -0.0832 
 
(0.394) (0.358) (0.323) 
Population growth rate -0.650 -0.880 -0.822 
 
(0.764) (0.772) (0.692) 
Population density -0.277 -0.218 -0.198 
 
(0.242) (0.218) (0.197) 
Population, log 28.28** 13.95 12.42 
 
(11.14) (11.76) (10.50) 
Urbanization, pct -0.224* -0.319** -0.324** 
 
(0.135) (0.146) (0.133) 
Farmland, hectares/sq.km. -0.000190 -0.000671 -0.000525 
 
(0.00106) (0.00107) (0.000984) 
Volume of goods transported via rail 0.00823*** 0.00547** 0.00538*** 
 
(0.00246) (0.00231) (0.00206) 
Volume of goods transported via road -0.000139 9.25e-05 8.35e-05 
 
(0.000275) (0.000278) (0.000249) 
Car ownership -0.0251 -0.0261* -0.0264* 
 
(0.0162) (0.0152) (0.0138) 
Public bus passengers 0.000341* 0.000406** 0.000416** 
 
(0.000188) (0.000189) (0.000172) 
Public school enrolment, pct 0.0235 -0.0369 -0.0365 
 
(0.0766) (0.0779) (0.0702) 
Population per hospital bed 0.0629 0.0878* 0.0882** 
 
(0.0443) (0.0460) (0.0418) 
Oil, value produced 3.30e-08** 3.34e-08** 3.25e-08** 
 
(1.65e-08) (1.61e-08) (1.45e-08) 
Gas, value produced -2.00e-09 -1.75e-09 -1.65e-09 
 
(1.66e-09) (1.62e-09) (1.46e-09) 
Time trend 1.227*** 1.810*** 0.785** 
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(0.414) (0.623) (0.328) 
Constant 
  
-1,599** 
   
(670.7) 
    Observations 588 588 588 
R-squared 0.622 0.650 0.951 
Number of Regions 76 76 
 First-stage F-statistic 11.71 20.01 
 First-stage F-statistic 21.24 10.30 
 Craig-Donald statistic 11.21 12.68 
 
 Notes: 
a) Robust standard errors in brackets; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
b) Real GRP, per capita and real revenue, per capita are endogenous. Excluded instruments are: paved 
roads as percentage of total length of roads a region, real value of paid services per capita,  air 
pollution tons per 1000 real rubles of gross regional product and residential space per capita.   
c) A time trend variable is included. 
d) A full range of year dummies included but not shown in the table.  
e) A complete set of region dummies and year dummies included but not shown in the table.  
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Table 4.7 
The effect of rent tax share on investment in fixed public capital and recurrent expenditures in regions of 
Russia (DDD estimation)
a) 
 
  (1) (2) 
VARIABLESb) qRfixrbpcc) qRexprpcd) 
      
DDD (republics) -0.303*** 0.947 
 
[0.116] [0.687] 
DDD (other producing regions) 0.000862 0.483 
 
[0.0786] [0.575] 
By birth population, pct-republics -16.04*** 42.58 
 
[6.006] [53.50] 
By birth population, pct-all regions -0.0335 0.0780 
 
[0.0400] [0.570] 
Ethnic Russian x population growth rate 0.318** 1.371 
 
[0.134] [2.023] 
Real revenue, pc 0.137*** 0.818*** 
 
[0.00494] [0.147] 
Real GRP, pc -1.74e-05*** 1.86e-05 
 
[2.43e-06] [5.04e-05] 
Real transfers, pc -0.146*** 0.0568 
 
[0.00390] [0.0471] 
Population below working age, pct -0.0614 -0.198 
 
[0.0634] [0.478] 
Volume of goods transported via rail 0.00161*** 
 
 
[0.000569] 
 Volume of goods transported via road -5.79e-05 
 
 
[4.03e-05] 
 Car ownership 0.00228 
 
 
[0.00185] 
 Population density -0.0862** 
 
 
[0.0353] 
 Population, log 5.297*** 0.695 
 
[1.791] [10.05] 
Urbanization, pct -0.0112 0.199 
 
[0.0226] [0.264] 
Farmland, hectares/sq.km. 0.000714*** 
 
 
[0.000215] 
 Public school enrolment, pct 0.0111 0.115 
 
[0.0130] [0.107] 
Population per hospital bed 0.00556 
 
 
[0.00348] 
 Oil, value produced 9.99e-09*** -4.57e-09 
 
[9.83e-10] [1.69e-08] 
Gas, value produced -6.40e-10*** -2.22e-10 
 
[8.92e-11] [8.94e-10] 
Time trend 0.0351 -0.130 
 
[0.0608] [0.873] 
New patients requiring treatment 
 
-0.00136 
  
[0.0109] 
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Outpatient visits 
 
-0.00784 
  
[0.0268] 
Population growth rate 
 
-0.0172 
  
[0.208] 
Unemployment rate 
 
-0.0275 
  
[0.442] 
Average pension payment 
 
0.000340 
  
[0.00142] 
Population below subsistence income 
 
-0.0276 
  
[0.0410] 
Constant 0 0 
 
[0] [0] 
   Observations 596 596 
R-squared 0.958 0.988 
Notes: 
a) Standard errors in brackets; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
b) Real GRP, per capita and real revenue, per capita are endogenous.   
c) Dependent variable: new investment in fixed public capital, real rubles per capita. A time trend 
variable and full range of year and region dummies are included. The year and regions dummies 
not shown in the table.  
d) Dependent variable: subnational recurrent public expenditure, real rubles per capita. A time 
trend variable and full range of year and region dummies are included. The year and regions 
dummies not shown in the table.  
 
 
  
191 
 
191 
 
Table 4.8 
The effect of rent tax share on investment in fixed public capital and recurrent expenditures in regions of 
Russia (DDD estimation)
a) 
  (1) (2) 
VARIABLESb) qRfixsnpcc) qRexprpcd) 
      
DDD (republics) -0.765 1.200** 
 
[0.629] [0.608] 
DDD (other producing regions) -1.111** 0.170 
 
[0.457] [0.473] 
By birth population, pct-republics 58.16 34.68 
 
[37.59] [45.71] 
By birth population, pct-all regions -0.407* 0.234 
 
[0.238] [0.232] 
Ethnic Russian x population growth rate 1.089* -0.708 
 
[0.650] [1.247] 
Real revenue, pc 0.244 0.613*** 
 
[0.150] [0.211] 
Real GRP, pc 4.41e-05 5.62e-05 
 
[3.30e-05] [3.99e-05] 
Real transfers, pc -0.346*** 0.0505** 
 
[0.0236] [0.0243] 
Population below working age, pct -0.0944 -0.338 
 
[0.413] [0.388] 
Volume of goods transported via rail 0.0105*** 
 
 
[0.00274] 
 Volume of goods transported via road -0.000317 
 
 
[0.000197] 
 Car ownership -0.0291*** 
 
 
[0.00944] 
 Population density -0.287 
 
 
[0.249] 
 Population, log 27.71*** 2.660 
 
[9.525] [8.213] 
Urbanization, pct 0.129 0.332* 
 
[0.153] [0.185] 
Farmland, hectares/sq.km. 0.000643 
 
 
[0.00115] 
 Public school enrolment, pct 0.159 0.105 
 
[0.0985] [0.0980] 
Population per hospital bed 0.0372* 
 
 
[0.0203] 
 Oil, value produced 7.21e-11 -2.05e-08 
 
[1.28e-08] [1.54e-08] 
Gas, value produced -6.19e-10 5.10e-10 
 
[6.75e-10] [7.99e-10] 
Time trend 0.526 -0.387 
 
[0.360] [0.362] 
New patients requiring treatment 
 
0.00161 
  
[0.00396] 
Outpatient visits 
 
-0.00689 
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[0.00738] 
Population growth rate 
 
1.747*** 
  
[0.678] 
Unemployment rate 
 
-0.0767 
  
[0.304] 
Average pension payment 
 
0.000978 
  
[0.00149] 
Population below subsistence income 
 
-0.0263 
  
[0.0202] 
Constant 0 0 
 
[0] [0] 
   Observations 583 583 
R-squared 0.949 0.991 
Notes: 
a) Standard errors in brackets; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
b) Real GRP, per capita and real revenue, per capita are endogenous.   
c) Dependent variable: new acquisition of fixed public capital, real rubles per capita. A time trend variable 
and full range of year and region dummies are included. The year and regions dummies not shown in the 
table.  
d) Dependent variable: subnational recurrent public expenditure, real rubles per capita. A time trend variable 
and full range of year and region dummies are included. The year and regions dummies not shown in the 
table.  
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Appendix A.1  Application of the Kolm Triangle Technique to Rent Assignment  
 
At the outset it is useful to demonstrate that assignment leads to nontrivial outcomes of 
welfare distribution. This alone may not be a sufficient condition for rent assignment but it does 
create a perspective to show that rent assignment needs to be seen from a number of 
perspectives. To demonstrate the effect of federal share in royalty and a transfer scheme, we use 
the Kolm triangle technique. For this purpose let‘s assume there are two regions A and B which 
comprise a federation. The federal government produces a public good G which is non-rival and 
non-excludable for residents in both regions. Each region produces a public good Xi which is a 
local public good or a club good and there is no free riding across the regions. Only region A is 
endowed with an exhaustible natural resource. We assume that the natural resource can be 
converted to the regional public good one for one.  
Figure A shows a simple Kolm Triangle. It is an equilateral triangle with the base or x-
axis representing the level of regional public goods. The length of the base is equal to the sum of 
the regional public goods. The upper vertex represents the federal public good. Each point k in 
the interior of the triangle represents a bundle of goods, the federal public good and the regional 
public goods. Let k1 represent an allocation (G, XA, XB), where certain quantities of all three 
goods are produced. In this Kolm Triangle the regional public goods are represented on the x-
axis but unlike an Edgeworth Box, the distance from the origin along the x-axis is not a measure 
of the level of regional public good. Instead, the shortest distance between the inclined axis and 
the point is a measure of the level of X in a region. When we draw a line through k parallel to the 
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horizontal axis, the distance between this line and the horizontal axis is the measure of the 
federal public good as shown in the figure.   
 
Figure A. 
 
 
A representative agent in each region has preferences over Xi and G. These preferences 
are depicted by indifference curves, exhibiting all properties of indifference curves. However, to 
accommodate the indifference maps in the triangle a transformation is carried out. This 
transformation is: 
)2(
3
1 yxx ot    and
ot yy   
Where superscript t is for the transformed variable and o is for the original variable.  
Now a Pareto region is easily identified in the triangle when the indifference maps of the 
two representative agents are known. For instance, if the two agents have normal Cobb-Douglas 
type of preferences then there indifference curves will be as represented below. In this case all 
 
                   c 
 
    ..  
 XB  
                                                      
                          XA           
 
                   a  XA              XB  b 
k1 
XA XB 
G 
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allocations not in the interior of the triangle are not part of the feasible set. Only the points in the 
interior of the triangle represent the feasible set of allocations in the nation. Given the 
indifference curves, the Pareto set in this case is the curved line df. No individual can be made 
better off without reducing the welfare of another for any of the points on this line. Points not on 
the line are not Pareto efficient. At point k1 there is an allocation which is not Pareto efficient. 
Both agents can be made better off by moving them to a point inside the area inscribed by the 
two indifference curves.   
 
 
Figure B. 
 
 
Let‘s assume that Region A is endowed with all the reserves of the exhaustible resource 
in the nation. Initially, there is no federal share in exhaustible resource rent. Then k0 in Figure C 
below represents the original allocation in the Kolm triangle. Then under the federal arrangement 
α.M is the federally collected royalty, which is then, through the transfer pool, allocated to region 
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 XB  
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 . k1 
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B. To begin with, keeping it simple, it is a conditional grant which can only be allocated to 
provision of regional public good XB. Through this federal arrangement, B gains a share of 
endowment. It is possible to argue in this manner because region B has a fixed share in transfers 
which is entirely financed by the federal royalty income. Hence the sum of XA and XB is equal to 
the length of the base of the triangle. Now let‘s say that with the federal arrangement, the new 
allocation is k1. Clearly it is not Pareto efficient. Therefore, through a process of reallocation 
within the budgets the two regions will reach k1* which is Pareto efficient. At this point, a bundle 
comprising G, XA and XB are produced in the economy.  
Figure C. 
 
 
The depiction in the triangle is for the sums of amounts of goods over time, the length of 
time being equal to the period in which the natural resource in exhausted. For the entire duration 
it is clear that the total amount of XA under the federal arrangement is less than that which would 
be without the federal arrangement. But the total amount of X, a regional capital good, produced 
under the scheme is the same as would have been produced if there had been no federal 
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 XB  
                                    d                 f 
                          XA           
 
                   a  XA              XB  b 
k0 
 . k1 
k1*
* 
XB 
XA 
G 
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intervention. But this result is possible under strict conditions, namely a conditional grant 
ensuring that region B invests the grant in regional capital formation and certain assumptions on 
preferences. If these conditions do not hold, region B‘s investment in the regional public good, 
under the income and substitution effects may be less than the decrease in public investment in 
region A, decreasing the sum of regional stocks X.  
From this simple depiction it is clear that sharing of exhaustible natural resource revenue 
outside a region in a federal arrangement may bring the stock of public good (asset) to be created 
to a lower level. Therefore, the owner region will need a compensation of some sort. But the 
question of equity can be discussed in the following manner. If the social welfare function 
assigns a high value to citizens in region B, then the sacrifice is justifiable under the objective 
function.  
  
198 
 
198 
 
 
Appendix B.1 Proofs 
 
Proposition 1.  
 
Proof.  
Government policy affects the choice of tax rates and level of taxes. If the government develops 
a higher priority for development, there will be sign on the following 
  
  
 and 
  
  
 . 
The social planner maximizes the following objective function: 
                                      
       
    
    
Where       
                                     
    
     
                             
     
  
Or simply as 
     
                  
 
  
     
 
 
Where   is the expenditure on long-lived public goods in region i and E is the total public 
expenditure in the nation.  
Following are the first order conditions for the maximization problem: 
  
  
   
  
  
                     
                                   
  
     
 
      
 
           
    
 
  
  
   
  
  
                  
                     
  
     
     
 
         
 
   
 
Or 
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And  
  
  
   
  
  
        
                                   
  
           
          
Or  
  
  
   
  
  
      
 
        
                                 
When            
        
 
,     , for i =1,2. And the first order conditions can be 
rewritten as: 
  
  
   
  
  
   
 
        
                                                           
  
  
   
  
  
   
  
        
                                                          
 
From the first order conditions, it can be seen that  
  
  
  
    
 
        
                            
and  
  
  
  
     
  
        
                        
Differentiating equation (1.3) and (1.4) with respect to parameter of preference for long-lived 
public goods c, we get the following equations: 
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These two equations can be written as a system of equations: 
 
 
 
 
  
   
   
 
     
         
 
   
    
 
       
         
 
   
    
 
       
         
 
   
   
 
  
   
          
 
 
 
 
  
  
  
  
  
   
 
  
  
 
  
  
                                         
 Or in matrix notation as:  
      
Where A is the Hessian matrix of second order differentials of the objective function and 
       
 
To demonstrate this we use the following substitutions: 
 
   
   
  , 
    
         
  ,  
   
    
  , 
       
         
  ,  
   
    
  , 
       
         
  ,  
   
   
   and 
  
   
         
  . Then the determinant = dm-dn+ct-cv-mw+nw-tx+vx 
= m(d-w) +t(j-x) +n(w-d) +v(x-j) 
= m(d-w) + n(w-d) + t(c-x) +j(x-j) because v = j 
= md –mw –nd +nw > 0 
Because  
md > 0 as a product of two negative terms 
mw, nd < 0 and –mn, -nd > 0 
nw > 0 as a product of two positive terms.  
 
= dm-dn+jt-jv-mw+nw-tx+vx  
=dm –dn–mw+nw-tx+jt +jj+jx 
dm > 0 as a product of two negative terms 
mw, dn < 0 and –mw, -dn > 0 
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nw > 0 as a product of two positive terms 
tx = nw and tx < 0 
j is the cross partial is positive but small in magnitude,  
therefore the determinant > 0 
 
  
Solving the system by Crammer‘s Rule, we have: 
  
  
 
    
   
 
  
  
 
    
   
  
Where 
     
  
  
 
   
    
 
  
  
 
   
   
 
  
  
 
  
   
         
 
  
  
 
       
         
    
Comparing the last two terms  
  
  
 
  
   
         
 
  
  
 
       
         
 
We substitute the values of 
  
  
 and 
  
  
 from equations (1.3) and (1.4) above. The two sides are 
equal but have opposite signs. Hence the determinant becomes: 
  
  
 
   
    
 
  
  
 
   
   
 
The first term is a product of a negative and a positive number and has a negative sign. The 
second term in a product of two negative numbers but has a negative sign. Therefore,        . 
And  
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First we compare 
  
  
 
     
         
 and  
  
  
 
       
         
. For this purpose wesubstitute the values of 
  
  
 and 
  
  
 from equations mngu and fdru above. The two are equal and have opposite signs. 
Hence the determinant becomes equal to: 
 
  
  
 
   
   
 
  
  
 
   
    
 
and the sum of two negative terms can but only be negative. Therefore,         
  
  
    
  
  
    
 
If            
       
   
, the objective function becomes: 
                            
Where  
      
                         
    
  
The first order conditions are: 
  
  
  
  
  
            
 
                          
                          
Or 
  
  
  
             
 
                          
                              
It is clear that, 
  
  
   
Because differentiating equation (1.6) with respect to c yields: 
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And 
  
  
 
  
  
  
                   
    
                       
  
  
                          
And  
  
  
   
Because equation (1.8) is not a function of  . Intuitively, this means that since   is fixed, there 
will be no change effected in the rate of federal tax unless a new political agreement is worked 
out.  
 
Now if              
       
   
   , the objective function becomes 
               
       
    
       
Where  
      
                    
    
    
  
    
  
The first order conditions are: 
  
  
   
  
  
 
  
   
    and 
  
  
   
And  
  
  
 
  
  
   since optimal   and α are independent of c but 
  
  
  . Intuitively, this indicates that 
fixing   at the highest possible level would have no substitution effect on long-lived goods; any 
reduction in the fiscal resource in Region A would be adjusted in consumable public goods.  
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Proposition 2. 
 
Proof.  
The social planner solves: 
                                      
       
    
    
Where       
                     
    
    
        
 
  
Where    stands for the preferential allocation percentage of the fund for long-lived goods and 
   the share of heritage sort of fund facility invested in long-lived public goods. 
The first order conditions of the maximization equilibrium are: 
  
  
  
  
  
    
 
           
                                          
  
  
  
  
  
          
 
           
                         
From equation (2.1) and (2.2), it can be seen that: 
  
  
     
 
           
                                                      
  
  
           
 
           
                                     
 
The second condition is independent of the size of the fund as far as the direction of the effect is 
concerned. The size of the facility will matter however in determining the magnitude of the 
effect. A larger fund does not necessarily mean a higher investment in long-lived public goods, if 
     . If      , then a change in   has no effect on the increase in long-lived public goods 
in the nation.  
Differentiating equations (2.1) and (2.2) with respect to c we obtain: 
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From the simultaneous equations (2.5) and (2.6), we get the following system: 
 
 
 
 
  
   
   
 
    
            
 
   
    
 
           
            
 
   
    
 
           
            
 
   
   
 
       
   
             
 
 
 
 
 
  
  
  
  
   
 
  
  
 
  
  
  
 
Or  
       
       
Because determinant of A = de +ag-ak-bg+cf+bk-df-ce 
Where a= 
   
   
, b= 
    
            
, j=  
   
    
, d= 
           
            
, e=  
   
    
, f= 
           
            
, g=  
   
   
 
and k= 
       
   
            
.  
Now ag –ak –bg + de + jf > 0 because each term               
       but have opposite signs so the two terms cancel each other; and 
assuming that the revenues from   and   are perfect substitutes, je = 0.  
 
Solving the system by Crammer‘s Rule, we have: 
  
  
 
    
    
 
  
  
 
    
    
  
Where 
     
  
  
 
   
    
 
  
  
 
   
   
 
  
  
 
       
   
            
 
  
  
 
           
            
              
as explained below: 
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Comparing the last two terms, we claim: 
  
  
 
       
   
            
 
  
  
 
           
            
                       
Substituting for 
  
  
 and 
  
  
 from equations (2.3) and (2.4), equation (2.7) can be rewritten as: 
 
  
           
 
       
   
            
   
        
           
  
           
            
                  
Or 
  
       
     
             
  
       
     
             
                  
Since the two terms are equal but have opposite signs in equation (2.7),  
     
  
  
 
   
    
 
  
  
 
   
   
 
Where the first term is a product of a positive and a negative number and is negative and the 
second term is a product of two negative numbers but has a negative sign.  
Using Crammer‘s Rule,  
     
   
    
 
  
  
  
   
   
  
  
 
  
  
 
    
            
 
  
  
 
           
            
            
 
Again substituting for 
  
  
 and 
  
  
 from equations (2.3) and (2.4) in equation (2.9) eliminates the 
last two terms. The first term in (2.9) is a product of a positive and a negative number and has a 
negative sign. The second term is a product of two negative numbers but has a negative sign. 
Therefore,         
Using these results, it can be seen that 
  
  
 
    
    
    
And 
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However, if      , then       ,         and          and the same results are obtained.  
If            
        
   
  , the analysis for the condition under Proposition applies. The 
first order conditions are: 
The first order conditions are: 
  
  
  
  
  
            
 
            
                                                             
  
  
  
  
  
                                                                                                                                                
They are the same as equations (1.6) and (1.8) except the addition of a positive number in the 
denominator in equation (2.10). Therefore, it follows that 
  
  
   
  
  
   
If               
       
   
 , the objective function becomes 
               
       
    
       
Where  
      
                                  
    
 
   
                
    
  
The first order conditions are: 
  
  
   
  
  
 
  
    
         
  
    
    
  
  
   
  
  
   
And  
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   since optimal   and α are independent of c but 
  
  
  . Intuitively, this indicates that 
fixing   at the highest possible level would have no substitution effect on long-lived goods; any 
reduction in the fiscal resource in Region A would be adjusted in consumable public goods. But 
the optimal condition for selecting 
  
  
 
  
   
 
 
 
        
  
    
  yield the following results: 
If M is large as compared to Y then an increase in c would need to be compensated by an 
increase in   . Depending upon the relative sizes of Y and M, the effect of 
  
  
 could be negative 
or positive.  
 
 
Proposition 3.  
The problem is given by the following maximization: 
              
Subject to the constraints 
           
       
    
   
Where      
                 
    
    
    
 
  and              
and    is the modified expenditure in Region B with the inclusion of the federal equalization 
transfer.  
The first order conditions are: 
  
  
   
  
  
     
 
        
     
 
         
                                            
And  
  
  
   
  
  
      
 
        
                                                              
 
These are same as equations (1.1) and (1.2) under proposition 1 with the exception that the 
expenditure for region B includes federal transfers financed from the general pool and q is 
replaced by q’.  
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Logical deduction concludes with the following results: 
If            
       
   
 
  
  
  
      
 
        
                                                                                            
And  
  
  
  
       
 
        
                                                                             
 
And  
  
  
   
  
  
   
 
Similarly, the results for the conditions as proved under Proposition 1 for            
       
   
  and            
       
   
 apply.  
 
 
Proposition 4.  
The social planner in this case maximizes an objective function that incorporates this type of 
transfer but is subject to the same constraints. It is given by: 
              
Subject to the constraints 
           
       
    
   
Where      
                        
    
    
  
       
   
 
   and         is the share of the 
federal rent tax revenue set aside for the transfer pool.  
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Proof. 
The first order conditions are: 
  
  
   
  
  
    
 
       
    
     
 
         
                                                      
And  
  
  
   
  
  
             
 
       
    
                                                  
 
These are same as equations (1.1) and (1.2) under Proposition 1 with the exception that the 
expenditure for Region B includes federal transfers financed from the resource rent pool and 
equation (4.2) includes the preference for long-lived public goods in both regions in the 
numerator of the second term.   
Logical deduction concludes with the following results: 
If            
       
   
 
  
  
  
      
 
        
                                                                                                       
And  
  
  
  
              
 
        
                                                                        
Clearly, equation (4.4) holds with a negative sing only if        . If this condition is relaxed, 
not only that       but also that         , only then 
  
  
  . In essence this means, that a 
policy aiming to achieve a increase in the stock of long-lived public goods would need to 
ascertain a much higher preference for such goods in the non-resource region even if this region 
were to be supported by federal equalization transfer.  
Since equations (4.1) and (4.2) are the same as equations (1.1) and (1.2), using the analysis under 
Proposition 1, it can be said that  
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The results will not hold if         . 
Similarly, the results for the conditions as proved under Proposition 1 for            
        
   
  and            
        
   
 apply.  
 
 
Proposition 5.  
              
Subject to the constraints 
           
       
    
   
Where      
                  
    
    
    
 
  and                  173 
And    is the expenditure in Region A inclusive of the federal transfer.  
Proof. 
Maximization yields the following first order conditions: 
  
  
   
  
  
     
 
        
     
 
         
                                            
And  
  
  
   
  
  
      
 
        
                                                              
 
These are same as equations (1.1) and (1.2) under Proposition 1 with the exception that the 
expenditure for Region A includes federal transfers financed from the general pool and q is 
replaced by    .  
                                                          
173
 It can be seen that in this case also the federal transfer achieves complete equalization when it is equal to the 
difference of regional fiscal resources. Hence, the resource in Region A after receipt of transfers becomes:  
                                                 
               
         
                                     
    
     
                  
    
  and                   
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Logical deduction concludes with the following results: 
If            
       
   
   
  
  
  
       
 
        
                                                                                            
And  
  
  
  
       
 
        
                                                                             
 
And  
  
  
   
  
  
   
 
Similarly, the results for the conditions as proved under Proposition 1 for            
       
   
    and            
       
   
   apply.  
 
 
 
 
 
Proposition 6.  
 
The social planner maximizes an objective function that incorporates regional taxes below the 
efficient level but is subject to the same constraints. It is given by: 
              
Subject to the constraints 
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Where      
                                  
    
    
     
 
   and           are the level 
of regional taxes in a region. 
Proof. 
For simplicity of exposition, let                  
The first order conditions are: 
  
  
   
  
  
    
 
        
     
 
         
                                                      
And  
  
  
   
  
  
      
 
        
                                                                        
Where      , the problem becomes that same as discussed under Proposition 1.  
Equation (6.1) and (6.2) same as equations (1.1) and (1.2) under Proposition 1 with the exception 
that the expenditures in both Regions vary with the level of local taxation that is allowed to vary 
in this case.    
Logical deduction concludes with the following results: 
If            
        
   
, 
  
  
  
     
 
        
                                                                                                       
And  
  
  
  
       
 
        
                                                                                             
The results are independent of the difference in preference for long-lived goods in each region.  
Since equations (6.1) and (6.2) are the same as equations (1.1) and (1.2), using the analysis under 
Proposition 1, it can be said that  
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Similarly, the results for the conditions as proved under Proposition 1 for            
        
   
    and            
        
   
   apply.  
Differentiating equations (6.3) and (6.4) with respect to  , we get the following: 
 
   
    
        
    
 
        
             
    
 
         
                  
 
   
    
   
           
 
         
                                                                               
 
From equations, (6.5) and (6.6), it can be seen that, 
  
  
   because the second order partial 
differentials are negative by assumption.   
 
 
Proposition 7.  
The objective function is the same as in Proposition 1.  
Proof. 
The first order conditions are:  
  
  
   
  
  
    
 
        
     
 
         
                         
  
  
   
  
  
      
 
        
                                             
When            
        
 
,     , for i =1,2. And the first order conditions can be 
rewritten as: 
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Differentiating with respect to   , we get the following equations: 
 
   
     
     
 
        
    
 
     
    
 
   
     
   
 
        
    
   
     
    
Rewriting the equations: 
 
  
  
 
  
   
     
 
        
    
 
     
    
 
  
  
 
  
   
   
 
        
    
   
     
    
Or 
  
   
      
 
        
    
 
     
   
  
  
   
  
   
     
 
        
    
   
     
   
  
  
   
 
Because from equations (7.3) and (7.4), 
  
  
 and 
  
  
 are negative.  
Proposition 8.  
The objective function is the same as in Proposition 1.  
Proof. 
The first order conditions are:  
  
  
   
  
  
    
 
        
     
 
         
                         
  
  
   
  
  
      
 
        
                                             
When            
        
 
  ,     , for i =1,2. And the first order conditions can be 
rewritten as: 
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Differentiating equations (8.3) and (8.4) with respect to Y and M respectively yield the following 
set of equations:  
  
  
  
  
  
  
 
        
         
  
         
                        
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
        
         
  
 
         
                     
Clearly from (8.5), 
  
  
   because 
  
  
   from equation (1.3), and 
  
  
   from equation (8.6) 
because  
  
  
   from equation (1.4).  
Dividing equation (8.6) by 
  
  
 and adding to equation (8.4), we get the following: 
  
  
 
  
  
 
 
 
           
   
        
                                          
The right hand side will be negative or positive depending upon the size of M relative to total 
public expenditure. If M is very large compared with the expenditure, or if the general tax base is 
smaller compared with natural resource revenue, then the first term becomes smaller and the 
second term becomes bigger, resulting at some point in the right hand side becoming negative. 
Constraining equation (8.7) to first term being smaller than the second term on the right hand 
side,  
             
   
        
                                                                 
Within plausible ranges of   and   , a range of  can be delineated for which equation (8.8) 
will hold. It is also evident that the higher the   the lower will be the ratio of  to the product of 
total public expenditure and investment on long lived public goods.  
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Appendix B.2   Choosing federal share of rent with political stability 
 
The following inequalities constrain the value of  , the federal share of exhaustible resource 
rent, within the unit interval, as given in equation 2.4.  
  
                     
       
 
  
  
 
        
  
               
Where  
                     
       
  
                     
       
                            
                                                                                                                              
    
        
  
    
        
  
        
        
  
    
                                                              
     
and 
                                                 
                                                    
 ,          and it depends on transfers to the 
region and other benefits provided by the federation.  
Table 2.1  Conditions on the bounds of the constraints 
Condition  Federal 
share of 
rent 
Region‘s response Federal response 
                            Indifferent to 
remaining in federation 
Take no rent away from 
Region A; buys off allegiance 
by increasing transfers  
                            Indifferent to 
remaining in federation 
Take no rent from Region A; 
Increase transfers to Region A 
           
        
  
      
        
  
 
 
 
          
    Depends on relative 
size of benefits and 
investment rent ratio 
Take all the rent; cannot reduce 
or need to increase transfers to 
sustain a high benefits ratio  
        
  
 
 
 
           
    Strong commitment to 
federation 
Take all the rent; cannot reduce 
transfers to Region A or B may 
fall below 1 
               
        
  
   : investment greater than or 
equal to total rent (rent small part of economy);     
    Not an important 
bargaining tool 
Take all the rent; benefits ratio 
may be sustained through 
transfers  
               
        
  
  : investment greater than or 
equal to rent (investment very high);     
    Benefits of association 
outweigh cession  
Take all the rent; keep benefits 
ratio (transfers) at current level  
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    Indifferent to 
remaining in federation 
Take all the rent; increase 
transfers to Region A 
        
  
            
    Indifferent to 
remaining in federation 
Take all the rent; increase 
transfers to Region A 
        
  
              
    No commitment to 
federation 
Take all the rent; increase 
transfers to Region A and 
fights to retain control 
        
  
              
    No commitment to 
federation 
Take all the rent; increase 
transfers to Region A and 
fights to retain control 
All the ten cases shown in Table 2.1 are where   is equal to the lower or the upper bound of the 
interval. In all cases, the federation becomes politically unstable. In all these cases, federal rent 
share needs to be compensated by transfers. In other words, the effective share will always be 
fixed away from 0 and 1. In other words,        . 
The above description all provides an important intuitive explanation. Only large regions with 
potentially a smaller benefits ratio   may raise an issue with the federation. For small 
subnational jurisdictions like a district or a county, the benefits ratio   is very large and claims to 
rent will be weak.  
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Appendix C.1  Description of Variables in the Data 
 
Variable Name 
 
Variable Description 
 
I. Identity variables 
ob_id unique identity code for region i 
year year of observation 
oblast name of region i 
  II. Investment in fixed capital variables 
rfixcappc fixed investment, million  rubles, real per capita 
fixcappc fixed investment, 000  rubles, at current prices 
fixgross fixed investment, at current prices, million  rubles 
fix_index fixed investment index as percentage of previous year 
fix_stat fixed investment by regions, percentage of total investment 
fix_mun fixed investment by municipalities, percentage of total investment  
fix_priv fixed investment private, percentage of total investment  
fix_mix 
fixed investment mixed all governments, percentage of total 
investment 
fix_equity fixed investment as equity, percentage of total investment 
fix_liab fixed investment as liabilities, percentage of total investment 
fix_bank fixed investment financed by bank loan, percentage of total investment 
fix_budg fixed investment budgetary funds, percentage of total investment 
fix_fbudg fixed investment federal budget, percentage of total investment 
fix_rbudg fixed investment regional budgets, percentage of total investment 
fix_hous fixed investment in housing, percentage of total investment 
fix_bild fixed investment in building other than housing, 
 
percentage of total investment 
fix_mach fixed investment in machinery and equipment, 
 
percentage of total investment 
fix_oth fixed investment other, percentage of total investment 
fix_val fixed investment, value of fixed assets end of 
 
year full book value, million  rubles 
rfixvalpc fixed investment, value of fixed assets end of 
 
year full book value, million real  rubles per capita 
rfixsnpc 
real investment in fixed capital, subnational governments, million 
ruble 
rfixpubpc 
real investment in fixed capital, subnational governments all sources, 
million ruble 
rfix_rbudgpc 
real investment in fixed capital, subnational governments, million 
ruble 
 
source identified as regional budget 
rfixfbudgpc real investment in fixed capital, subnational governments, million 
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Variable Name 
 
Variable Description 
 
ruble 
 
source identified as federal budget 
build_debt Building financed by debt 
deprec Beginning of year, depreciation of fixed assets, in percent 
  III. Revenue and expenditure variables  
rrevpc regional revenue, million real   rubles, per capita 
rsngpc regional subnational tax, million real   rubles, per capita 
rtransferpc transfer to the region, million real   rubles, per capita 
nontax regional nontax revenue, million real   rubles, per capita 
rexppc total expenditure, million real   rubles, per capita 
rexpsocpc total on social sectors million real   rubles, per capita 
rexpobpc exp for the obligations of the  Russian Federation,  
 
million real   rubles, per capita 
penfin million  rubles, intake in pension fund 
penfexp million  rubles, expenditure from pension fund 
mhealint million  rubles, intake in mandatory health insurance fund 
mhealexp million  rubles, expenditure from mandatory health insurance fund 
mhealexp million  rubles, expenditure from mandatory health insurance fund 
ssecint million  rubles, intake in social security fund 
ssecexp million  rubles, expenditure from social security fund 
  IV. Structural variables  
resid residential area, 000 sq meters 
newres 000 sq m of total area added as new residences 
newapart apartment units added in a year 
construct value of new construction at current prices, million   rubles 
bus_pop buses per 100 000 population 
bus_pass million passenger kilometers 
buspub millions of buses 
cars # shareholders per 1000 population 
roaden km of road per 1000 sq km area 
raodimp percentage of improved roads 
roadpavd percentage of paved roads 
roadtrans million ton-kilometers transported by road 
tonnage million tonnes transported by rail 
accid accidents per 100 000 
railden km of ways to 10 000 sq km area 
railpass 000s of rail passengers 
  V. Demand variables (for public services) 
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Variable Name 
 
Variable Description 
 
enrolpub enrolment in public as percent of total enrolment 
stu_sprof students in secondary public professional  
 
education on 10000 population 
disburd first time diagnosis per 1000 population 
imr number <1year deaths per 1000 live births 
klinout 1000s visits per shift in public hospitals 
klinik public outpatient visits per 10 000 population 
docs # per 10 000 population 
hosp_bedk hospital beds per 10 000 population 
paramed # per 10 000 population 
pop_para population per paramedical service 
lsgempl # of employ in government bodies 
employp fraction employed by subnational government 
pop_hospbed persons per hospital bed 
pop_doc persons per doctor 
exec_emp # employ of executive power, Subjects & LSG 
rpaidser_pc real value of paid services per capita, million   rubles 
pension_av 1000   rubles 
  VI. Other control variables  
sown farms all categories, 000s of hectares 
forest 000 hectares 
freshwatpc millions of cu ft usage, per capita 
recywatpc recycled and consistently used, million cu m, per capita 
wastwat discharge into surface water bodies, million cu m 
airpoll 1000 tons from stationary sources 
areasqkm area in sq km 
  VII. Economic variables 
rgrppc gross value added, per capita, 000 real   rubles 
rsgrppc gross value added, per capita, 000 real   rubles (National Accounts) 
rgrppc2 calculated, million  rubles per capita 
rincpc income per capita per month, real   rubles 000s 
rconspendpc average per capita per month, real   rubles 000s 
rconsfin final consumption of households, 000 real   rubles 
coal 000 tons 
gas million cu meters 
oil 000 tons, including gas condensate 
pindex_m mineral production index, percentage change 
indind  aggregated production index, percentage change 
electric billion kilowatt-hours 
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Variable Name 
 
Variable Description 
 
unempreg registered unemployed, in percent 
unemployed unemployed in 1000s 
unemrate unemployment rate, calculated 
wage_nom av nominal wage,   rubles 000s 
rwage nominal wage/deflator 
cpi CPI, Dec to Dec in percent 
deflator indices, GDP deflators 
  VIII. Demographic variables  
pop 1000s end of year 
lpop  natural log of regional population 
urb urban population as percent of total 
popden population density, # per sq km of area 
migrate migration, per 10 000 population 
noworkage population below working age, percent of total 
inc_sub below subsistence level, percentage of population 
oiltot oil production total  rublesia 
gastot gas production total  rublesia 
oilprice $ per ton, 7.3 barrel eq @ 33API, international price 
gasprice $ per 000 cu meter, for domestic industy 
  IX. Treatment variables  
treat producing region dummy,  =1 if region i producing, 0 otherwise 
g1 dummy for producing region, =1 for producing, 0 otherwise 
post1 year=2002 
post2 year=2003 
post3 year=2004 
post4 year=2005 
post5 year=2006 
post6 year=2007 
p1g1 interaction: g1 times post1 
p2g1 interaction: g1 times post2 
p3g1 interaction: g1 times post3 
p4g1 interaction: g1 times post4 
p5g1 interaction: g1 times post5 
p6g1 interaction: g1 times post6 
postx dummy for post treatment period, =1 if year >=2002&<=2007 
 
0 otherwise 
pxg1 interaction: g1 times postx 
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Appendix C.2    Determinants of investment in long-lived public goods in Regions of Russia 
 
Table C.1.1 
The determinants of investment in fixed public capital in regions of Russia 
a) 
Real GRP, pc -2.65e-05*** -2.08e-05*** -2.08e-05*** 
 
[4.18e-06] [3.55e-06] [3.25e-06] 
Real revenue, pc 0.143*** 0.138*** 0.138*** 
 
[0.00926] [0.0102] [0.00936] 
Real transfer, pc -0.139*** -0.143*** -0.143*** 
 
[0.00830] [0.00882] [0.00806] 
Population below working age, 
pct 0.0693 -0.0304 -0.0304 
 
[0.0768] [0.0705] [0.0645] 
Population density -0.0501 -0.00999 -0.00999 
 
[0.0382] [0.0374] [0.0343] 
Population (log) 4.621* 0.752 0.752 
 
[2.600] [2.721] [2.489] 
Urbanization, pct 0.0131 -0.0393 -0.0393* 
 
[0.0224] [0.0247] [0.0226] 
Farmland, hectares per sq km 
area 0.000494** 0.000564** 0.000564*** 
 
[0.000201] [0.000222] [0.000203] 
Volume of goods transported 
via rail 0.000915** 0.00117** 0.00117*** 
 
[0.000416] [0.000471] [0.000431] 
Volume of goods transported 
via road -9.01e-06 -3.58e-06 -3.58e-06 
 
[6.07e-05] [6.15e-05] [5.62e-05] 
Car ownership 0.00247 0.00147 0.00147 
 
[0.00189] [0.00183] [0.00167] 
Public enrolment, pct -0.00807 -0.000548 -0.000548 
 
[0.0172] [0.0180] [0.0164] 
Hospital beds per 10,000 
population 0.00656** 0.00938*** 0.00938*** 
 
[0.00330] [0.00361] [0.00330] 
Value of oil extracted, real 
dollars 
 
1.24e-05*** 1.24e-05*** 
  
[4.72e-06] [4.32e-06] 
Value of gas extracted, real 
dollars 
 
-6.74e-07 -6.74e-07 
  
[5.59e-07] [5.11e-07] 
Oil price, dollars 0.141*** 0.405* 0.115*** 
 
[0.0379] [0.214] [0.0443] 
Gas price, dollars -0.0481** 0.119** -0.00159 
 
[0.0188] [0.0581] [0.0183] 
Time trend 0.271** -1.147* 0 
 
[0.107] [0.619] [0] 
Value of oil extracted, real 
rubles pc 0.0311*** 
  
Dependent variable: new real investment in fixed public capital per capita  
VARIABLES
b) 
Fixed effects (1) 
c) 
Fixed effects (2) 
d) 
Pooled 
e) 
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[0.0117] 
  Value of gas extracted, real 
rubles pc -0.000401 
  
 
[0.00126] 
  Constant 
  
-1.028 
   
[12.71] 
    Observations 600 600 601 
R-squared 0.890 0.897 0.957 
Number of ob_id 76 76 
 First-stage F-test 13.34 9.070 
 First-stage F-test 9.520 12.57 
 Craig-Donald statistic 24.72 25.37 
  
Notes: 
f) Robust standard errors in brackets; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
g) Real GRP, per capita and Real revenue, per capita are endogenous. Excluded instruments are: paved 
roads as percentage of total length of roads a region, real value of paid services per capita and waste 
water generated per capita.  
h) A time trend variable is included. 
i) A full range of year dummies included but not shown in the table.  
j) A complete set of region dummies and year dummies included but not shown in the table.  
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Table C.1.2 
The determinants of new acquisition of fixed public capital in regions of Russia 
a) 
Dependent variable: new acquisition of fixed public capital (real rubles per capita)  
VARIABLES 
b) 
Fixed effects (1)
c) 
Fixed effects (2)
d) 
Pooled
e) 
Real GRP, pc -3.88e-05 -2.96e-06 -2.96e-06 
 
[7.41e-05] [6.08e-05] [5.56e-05] 
Real revenue, pc 0.397 0.219 0.219 
 
[0.362] [0.390] [0.357] 
Real transfer, pc -0.292*** -0.317*** -0.317*** 
 
[0.0606] [0.0432] [0.0395] 
Population below working 
age, pct 0.730 -0.0486 -0.0486 
 
[0.478] [0.367] [0.335] 
Population density -0.0291 0.0795 0.0795 
 
[0.403] [0.255] [0.233] 
Farmland, hectares per sq 
km area 0.000706 0.00102 0.00102 
 
[0.00205] [0.00181] [0.00166] 
Volume of goods transported 
via rail 0.00687*** 0.00578*** 0.00578*** 
 
[0.00248] [0.00205] [0.00188] 
Volume of goods transported 
via road -0.000138 -5.80e-05 -5.80e-05 
 
[0.000223] [0.000187] [0.000171] 
Car ownership -0.0232 -0.0240 -0.0240* 
 
[0.0167] [0.0158] [0.0144] 
Public enrolment, pct 0.00772 0.0358 0.0358 
 
[0.167] [0.111] [0.102] 
Hospital beds per 10,000 
population 0.0672 0.0777 0.0777 
 
[0.0472] [0.0528] [0.0483] 
Value of oil extracted, real 
dollars 
 
1.20e-05 1.20e-05 
  
[3.09e-05] [2.83e-05] 
Value of gas extracted, real 
dollars 
 
-6.92e-07 -6.92e-07 
  
[1.69e-06] [1.55e-06] 
Oil price, dollars 0.803*** 1.470 0.912*** 
 
[0.266] [1.323] [0.282] 
Gas price, dollars -0.178 0.851** 0.0565 
 
[0.118] [0.361] [0.147] 
Time trend 1.397** -5.392 0 
 
[0.623] [3.276] [0] 
Population (log) 10.30 
  
 
[17.58] 
  Urbanization, pct -0.144 
  
 
[0.116] 
  Value of oil extracted, real 
rubles pc 0.0458 
  
 
[0.0765] 
  Value of gas extracted, real 
rubles pc 0.00156 
  
 
[0.00387] 
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Constant 
  
-15.77 
   
[38.14] 
    Observations 588 588 588 
R-squared 0.663 0.719 0.960 
Number of ob_id 76 76 
 First-stage F-test 11 10.22 
 First-stage F-test 9.320 9.650 
 Criag-Donald statistic 1.780 4.452 
 Notes: 
f) Robust standard errors in brackets; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
g) Real GRP, per capita  and Real revenue, per capita  are endogenous. Excluded instruments are: paved 
roads as percentage of total length of roads a region, real value of paid services per capita and number of 
doctors per 10,000 population.  
h) A time trend variable is included. 
i) A full range of year dummies included but not shown in the table.  
j) A complete set of region dummies and year dummies included but not shown in the table.  
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Table C.1.3 
The determinants of investment in fixed public capital in regions of Russia 
a) 
 
Dependent variable: investment in fixed public capital per capita      
VARIABLES
b) 
Fixed effects 
c) 
Fixed effects 
d) 
Pooled 
e)  
        
Real revenue, pc 0.115*** 0.116*** 0.121*** 
 
[0.0173] [0.0172] [0.0147] 
rfixvalpc -0.00640*** -0.00711*** -0.00650*** 
 
[0.00206] [0.00230] [0.00113] 
Real transfer, pc -0.124*** -0.127*** -0.126*** 
 
[0.0265] [0.0260] [0.0227] 
Population below working age, pct 0.153 0.0623 -0.111 
 
[0.185] [0.187] [0.156] 
Population density 0.0547 0.0515 -0.0223 
 
[0.0904] [0.0912] [0.0631] 
Population (log) 3.197 2.320 2.009 
 
[5.133] [5.552] [4.068] 
Population growth rate 0.0495 0.0448 0.00714 
 
[0.0499] [0.0513] [0.0433] 
Farmland, hectares per sq km area 0.000502* 0.000323 0.000689** 
 
[0.000290] [0.000342] [0.000287] 
Volume of goods transported via rail 0.00174* 0.00159* 0.00210*** 
 
[0.000899] [0.000920] [0.000805] 
Urbanization, pct 0.0887*** 0.0754** 0.0397 
 
[0.0326] [0.0368] [0.0270] 
Volume of goods transported via road 0.000138 0.000180 5.24e-05 
 
[0.000118] [0.000128] [7.57e-05] 
Car ownership 0.00231 0.00141 0.00244 
 
[0.00325] [0.00333] [0.00316] 
bus_pass 8.07e-05 8.93e-05 1.53e-05 
 
[6.68e-05] [7.38e-05] [4.98e-05] 
Public enrolment, pct -0.0647 -0.0855* -0.0298 
 
[0.0410] [0.0436] [0.0322] 
Hospital beds per 10,000 population -0.00212 0.00256 0.00788* 
 
[0.00544] [0.00588] [0.00427] 
Value of oil extracted, real dollars 
  
-5.40e-07 
   
[1.38e-06] 
Value of gas extracted, real dollars 
  
8.03e-07*** 
   
[2.13e-07] 
Oil price, dollars 0.141 0.820 0.232 
 
[0.101] [0.504] [0.149] 
Gas price, dollars -0.0880** 0.190 -0.0447 
 
[0.0436] [0.127] [0.0522] 
Time trend 0.383 -2.196 0 
 
[0.250] [1.354] [0] 
Value of oil extracted, real rubles pc 0.000722 0.00123 
 
 
[0.00188] [0.00204] 
 Value of gas extracted, real rubles pc 0.000552** 0.000632** 
 
 
[0.000257] [0.000287] 
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Constant 
  
-20.14 
   
[35.23] 
    Observations 624 624 625 
R-squared 0.568 0.556 0.891 
Number of ob_id 79 79 
 First-stage F-test 19.88 19.43 
 First-stage F-test 14.07 14.14 
 Criag-Donald statistic 38.82 42.77 
 Notes: 
f) Robust standard errors in brackets; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
g) Real revenue, per capita  and real value of fixed capital, per capita  are endogenous. Excluded instruments 
are: paved roads as percentage of total length of roads a region, real value of paid services per capita, 
waste water generated per capita and residential area per capita.  
h) A time trend variable is included. 
i) A full range of year dummies included but not shown in the table.  
j) A complete set of region dummies and year dummies included but not shown in the table.  
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Table C.1.4 
The determinants of new acquisition of fixed public capital in regions of Russia 
a) 
Dependent variable: new acquisition of fixed public capital (real rubles per capita) 
VARIABLES
b) 
Fixed effects (1)
c) 
Fixed effects (2)
d) 
Pooled
e) 
        
Real revenue, pc -0.0686 -0.00208 -0.00208 
 
[0.257] [0.300] [0.274] 
Real value of fixed capital, pc 0.0374 0.0178 0.0178 
 
[0.0269] [0.0302] [0.0275] 
Real transfer, pc -0.318*** -0.323*** -0.323*** 
 
[0.0554] [0.0427] [0.0390] 
Population density -0.417 -0.0252 -0.0252 
 
[0.316] [0.318] [0.290] 
Population (log) 32.73 10.82 10.82 
 
[20.85] [24.49] [22.33] 
Population growth rate 0.436 0.646 0.646 
 
[0.574] [0.505] [0.460] 
Urbanization, pct -0.302 -0.274 -0.274* 
 
[0.220] [0.167] [0.152] 
Farmland, hectares per sq km area 0.00110 0.000801 0.000801 
 
[0.00106] [0.000915] [0.000834] 
Volume of goods transported via rail 0.00522** 0.00462** 0.00462** 
 
[0.00220] [0.00216] [0.00197] 
Volume of goods transported via road -0.000297 -3.03e-05 -3.03e-05 
 
[0.000236] [0.000239] [0.000218] 
Car ownership -0.0211 -0.0261* -0.0261* 
 
[0.0149] [0.0153] [0.0140] 
bus_pass 0.000817*** 0.000646*** 0.000646*** 
 
[0.000299] [0.000228] [0.000208] 
Public enrolment, pct 0.154 0.0770 0.0770 
 
[0.106] [0.0911] [0.0830] 
Hospital beds per 10,000 population 0.0496 0.0665 0.0665* 
 
[0.0362] [0.0409] [0.0373] 
Value of oil extracted, real dollars 
 
6.35e-07 6.35e-07 
  
[1.79e-05] [1.63e-05] 
Value of gas extracted, real dollars 
 
-1.03e-06 -1.03e-06 
  
[8.01e-07] [7.31e-07] 
Oil price, dollars 0.625*** 0.997 0.817*** 
 
[0.210] [1.541] [0.215] 
Gas price, dollars 0.0196 0.709 0.125* 
 
[0.146] [0.431] [0.0714] 
Time trend 0.301 -3.597 0 
 
[0.531] [4.664] [0] 
Value of oil extracted, real rubles pc -0.0143 
  
 
[0.0270] 
  Value of gas extracted, real rubles pc -0.00696 
  
 
[0.00687] 
  Constant 
  
-86.89 
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[168.5] 
    Observations 588 588 588 
R-squared 0.636 0.714 0.960 
Number of ob_id 76 76 
 First-stage F-test 10.51 8.390 
 First-stage F-test 10.59 9.890 
 Criag-Donald statistic 1.193 1.047 
  
Notes: 
f) Robust standard errors in brackets; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
g) Real revenue, per capita  and real value of fixed capital, per capita are endogenous. Excluded instruments 
are: paved roads as percentage of total length of roads a region, real value of paid services per capita, air 
pollution tons per 1000 real rubles of gross regional product and waste water generated per capita.   
h) A time trend variable is included. 
i) A full range of year dummies included but not shown in the table.  
j) A complete set of region dummies and year dummies included but not shown in the table.  
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Table C.1.5 
The determinants of investment in fixed public capital and total public expenditure in regions of Russia 
(using seemingly unrelated equations) 
a) 
  (1) (2) 
VARIABLES
b) 
qRfixrbpc
c) 
qRexprpc
d) 
      
Real revenue, pc 0.147*** 0.865*** 
 
[0.00519] [0.0848] 
Real GRP, pc -2.20e-05*** 5.38e-06 
 
[3.59e-06] [4.37e-05] 
Real transfer, pc -0.146*** 0.0457 
 
[0.00421] [0.0335] 
Population below working age, pct 0.0433 -0.221 
 
[0.0707] [0.459] 
Volume of goods transported via rail 0.00133** 
 
 
[0.000614] 
 Volume of goods transported via road -4.64e-05 
 
 
[4.34e-05] 
 Car ownership 0.00261 
 
 
[0.00198] 
 Population density -0.0771** 
 
 
[0.0326] 
 Population (log) 7.088*** 1.431 
 
[1.927] [11.60] 
Urbanization, pct 0.0319 0.0914 
 
[0.0221] [0.169] 
Farmland, hectares per sq km area 0.000520** 
 
 
[0.000228] 
 Public enrolment, pct -0.00251 0.128 
 
[0.0135] [0.0884] 
Hospital beds per 10,000 population 0.00330 
 
 
[0.00370] 
 Value of oil extracted, real rubles pc 0.0269*** -0.0160 
 
[0.00435] [0.0456] 
Value of gas extracted, real rubles pc -0.000451* -8.38e-05 
 
[0.000256] [0.00153] 
Time trend 0.114 0.0978 
 
[0.0702] [0.716] 
Burden of disease 
 
-0.00521 
  
[0.00574] 
Outpatient visits 
 
-0.0120 
  
[0.0205] 
Population growth rate 
 
0.0783 
  
[0.115] 
Unemployment rate 
 
0.0935 
  
[0.433] 
Average pension 
 
0.000534 
  
[0.00121] 
Population below subsistence, pct 
 
0.00144 
  
[0.0317] 
Constant -265.1* -206.5 
 
[144.5] [1,499] 
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   Observations 596 596 
R-squared 0.952 0.986 
Notes: 
e) Standard errors in brackets; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
f) Real GRP, per capita and real revenue, per capita are endogenous.   
g) Dependent variable: investment in fixed public capital, real rubles per capita. A time trend variable and 
full range of year and region dummies are included. The year and regions dummies not shown in the table.  
h) Dependent variable: subnational current public expenditure, real rubles per capita. A time trend variable 
and full range of year and region dummies are included. The year and regions dummies not shown in the 
table.  
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Table C.1.6 
The determinants of new acquisition of fixed public capital and total public expenditure in regions of Russia 
(using seemingly unrelated equations) 
a) 
  (1) (2) 
VARIABLES
b) 
qRfixrbpc
c) 
qRexprpc
d) 
Real revenue, pc 0.0414 0.791*** 
 
[0.280] [0.219] 
Real GRP, pc 0.000134 3.16e-05 
 
[8.18e-05] [3.94e-05] 
Real transfer, pc -0.399*** 0.0607** 
 
[0.0491] [0.0274] 
Population below working age, pct -0.433 -0.559 
 
[0.669] [0.422] 
Volume of goods transported via rail 0.0125*** 
 
 
[0.00365] 
 Volume of goods transported via road -0.000565** 
 
 
[0.000267] 
 Car ownership -0.0362*** 
 
 
[0.0124] 
 Population density -0.320 
 
 
[0.279] 
 Population (log) 9.146 2.351 
 
[14.50] [8.097] 
Urbanization, pct 0.205 0.167 
 
[0.163] [0.133] 
Farmland, hectares per sq km area 0.00270 
 
 
[0.00197] 
 Public enrolment, pct 0.297 0.0618 
 
[0.191] [0.124] 
Hospital beds per 10,000 population 0.0193 
 
 
[0.0275] 
 Value of oil extracted, real rubles pc -0.128 -0.0422 
 
[0.0839] [0.0406] 
Value of gas extracted, real rubles pc 0.00210 -0.000111 
 
[0.00142] [0.00125] 
Time trend 0.00541 -0.511 
 
[0.520] [0.426] 
Burden of disease 
 
-0.00215 
  
[0.00276] 
Outpatient visits 
 
-0.00915 
  
[0.00906] 
Population growth rate 
 
0.994** 
  
[0.416] 
Unemployment rate 
 
-0.0407 
  
[0.352] 
Average pension 
 
0.000706 
  
[0.00156] 
Population below subsistence, pct 
 
-0.0201 
  
[0.0215] 
Constant 0 1,026 
 
[0] [892.4] 
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Observations 583 583 
R-squared 0.932 0.989 
Notes: 
e) Standard errors in brackets; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
f) Real GRP, per capita and real revenue, per capita are endogenous.   
g) Dependent variable: new acquisition of fixed public capital, real rubles per capita. A time trend 
variable and full range of year and region dummies are included. The year and regions dummies 
not shown in the table.  
h) Dependent variable: subnational current public expenditure, real rubles per capita. A time trend 
variable and full range of year and region dummies are included. The year and regions dummies 
not shown in the table.  
  
 Appendix C.3  Average Treatment Effects: Matching & Propensity Score Estimation 
 
The application of the models is based on identification of treatment effects.  
 Identification of treatment effects  
The models specified above estimate treatment effects. Three types of treatment effects 
are relevant here although the DD estimators provide only the average treatment effect. The 
matching estimators on the other hand provides the  average treatment effects (ATE), average 
treatment effect on the treated (ATT) and average treatment effect on the control (ATC). For all 
the regions  ,         , theoretically all the regions in the population being exchangeable, 
              are the potential outcomes of investment in long lived public goods in region  . 
       is the outcome of region   when it not exposed to treatment and       is the treatment 
when it is exposed to the treatment namely reduction in resource rent tax share. Only one of the 
two outcomes is observable. Either the treatment is applied to a region or not. Depending upon 
the application, either        or       is observed. Out of the total regions,    are treated and    
are not treated and form the control group. The treatment is binary in application but varies in 
intensity for the treated regions. The average treatment effects are defined below
174
: 
    
                 
       
    
 
 
              
 
   
 
For the treated group of regions, the average treatment effect is
175
 
                                                          
174
 These definitions are based on Abadie and Imbens (2002) and Imbens (2004).   
175
 To simplify notation, I drop the subscript sample since I am interested in sample treatment effects.  
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for the control group of regions, the average treatment effect is 
     
 
  
              
  
     
 
where         denoates treatment received,         are the number of treated 
regions and and             are the number of control regions. 
Estimation uses the fact that only one of the potential outcomes is observed. Hence, the 
observed outcome for each region (after Imbens, 2004) is given by 
           
                         
                           
  
and estimates the unobserved outcome for each region in the data.  
The data comes from observational study instead of a randomized experiment. That is 
quite in the nature of many economic inquiries. The fact that data are not random introduces a 
concern about the identification of the estimates. We employ three estimation methods to invoke 
assumptions on the data to identify the treatment effects.  
Assumptions 
Before discussing the empirical models, we introduce five assumptions that apply to the 
data. The various empirical models are based on these assumptions: 
Assumption 1: Unconfoundedness 
                    
Where   is the treatment indicator,      . In other words, the potential outcomes are 
independent of the treatment conditional on the observed covariates. This is a standard 
assumption in such analysis. However, it has a component that the outcomes are independent of 
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the unobservables, which is too strong
176
. Nevertheless, conditional on the covariates, the 
outcome is independent of the treatment. We relax the unconfoundedness assumption later on.  
It has been argued that if the difference in the choice of treatment is based on the 
differences in unobserved that in turn are not correlated with the outcomes then 
unconfoundedness is a valid assumption when using observational data (Imbens and Wooldridge, 
2007). Now regions maximize social welfare approximated by a choice of investments in long 
lived public goods and current public goods while choosing tax rates (and shares). Here the 
objective of the region is different from the variable of interest of the outcome. The regions 
maximize social welfare while the outcome of interest is the investment in fixed capital. For the 
present, let‘s assume the shares and taxes are chosen by the regions.  
Let fixed capital investments in regions be            and investment is stochastic 
conditional on the covariates    and the individual specific error term   177. Each region 
maximizes social welfare denoted by a function that is a sum of long lived public goods and a 
reduction in the ratio between expenditure on long lived public goods and the total regional 
expenditure. The region chooses a the tax share (or rate) as available in the treatment W.  
                     
                                      
where    is an unobserved preference for long lived public good investments arising out 
of considerations like identity preservation or lower discount rates for utility of the future 
generations.  
Or 
                                
                                                          
176
 Imbens and Wooldrdige (2009), p.26 consider this to be controversial since this is equivalent to independence of 
the error term and   and refer to Imbens (2004) where  
177
 This characterization follows Imbens and Wooldridge (2007), p.8.  
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The preferences for long lived public goods are unobserved and they are uncorrelated to 
the error term otherwise influencing investment in fixed public capital. Due to this reason, the 
unconfoundedness assumption holds. This means that 
                     
Assumption 3: Common Support 
Following Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983),  
                      
In other words, the probability that the support of the conditional distribution of    given 
     has a complete overlap with the conditional distribution of    when    . The 
assumption that the probability of assignment to treatment is bounded away from 0 and 1 is 
necessary to create the common support in some of the matching estimators we employ for 
estimation.  
The combination of unconfoundedness and common support assumption are in 
accordance with Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983). When both inequalities in Assumption 2 hold, 
according to Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983), it implies strong ignorability. Because of strong 
ignorability, the average treatment effects for the sample and the population are identified as 
demonstrated by Imbens and Wooldridge (2009).  
The two assumptions are the same as in program evaluation using observational data. The 
following two additional assumptions are however, needed because of the specific nature of the 
data.  
Assumption 3’: Local effects of the outcome variable 
The outcome variable, real investment in fixed public capital, is a local public good. Its 
effects are excluded from other jurisdictions. The level of treatment received by one region does 
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not affect the outcomes in other regions. This assumption is equivalent to the Stable Unit 
Treatment Value Assumption (Rubin, 1978). This assumption is based on the notion that 
reduction is tax share of one region will not affect investment in another region
178
.  
Assumption 4: Exogenous covariates  
Covariates     are exgoneous and      are endogenous. The first class of covariates 
include some of the determinants of investment in long lived public goods as well control 
variables. However, all the determinants cannot be argued to be exogenous. In particular, real 
gross regional product and real public expenditure by the region are correlated with the error 
term for each region. They may very well be correlated across time for each region. This is 
plausible since in general gross regional product and public expenditure are serially correlated.  
Assumption 5: Valid instruments  
A set of variables    exists that fulfill the exclusion restriction and are valid instruments 
for    . This assumption is made here to employ an estimation method. In the analysis this is 
validated as well.  
Given strong igonarability (Assumptions 1 and 2), the average treatment effects are 
identified. If unconfoundedness and common support assumptions are weakened as below, the 
average treatment effect on the treated is still identified (Heckman, Ichimura and Todd, 1997): 
Assumption 1’: Weak unconfoundedness 
          
Another version of this assumption is due to Imbens (2000), which is useful for 
estimation of the average effects of multi-valued treatment. It is stated as 
Assumption 1’’: Weak unconfoundedness with multi-valued treatment 
                                                          
178
 Heckman et al. (1999) provide evidence from simulations that violation of this assumption may lead to bias in 
estimates.  
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Assignment to multi-valued treatment is weakly unconfounded given the covariates, if 
                            
Assumption 2’: Weak common support 
                
In equations (1), (2), (3) and (4), the coefficients listed below have the meanings 
described here: 
         = average value of outcome in control group is pretreatment period 
         = difference between the averge value of outcome in the control group in post-
treatment period and the same group in the pretreatment period 
         = difference between the average value of outcome in the treatment group in the 
pretreatment time period and the control group in the pretreatment time period  
         = difference between the difference in the average value of outcome in the 
treatment group in post-treatment period and control group in post-treatment period and the 
average value of the treatment group in the pretreatment time period and control group in the 
pretreatment time period.  
In the above model,     provides an estimate of the average treatment effect. Employing, 
instrumental variables, this model is estimated as a fixed effect model including the complete 
vector of year dummies. Under certain assumptions, Murtazashvilli and Wooldridge (2008) show 
that the fixed effect instrumental variable estimator is consistent
179
. The linear estimation model 
                                                          
179
 Another application of IV model to estimate treatment effects is provided by Chernozhukov and Hansen (2005) 
for quintile treatment effects; Hoderline et al. (2009) show that average effects are identified in the presence of 
explanatory variables that are correlated with the error term.  
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is plausible as the normalized differences between covariates by treatment status generally do not 
exceed one quarter
180
.  
 
  
                                                          
180
 This rule of thumb is provided in Imbens and Wooldridge (2009), p.24 quoting Imbens and Rubin (forthcoming).  
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I. Average Treatment Effects on Gross Investment in Fixed Public 
Capital 
Matching on value of stock of fixed capital, real GRP per capita, real public expenditure 
per capita, real transfers per capita, population below working age, population density and 
volume of goods transported via rail. The observations for both the pre-treatment years and the 
corresponding year of observation on all variables were used. Matching was required for 4 
observations. The same number was used for robustness. The estimates were bias adjusted.   
Table C.3.1 Matching Estimators 
[acquisition of fixed capital, per capita, by subnational governments is the dependent 
variable] 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
VARIABLES 2002 2002 2002 2003 2003 2003 2004 2004 2004 
                    
SATE -1.106*** 
  
-
1.734*** 
  
-1.433** 
  
 
[0.000709] 
  
[5.52e-
07] 
  
[0.0412] 
  
SATT 
 
-
3.455*** 
  
-
4.017*** 
  
-0.778 
 
  
[0] 
  
[0] 
  
[0.249] 
 SATC 
  
0.739*** 
  
0.223 
  
-1.966* 
   
[0.00478] 
  
[0.460] 
  
[0.0589] 
          Observations 75 75 75 78 78 78 78 78 78 
           
  (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) 
VARIABLES 2005 2005 2005 2006 2006 2006 2007 2007 2007 
                    
SATE 1.542 
  
-
5.165*** 
  
-
11.02*** 
  
 
[0.159] 
  
[6.59e-
08] 
  
[0] 
  
SATT 
 
4.854*** 
  
-
12.94*** 
  
-
18.16*** 
 
  
[0.00843] 
  
[0] 
  
[0] 
 
SATC 
  
-1.286 
  
1.284* 
  
-
5.374*** 
   
[0.212] 
  
[0.0606] 
  
[2.10e-
06] 
          Observations 76 76 76 75 75 75 77 77 77 
                   Notes 
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a) ATE, ATT and ATC are separately estimated using 4 matches, bias adjustment for all variables and 8 
matches for standard error estimation.  Variable list for matching: real value of fixed capital pc 
population below working age population density tonnage public expenditure pc transfer pc real GRP 
pc (values in 2000 and 2001) and contemporaneous real values of fixed capital pc, urbanization pct., 
farmland, hectares, population below working age, population density, tonnage, public expenditure pc, 
transfer pc, and real GRP. The dependent variable is acquisition of ownership of fixed public capital in 
each year.  
b) Robust standard errors in brackets 
c) *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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II. Propensity Score Matching Method 
 
Table C.3.2 
Propensity Score Adjustment 
a) 
Matching method 
Number of 
treated
b) 
 
Number of 
controls
b) 
ATT Std. Err. t 
       Nearest neighborhood (equal 
weights)  246 
 
144 -0.542 0.840 -0.645 
       Random draw  246 
 
144 -0.542 0.605 -0.897 
       
       Notes: 
a) The propensity score was computed using  real value of fixed capital pc, regional gross product 
pc‘, revenue pc, transfer pc, population below working age, population density,  public bus 
passengers, car ownership, road transported goods, volume, public schools enrolment pct., 
outpatient visits and time dummy.  
b) The numbers of treated and controls refer to actual nearest neighbor matches. 
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